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This research focuses on the experiences of migrants who have ‘returned’ to the Kurdish 
regions of Iraq from neighbouring countries and Europe. It addresses key issues in the field 
of Refugee Studies, including concepts of return, understandings of home and negotiations of 
identity and belonging among second generation Iraqi Kurdish returnees. Scholars and 
researchers have often used these terms loosely and sometimes interchangeably: critical 
analysis informed by this research suggests that they are related but are also distinct and 
specific. The second-generation Iraqi Kurds taking part in the study belong to the generation 
of migrants who were born in diaspora countries or moved to diaspora in their early 
childhood from the region of Iraqi Kurdistan. These second-generation migrants have a 
different understanding of ‘home’ to their parents. Their upbringing in diaspora countries and 
transnational links to ‘homeland’ create a tension between their constructions of ‘home’ and 
‘belonging’.  
The empirical data for this study is based upon an in-depth qualitative study of the 
experiences of 20 Iraqi Kurd returnees in Kurdistan, most of whom were neither born nor 
grew up in the KRG region, and had little or no previous experience of their ‘homeland’. 
Interview themes involved home, transnational ties and attachments, identity and belonging. I 
propose that second-generation migrants are motivated to ‘return’ because of a strong sense 
of belonging and a need for identity in relation to a familial and/or ancestral ‘home’. 
Analysing in detail the life-narratives of second-generation returnees, the research identifies 
multifaceted perspectives in which notions of ‘return’, ‘home’, ‘identity’ and ‘belonging’ are 
relevant in recent Kurdish experience. It proposes that diasporic links and networks, and 
earlier experiences outside the KRG, play a key role in shaping aspirations, expectations and 
experiences in Kurdistan. 
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The findings from this research suggest that the factors motivating Kurdish returnee 
migration back to Kurdistan are sophisticated. Certainly, the analysis of my data indicates 
that for the second generation who have taken the decision to return to KRG region, this 
migration is facilitated through the social relationships and resources which are generated and 
sustained through their family networks. It is these family networks which make the 
difference between the dream or intention to return and the actual reality of doing so. The 
findings explain that family narratives are vital factors of the second generation’s ‘home’ 
constructions. However, the return experiences show that their ‘imagined home’ and ‘reality’ 
do not always match. The KRG region, more often referred to as homeland, is very central in 
respondents’ narratives. What is most noticeable for the second-generation Iraqi Kurds is that 
while homeland is very significant for them, no given homeland exists. The homeland is 
therefore an ambiguous, vague and ambivalent conception. It is mostly about a subjective 
feeling and individual and political constructions based on lived experiences, collective 
memory and history and political discourses. For them ‘home’ is a space that exceeds several 
territorial borders and several nation-states. The meaning of identity, home(land) and 
belonging for second-generation Iraqi Kurds is more situational, ambivalent and flexible.  
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Around the world, migrants and refugees have been moving from one nation to another 
driven by different dreams and aspirations (Portes & Rumbaut, 2005). The understanding 
about the movement across and beyond national borders has become very clear, but the 
meaning of ‘home’ has become vague and unclear. As Christou states, ‘migration, is a 
phenomenon which has brought about unprecedented changes not only in the movement of 
peoples but also in their identifications which, although negotiable, are at the same time 
intimately and ultimately connected to the notion of place’ (Christou, 2003).   
Research in migration studies is often involved with one of two themes – “either a 
country of origin focus (what causes people to migrate and the impact of population loss on 
the ‘homeland’) or a receiving country focus (the process of adaptation that migrants undergo 
in the new country). In addition to this spatial dichotomy in approach, there is also an 
‘either/or’ assumption about the temporal dimension of migrant experience: either they are 
permanent residents and potential future citizens, at some stage in the (linear) process of 
assimilation, or they are temporary sojourners who do not prioritise assimilation, as their goal 
is to return to their country of origin” (Oeppen 2009). 
“The first significant numbers of Kurds to out-migrate were mainly young men who 
fled the 1975 collapse of the Kurdish rebellion against the central government in which many 
of their peers perished. Most settled in neighbouring countries, Europe and the United States. 
Their was probably the last generation of Iraqi Kurdish out-migrants to experience a thorough 
rupture from their past that was sustained by Iraq’s ongoing political unrest, totalitarianism, 
and relatively sealed borders. This changed dramatically in 1991 when the Kurdish region of 
Iraq became functionally independent from Baghdad” (King 2013). 
 Between 1991-2003, despite organising the first independent election to form the first 
parliament and electing the first KRG government in 1992, Iraqi Kurds – mainly youngsters 
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and also families – started to flee from their region. One can summarise the reasons for 
leaving as: financial crisis after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces in October 1991 left the local 
government in a difficult position, inability of the locally elected government to pay salaries, 
lack of people’s trust in the Kurdish government, fear of Saddam’s return, and finally, the 
internal fighting between the main two parties the KDP and the PUK (Fareed Asasard 2006). 
Therefore, in order to understand the meaning of home for Iraqi Kurds, it is important to 
understand the context within which the decision to leave and to return was made, which is 
closely affiliated to the history of the country.  
Iraq is a state profoundly affected by displacement (Philip 2011). Insecurity and 
violence have been seen as major reasons for displacement since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
when Kurds allied with the international community to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. 
For Kurds, the liberation of Iraq was a real opportunity to assure their own rights in the Iraqi 
constitution. It was the first real moment to participate in building a new democratic Iraq 
through which the Kurds could guarantee their role in ruling Iraq, their share in the economy, 
and a solution to the unsettled border territories like Kirkuk (Fathil Mirani 2013).   
After the fall of the Ba’athist regime and the invasion in 2003, the number of exiled 
families deciding to return to Iraqi Kurdistan increased from dozens to hundreds and 
continued to increase (Martina, 2007). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) estimates that more than four million Iraqis were displaced by the war in Iraq. 
Two million found asylum in neighbouring countries like Syria and Jordan, smaller numbers 
fled to Egypt, Iran, Lebanon and Turkey (Riller, 2009). There are no official figures about the 
Kurdish population in the West since they are registered as citizens of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and 
Syria. Yet, the Kurdish diaspora in the West is estimated to exceed one million immigrants 
(Hassanpour & Mojab 2005).  
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Therefore, it is important to find out what motivate the second-generation Iraqi-Kurd 
returnees, born and/or grow up in diaspora courtiers, to reurn to Kurdistan Iraq where in the 
past, many Kurds were forced to seek refuge in European countries and neighbouring 
countries as a result of war and ethnic prosecution by the Iraqi governments. 
Regime change in Iraq opened the door to the return of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the majority of whom were expelled from 
areas in northern Iraq (Romano and Gurses 2014). The Kurds in northern Iraq became 
functionally independent from Bagdad and achieved de facto autonomy by creating their own 
government in the north – the area controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).  
This project seeks to address a lacuna in research on the second generation’s 
connections to the ancestral homeland, mobilizing migrants’ strategic positionality with 
respect to questions of home and identity.  
The words “return” and “home” need to be contextualised, as some of the second-
generation Iraqi Kurd returnees were born in dispora and indeed do not “return” to their 
homeland but move to their parental homeland where they have not previously lived but have 
a strong emotional and political affiliation and attachment to it (Keles 2016).  
My study will examine the return home of the Iraqi Kurdish second-generation from 
different diaspora countries. My study examines the return to Kurdistan of the second 
generation with Iraqi-Kurdish parentage, and explores their complex and ambivalent 
identities, views of ‘home’ and search for ‘belonging’ in the ancestral homeland. In many 
ways, the conflict in Kurdistan has been a conflict over the meaning of home.  
The aim of my research is to obtain accurate information about the life experiences 
and attitudes to return of second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning from Europe and 
neighboring countries.  
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I explore narratives of life in diaspora countries as a constitutive element of a Kurdish 
diasporic imaginary in the homeland itself in addition to in the diaspora countries. While 
abroad, some migrants and refugees produce children who are referred to as second-
generation migrants (Hollifield, 2004). The term second-generation, in the context of this 
study, refers to people who were born outside their native parents’ country and have stayed 
abroad and are perhaps considering returning ‘home’ (Christou, 2006; Ali, 2011). After living 
away from their parents’ homes, second-generation migrants and refugees may feel an urge 
to trace their cultural roots for a variety of reasons, such as psychological satisfaction and 
knowledge of their history (Favell 2008). For second-generation migrants and refugees, a 
sense of belonging strengthens their perseverance to return home and to reconnect with their 
communities. By extension, if second-generation migrants feel they belong, there is a sense 
of ‘homeness’, whereas if the opposite is perceived, the person feels ‘homeless’. Generally, 
when a person belongs, there is a strong sense of identity (Ali, 2011). Therefore, belonging 
creates some psychological harmony between the second-generation migrant and refugees 
with their environment. Some scholars contend that the term ‘home’ is synonymous to 
‘belonging’, but this depends on the circumstances of the second-generation migrant or 
refugee (Hedetoft, 2002). With this explanation, the common belief that ‘home is where we 
belong’ should not be taken at face value, but analyzed further according to the plight of 
second-generation migrants and refugees (Christou, 2004).  
My research examines the experience of second-generation refugees returning to the 
territories of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) from various locations within the 
Kurdish diaspora.  
It is based upon a qualitative study of the experiences of 20 young people, many of 
whom were neither born nor grew up in KRG region, and have little or no experience of 
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living in their ‘homeland’. Iraqi Kurdistan is seen as a ‘homeland’ for a significant number of 
Kurdish people living throughout the West and in countries neighboring Iraq.  
However, for second-generation Iraqi Kurdish returnees, returning to one’s 
‘homeland’ does not necessarily mean ‘return’, because the majority of them have grown up 
in diaspora country or left the Iraq in a very young age of their life without ever having and 
experienced life in KRG region. 
The return of second-generation Iraqi Kurds from diaspora countries can be seen as an 
advantage for the country rebuilding its communities from the grassroots. Some of the 
returnee participants interviewed in this study were found to be covering important shortages 
in state and private sectors. Many participants, especially those returning from European 
countries, reported that they had acquired new skills while they were living in the diaspora. 
Even among those who returned from neighbouring countries, it was noted that they acquired 
a better understanding of employment. Changes were observed in the level of skills, both 
among returnees from Europe and from neighbouring countries.  
Interestingly, highly educated Iraqi Kurdish returnees from Europe seem to be more 
likely to make a sustained contribution to KRG’s development, as evidenced by that fact that 
those interviewed for this research who were returning from European countries were better 
able to settle in the KRG region than those from neighbouring countries. Moreover, Iraqi 
Kurdish returnees from European countries are usually considered less economically 
vulnerable than those who returned from neighbouring countries, because of the education 
and skills they were able to acquire as well as the financial savings some could accrue. 
Through a combination of push and pull factors the decision has been made by 
second-generation Iraqi Kurds from diaspora countries to return to their ‘homeland’, and 
while meeting the physical needs of this group is high on the agenda of the KRG government 
wanting to bring young Iraqi Kurds home, their psychosocial needs – while much less visible 
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– are possibly no less crucial to their successful and permanent return. Differing from two 
other studies (Alinia and Eliassi 2014) that look at older and younger ‘generations’ of the 
Kurdish diaspora living in Sweden, my research focuses on conceptions of Kurdish identity, 
home(land) and belonging among the Iraqi Kurdish second generation. 
According to (Alinia and Eliassi 2014) there is a distinction between the younger and 
older generation in terms of their relationship to homeland and their perceptions to home. 
Generally, it can be said that “homeland for the older generation is something real, a physical 
place from which they have lived experiences and to which they have real and material 
bonds. For the younger generation, on the contrary, homeland is imaginary, something they 
‘create’ according to their wishes and needs. For the older generation, homeland is connected 
to their experiences and memories from the past and means a continuation of their identities” 
(Alinia and Eliassi 2014). 
Taylor develops a slightly different understanding of the meaning of home. She 
focuses on four key aspects of home - the spatial, temporal, material and relational - to reveal 
that ‘home for the refugee is complex, multiple and in process’ (Taylor 2009). Taylor states 
in her research that: ‘What the refugee loses when they are displaced is not only the physical 
property of the spatial home; but also, the networks and social capital of the relational home; 
the framed memories, repetitions of daily life and future potential of the temporal home; as 
well as the tastes, scents and embodied experience of the material home’ (Taylor 2009:1).  
Returnees have life experiences in both countries; they retrospectively evaluate their 
new lives in their new homes, comparing and contrasting the two countries, remembering 
their romanticized ideas or their childhood memories of homelands they had never lived in 
before (Kilinc 2014). The processes of ‘becoming’ and the transformation of ‘home’ also 
prove that identities are in flux and the feeling of ‘belonging’ is a journey with pauses, 
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sometimes receding, sometimes proceeding, collecting the new and the old and constantly 
renegotiating the self in the light of new circumstances.  
“A key element is missing from the existing theories and literature on return 
migration which do not consider the political dimension of the return of geographically 
displaced Diasporas and the descendants such as the Kurds, Tamils and other stateless 
Diasporas who have developed a strong diasporic consciousness in their settlement countries 
towards their imagined homeland beyond economic concerns, they claim a legitimate 
belonging and desire to return to an imagined homeland whilst residing in another country” 
(Keles 2016:9). 
Second-generation’s Iraqi Kurd’s sense of belonging and attachment to their parent’s 
home country is intergenerational and demonstrated in the transnational activities, fund-
raising for homeland and sending remittances as well as returning to their homeland at some 
point to play a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction and consolidate the process of the 
institutionalization of the nation building project to which they have transnationally have 
contributed in diaspora. In this sense, the “return” migration of second-generation Iraqi Kurd 
returnees with diasporic backgrounds to a post-conflict region has been the subject of limited 
scholarly work. The aim of this report is to fill in this research gap.   This research will focus 
on the motivations of second-generation Iraqi Kurds for the ‘return’ to their parental 
homeland and the discourse of belonging and how they build transnational networks.  
One of the key findings of my research demonstrate that the second generation’s 
decision to return is enhanced through the social relationships and resources which are 
obtained through their family connections. The second-generation’s feeling of belonging to 
their homeland is not just a bond with their territorial place but is often based on a sense of 
attachment to the relatives and friends, personal and collective memories, language, and 
cultural products and practices. 
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1.1 Research Context  
The second-generation return migration phenomenon has become very widely researched in 
recent years (King and Kılınc 2014). Research has been conducted on the English-speaking 
Caribbean (Phillips & Potter 2009; Potter 2005; Reynolds 2011), India (Jain 2013) and 
several southern European countries including Portugal (Sardinha 2011), Italy (Wessendorf 
2007), Greece (King et al. 2010) and Cyprus (Teerling 2011). However, my purpose for this 
research on second generation Iraqi Kurds is not just to add another case-study. Rather, what 
it is interesting is that it almost no research has been published on second generation Iraqi 
Kurds returning from Europe and neighboring countries to the KRG region.   
Although there is some academic work on first generation Iraqi Kurdish refugees and 
a wide range of research about other groups of first- and second-generation refugees in other 
countries, there is a gap in research on Iraqi Kurdish returnees to the KRG region. The study 
of returnees has been an under-explored field of migration research more generally. Scholars 
usually examine the immigrant group’s lives, expectations and integration/assimilation 
processes in the host country (Kilinc, 2014). Therefore, my research aims to contribute to 
return migration studies in general and also to the specific case of second-generation Iraqi 
Kurds returning to the KRG region. 
My study is new in terms of the second movement of Iraqi Kurdish second- 
generation returning from the diaspora to their home country, a country whose structures 
have been changed since 1991. There has been little sustained research on Iraqi Kurds 
second-generation returnees. I anticipate that the project will make a contribution to literature 
on the refugee experience, on “return”, home and identity, and to understanding of processes 
of rapid change now taking place in the KRG. 
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Different phases of the second-generation Iraqi refugees are investigated in my 
research: 
 the reason for return, and their experiences in the parental homeland of KRG, 
belonging and identity. The first and second research questions are about the images of the 
‘homeland’ created by second-generation returnees and the factors, that encouraging the 
second generation’s decision to return. 
These questions aim to explore constructions of home and belonging through the 
participants’ Kurdish upbringing in diaspora countries and their childhood memories from the 
homeland. The third research question aims to explore how the second generation adjusts 
constructions of home and their belongingness once they return to their parental homeland, as 
well as their gendered-self. These questions try to make a connection between past and 
present; how these diasporic and transnational experiences shaped the return migration 
project and what kind of ‘counter-diasporic' experiences they had in the parental homeland 
(cf. King and Christou 2010).  
 
1.2 The term ‘second-generation’  
From the outset of my thesis I acknowledge that the term ‘second generation’, is rather 
complex and is actually a contradiction in itself, particularly in the context of my study. A 
fundamental part of the research on the ‘second generations’ emphasizes the complex issues 
of home, identity and belonging. In terms of ‘second generation’ the term ‘return’ is vague, 
as it is not a return in terms of birth-place, but rather an emigration to another country 
(Christou 2006c: 15). Furthermore, the term ‘generation’ has been debated in other 
researches (for example, Kertzer 1983). Kertzer conceptualises ‘generations’ using four 
principles: ‘generation as a principle of kinship descent; generation as cohort; generation as 
life stage; and generation as historical period’ (Kertzer 1983:126).  
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In the context of my research the term ‘generation’ is mainly understood as kinship descent, a 
genealogical aspect related to the family (parents and their children).  
Hence, the first generation are Iraqi Kurds born in Iraq who emigrated to Europe and 
neighboring countries, whilst the second generation are the Iraqi Kurds born in Europe and 
neighboring countries who arrived in the diaspora before the age of five years old.   
Kilinc indicates in her research that the term second generation refers to the children 
of ‘first generation’ immigrants, who are born in the host country of their parent’s 
immigration. Most of the time, they do not have any connections to their parents’ country 
except vague memories of their relatives and neighbours from summer holidays and short 
visits. Therefore, the second generation imagines a ‘homeland’ that is constructed through 
familial stories and nostalgia (Kilinc 2013). In the framework of my research the ‘second 
generation’ refers to kinship descent; connecting the children of the first-generation Iraqi 
Kurds immigrants into this research as ‘second generation’. The following paragraphs will 
discussion the concept of ‘second generation’. 
Other researchers, who investigate immigrant groups in the USA came up with some 
definitions for the concept of ‘second generation’, but their definitions are not detailed 
enough and often inadequate. Portes and Zhou (1993:75) outline second- generation as 
‘native-born children with at least one foreign-born parent or children born abroad who came 
to the United States before the age of 12’. The explanations are equally vague in European 
research of the second generation. However, ‘the strict or “classic” definition of the second 
generation is that it is made up of children born in the host country to two immigrant parents, 
the latter being the first generation’ (King and Christou 2008: 5).  
Most studies which focus on the second generation are about their 
integration/assimilation in the host society: the expectation is that they will adapt better than 
their parents and make greater progress than their parents in education and employment 
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(Thomson and Crul 2007; Kilinc 2014). Until recently, there was little or no expectation that 
they would return to the country of origin of their parents, although there is now a small, 
growing, and distinctive literature on second-generation or counter-diasporic return migration 
(Wessendorf 2007; King and Christou 2010; Oso 2011; Sardinha 2011; Teerling 2011). 
Researches on the Iraqi Kurd second-generation returnees are still lacking. 
What is common among the studies on second generation returnees is their approach 
to generation from the perspective of migration experience and in addition to belonging to the 
same age cohort. Indeed, migration literature is replete with references to the ‘first’, ‘second’, 
and ‘third’ generation (of migrants), with the first term referring to individuals who migrated 
as adults, the second to individuals born to migrant parents in the society of settlement, and 
the third to their descendants (Rumbaut 2004). However, the self-contradictory term ‘second-
generation migrant’ needs to be approached critically on account of its implicit assumptions 
as to (national) origins, ‘nativeness’, and relations of (non-)belonging (Kilinc: 2014). Kilinc 
has employed the term ‘generation in-between’ in her research on young Turkish second 
generation returning to Turkey from Germany. She has stated that the term second generation 
refers to individuals who share the experience of migration having taken place in their 
childhood and early teenage years (Kilinc: 2014). More specifically, Levitt suggests that “the 
‘second generation’ are often raised in settings in which the homeland is referenced daily – 
ideologically, materially, and affectively. She also considers the members of the ‘second 
generation’ to be ‘socialized directly and indirectly into the asymmetries and disjunctures 
inherent in the transnational social field and […] part of the cast of characters who resolve 






1.3 Research Questions 
"! In what way are images of the ‘homeland’ created by second-generation returnees? 
"! What are the factors encouraging the second generation’s decision to return? 
"! How do second-generation returnees react to the potential discovery that the ‘pure’ 
Kurdistan of their received memory (from parents’ stories, holiday visits etc.) is different in 
reality?  
"! How does the second generation’s return affect the meaning and boundaries of their 
‘identities’: their sense of ‘who they are’ and where or what ‘home’ is? 
"! How are the returnees’ narratives of home and ‘belonging’ shaped or influenced by 
externally scripted views of home?   
 
1.4 Research Background  
My interest in researching Iraqi Kurdish migration stems from my family background and 
academic studies. I was born in Sulaimani and was 16 years old when I arrived with my 
family to Germany. In early 1996, my family went into exile and ended up in Germany. We 
started a new life, a life away from our homeland. We did not get into a refugee camp 
because my father arrived in Germany before us. First of all, I had to learn German – a new 
and a difficult language – with no previous experience. Secondly, as a teenager I had to 
integrate into a new society and a totally different culture – a struggle which was not easy at 
all. I was conflicted between keeping some of my traditional customs and social behaviours 
and adapting to those of the host country. Finally, I had to adjust to a new educational 
system, and to find my way through this system to achieve my aims, goals, and objectives. 
Describing my situation brings me back to a time of suffering which all immigrants went 
through. 
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I studied for a BA in Social Science at Humbouldt University in Berlin/Germany from 
2001-2004. I then completed an MA in Refugee Studies at the University of East London in 
September 2008. My dissertation looked at the deportation of Iraqi Kurdish refugees in the 
United Kingdom.  
I returned to Kurdistan twice, once after about 14 years when I graduated from high 
school. For summer holidays we visited Kurdistan. In 2004, after I graduated from university, 
I returned to see if it was possible for me to come back and live in Kurdistan. I did not stay 
for the whole year, but I stayed for more than one month. I visited the university. I spoke with 
my old friends and relatives.  
In 2009, I came to the decision that I needed an academic background in social 
science. After coming to the UK, I always thought about a suitable time for return. In late 
2010, I decided to return to Kurdistan.  
The reason behind my return was that I always want to be involved in making 
changes in a place, not being in a place where my existence does not bring much to the table. 
I thought that if I stayed in Europe, I would not have any influence since there were 
thousands of professional academics likes me. When I returned, I started teaching in the 
University of Sulaimani. Teaching and working with my colleagues was both beneficial and 
enjoyable. It was a particularly good time for Iraqi/Kurdistan. Many families had decided to 
return to the KRG region and many more were already living in the region. Some time later, I 
decided to base my PhD on ‘return’ to the KRG region. I took an exam to win a scholarship 
from the Ministry of Higher Education in the KRG region and passed the exam.  
Migration and displacement have been a part of my immediate and extended family’s 
history. I have always had a great interest in refugee and migration-related matters and the 
personal stories of those involved, which led me to embark on academic and professional 
career.  
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Being familiar with life in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and neighboring 
countries, and having experienced life among ‘divided’ populations, this research project on 
second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning to the KRG region produced the ideal opportunity 
for me to further explore these important and current issues in the field of migration and 
refugee studies.  
I am myself part of the 1.5-generation of Iraqi Kurd in the diaspora. As stated earlier, I was 
born in Sulaimania/Iraq in 1978 where I spent the first sixteen years of my life. I was just two 
years old when the Iran/Iraq war started in 1980. That was the end of my childhood as I knew 
it because of all the wars and political complications in the area. 1996 we were to seek 
asylum in Germany. I lived in Berlin with my family.  
All of this happened about twenty-two years ago, which means that I have now spent more 
than half of my life outside my native country. Berlin became my permanent home while 
Sulaymaniyah belonged to the past. Several years have passed and despite the fact that I can 
speak German fluantly, I am always being asked where I am from. This has made me 
question where my home really is and where I belong; this struggle to belong despite 
successfully integrating (at least linguistically, among other things) ignited my interest in the 
issue of identity and belonging. Although sociologically significant, these issues have for a 
long time been also at the heart of my life journey. 
I am providing these parts of my life story here because there is no denying that my interest 
in the issue of identity formation a result of my own daily experiences and struggles. I am 
aware of the fact that exploring one’s own experience has the potential to create some 
ambiguities, but this reflexive awareness combined with having lived the issues at hand will 






1.5 Summary of the Thesis structure  
Chapter 1: This chapter introduces the thesis. In this chapter I demonstrate my research aims 
and objectives. 
Chapter 2: This chapter provides a brief overview of the political history of Kurdistan in 
general and Iraqi Kurdistan in particular. Furthermore, this chapter states the refugee 
background of the Iraqi Kurdish population, with special attention being paid to second-
generation Iraqi Kurdish returnees.  
Chapter 3: This presents the experiences of second-generation returnees born in exile, 
returning to the ‘home’ country of their parents, where they have never lived. Moreover it 
explores the decision-making strategies of second-generation returnees making the decision 
to return back homes, who was involved in such choices and how they perceive the process 
of returning ‘home’. The study adopts theories of social and cultural capital to examine its 
role in shaping the second-generations returnees experiences of returning. As research on 
some of these topics is rather limited, I try to add further insights by interweaving some of 
my own empirical material, which I collected during fieldwork in the KRG region.  
Chapter 4: This introduces the methodological and ethical perspectives and context in which 
the research was conducted, analysed and written up. It provides an in-depth explanation and 
assessment of the research design and methods of data collection. In this chapter, the 
disclosure and explanation of the narrative methodology have been presented. Additionally, 
the use of snowballing as the sampling technique when an inadequate sample was 
unreachable was also justified. This chapter are then followed by the significant chapter that 
make up the important part of my thesis: the ‘findings or results’ chapters.  
Chapter 5: In this chapter I present the results of the narratives in relation to the thematic 
factors that cause the second generation Iraqi Kurds to return to Kurdistan.  
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It shows that family and social relations, political, hostility and discrimination in settlement 
countries, nationalism and patriotism and the interaction between these factors motivate the 
decision to return. It looks at the meaning of home and belonging of second-generation Iraqi 
Kurd returnees. To trace the process through which the notions of ‘belonging’ and ‘home’ are 
constructed, this research section reflects three main memory types that feature in the 
theoretical overview outlined by Erll (2011), Assman and Czaplicka (1995). 
Chapter 6: This is the concluding chapter. This chapter revises the research questions and 
makes comparisons with other research on second-generation return and re-evaluates my 







2. History of Iraqi Kurdistan 
2.1 Kurdish History 
Iraqi Kurdistan is at a momentous crossroads in terms of its political development. Painting a 
picture of 25 centuries of Iraqi Kurdistan’s history in one chapter is an impossible task. 
Therefore, this introduction will merely highlight major landmarks and facts likely to help in 
understanding the present reality. The political situation of Iraqi Kurdistan is often said to be 
unique. Some aspects of it are, but others have corollaries elsewhere, and it is possibly more 
correct to say that the situation is anomalous. For example, Iraqi Kurdistan remains 
unrecognized as a state by the international community, yet it possesses a domestic political 
system which displays highly developed and increasingly sophisticated state-like institutions, 
attributes and characteristics. 
Kurdistan is a region of mountains and plateaus bordering Turkey, Syria, Iran and 
Iraq (Askari 2013); mostly inhabited by Sunni Muslims. Most Kurds, who are a group of 
individuals whose language is associated with Western Iran, inhabit the Kurdistan region 
(Askari 2013). Kurds largely lived a nomadic lifestyle and are currently considered one of the 
largest ethnic communities lacking their own state (King 2013). Before the First World War, 
the Kurds were spread in areas currently covered by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenia; 
which were still under the Ottoman Empire (Barbir and Hathaway 2014).  Their main 
livestock included sheep and goats, which they herded throughout the plains of Mesopotamia, 
the Turkish, and Iranian islands (Barbir and Hathaway 2014).  
Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, which led to the formation of new 
states, the Kurds abandoned their traditional lifestyles and seasonal movements, mainly 
because they were not free to cross borders into different states without permissions 
(McDowall 2004). Subsequently, due to restrictions on border movements, Kurds embraced a 
market economy (McDowall 2004). 
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Evidence points to Central Asia as the ethnic origin of the Kurds, which connects 
them closely with Iran (Muys 2010). An estimated 15 to 20 million Kurds live in regions 
covering parts of Armenia, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran (Sharp 2011). In order to overcome many 
years of subjugation, they have tried to establish an independent state for themselves, but 
each time they try to do so the governments of the regions in which they reside have crushed 
their uprisings (Russell 2014). This chapter focuses on Saddam Hussein’s al-Anfal 
campaigns against the Kurdish population, the displacement of Kurds, the Halabja massacre, 
which saw the death of thousands of Kurds, the major political organizations and activities, 
the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the role of the Kurdish Regional Government in 
Iraq, and the present region of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
The history of the Kurdish people can be traced back to the medieval period, which covers 
the Safavid era (Izady 2015). Arab people used the term ‘Kurds’ as a universal concept that 
referred to Iranian nomadic tribes; the concept predates the Islamic period (Aziz 2014). 
During the 16th century, the term ‘Kurd’ was used by Sherefxan Bidlisi to refer to four tribal 
groups of people, who are known as the Iranian nomads: Guran, Kurmanj, Kalhor and Lur. 
Each of these tribal groups spoke different dialects (Rashidvash 2014).  
However, the two tribal groups most closely associated with modern Kurds are the 
Carduchi and Corduene, because Carduchi has been considered to be a primordial equivalent 
of the term ‘Kurdistan’, while scholars have viewed Corduene as being equivalent to the 
contemporary Kurdistan: these two groups are considered as the ancestors, or at least the 
original nucleus of the Iranian-speaking people inhabiting what is currently known as 
Kurdistan (Calavito 2015; Rashidvash 2014). 
Clearly, the Kurds did not originate as a single tribe. It is apparent that the Kurds and 
their history are the products of centuries of continuous internal assimilation and evolution of 
new tribal groups and ideas that were introduced periodically in the land that would come to 
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be known as the Kurdistan. Essentially, the Kurds turn out to be the descendants of all the 
tribal groups that finally settled in Kurdistan.  
Around 4,000 years ago, the first precursor of the Indo-European speaking people was 
immigrating into Kurdistan in small numbers to inhabit the area (Calavito 2015). These 
people finally formed the nobility of the Hittite, Mitani and Kassite Kingdoms (Soomro 
2008). However, the people who had settled there earlier remained solidly Hurrian. With 
time, Hurrian Kurdistan fast became Indo-European Kurdistan (Soomro 2008). The Hurrian 
are considered the most significant reflection of Kurdish culture to date. Medes is one of the 
prominent clans that had settled in the areas of Kurdistan (Izady 2015). The Medes 
established an empire that included all Kurdistan and some of the surrounding territories 
(Middleton 2015).  
However, the people who came to be known as Kurds experienced massive 
population movements by the start of 300 BC; in the process, they settled in and dominated 
various neighbouring regions (Izady 2015). Kurdish polities of the time resulted from these 
movements (Leonard 2005). They formed such kingdoms as Cortea, Adiabene, Gordyene, 
Media and Kirm, which joined the confederate members of the Parthian Federation in the 1st 
century BC (Leonard 2006). In the 12th and 13th centuries, the Turkic nomads immigrated to 
the Kurdistan region and, with time, exerted political dominations of the vast areas the 
Middle East (Docherty 2007). In the process, most of the kingdoms that had been established 
succumbed to the kingdoms and empires that had been established by the Turkic people 
(Docherty 2007). However, the Kurdish principalities were not assimilated in to the 
kingdoms and they continued to exist autonomously until around the 17th century (Meho 
2002). 
The dawn of the Ottoman and Safavid empires changed the Kurdistan region; 
partitioning it into two colonies and introducing artilleries, which devastated its inhabitants. 
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During the 16th and 18th centuries, large numbers of Kurds were expelled violently to far 
corners of the Ottoman and Safavid empires (Ahmed 2012). Due to the circumstances as a 
result, the Kurdish people started voicing a desire for nationalism and a unified Kurdish state; 
they also began to defend themselves (Ahmed 2012). The call for a unified Kurdish 
community led to the birth of nationalism. The Kurdish people started to agitate for an 
independent Kurdistan while still under the Ottoman Empire, but Kurdish nationalism 
became more prominent in the 20th century, when the Ottoman Empire was dissolved after 
the First World War (Ahmed 2012). 
When the Ottoman Empire was divided into different regions, the League of Nations 
granted Britain mandates over Palestine and Mesopotamia (later known as Iraq), while 
France was granted mandates over Lebanon and Syria. The territories of the state of Iraq 
were defined in 1920 (Kadhim 2012). They included Lower Mesopotamia and Upper 
Mesopotamia, which came to be known as Iraqi Kurdistan (Barkan 2013). The British 
mandate formally ended in 1932 and the Kingdom of Iraq obtained its independence (Shelley 
2013). The Kingdom joined the United Nations in 1945 and it became one of the founding 
members of the Arab League (Taus-Bolstad 2003). During the same time, Kurdish leader 
Mustafa Barzani led a rebellion against the government of Iraq (Taus-Bolstad 2003). The 
rebellion failed, prompting Barzani and his associates to flee to the Soviet Union, but it 
marked the beginning of a series of uprisings by the Kurdish people to agitate for their own 
independent state (Taus-Bolstad 2003). 
The Kingdom of Iraq became the Republic of Iraq in 1958 after a coup led by Abd al-
Karim Qasim and Abdul Salam Arif to overthrow the Hashimite monarchy (Romero 2010). 
During the five years of his governance Qasim achieved much, withdrawing from the 
Baghdad Pact, issuing agrarian and land reform legislation and nationalizing oil companies’ 
lands.  
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The only allies Qasim had were his own people and the Soviet Union, and he faced 
various attempts to overturn his rule. The most significant was an unsuccessful attempt in 
Mosul by the Al-Shawaf Movement just few months after he came to power in March 1959, 
and another failed assassination attempt in October 1959 by the Arab Baath Socialist Party. 
Qasim was later assassinated in 1963 after the Baath had captured power, with 
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as the Prime Minister and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif as the president 
(Ciment 2015). The conflicts between the Kurdish people began around this time as the Baath 
government forces campaigned to end insurrection by the Kurds (Tucker 2010). Saddam 
Hussein coerced President Hassan al-Bakr to resign in 1979, then assumed office as both the 
President of Iraq and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (Hauss 2010). Apart 
from invading Iran, Saddam Hussein’s forces started suppressing the agitations of the 
Kurdish people, who continued to press for an independent state (Kelly 2008). In order to 
deal with Kurdish pro-independence elements, Saddam Hussein conducted the Al-Anfal 
campaigns and used chemical weapons against the Kurdish population (Kelly 2008). The 
subsequent sections examine these scenarios in depth. 
 
2.2 Diplomatic Struggle for a state: - Kurds and the international 
community in the 20th century.  
The dawn of the Ottoman and Safavid empires changed the Kurdistan region; 
partitioning it into two colonies and introducing artilleries, which devastated its inhabitants. 
During the 16th and 18th centuries, large numbers of Kurds were expelled violently to far 
corners of the Ottoman and Safavid empires (Ahmed 2012). Due to the circumstances as a 
result, the Kurdish people started voicing a desire for nationalism and a unified Kurdish state; 
they also began to defend themselves (Ahmed 2012). The call for a unified Kurdish 
community led to the birth of nationalism.  
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The Kurdish people started to agitate for an independent Kurdistan while still under 
the Ottoman Empire, but Kurdish nationalism became more prominent in the 20th century, 
when the Ottoman Empire was dissolved after the First World War (Ahmed 2012). 
When the Ottoman Empire was divided into different regions, the League of Nations 
granted Britain mandates over Palestine and Mesopotamia (later known as Iraq), while 
France was granted mandates over Lebanon and Syria. The territories of the state of Iraq 
were defined in 1920 (Kadhim 2012). They included Lower Mesopotamia and Upper 
Mesopotamia, which came to be known as Iraqi Kurdistan (Barkan 2013). The British 
mandate formally ended in 1932 and the Kingdom of Iraq obtained its independence (Shelley 
2013). The Kingdom joined the United Nations in 1945 and it became one of the founding 
members of the Arab League (Taus-Bolstad 2003). During the same time, Kurdish leader 
Mustafa Barzani led a rebellion against the government of Iraq (Taus-Bolstad 2003). The 
rebellion failed, prompting Barzani and his associates to flee to the Soviet Union, but it 
marked the beginning of a series of uprisings by the Kurdish people to agitate for their own 
independent state (Taus-Bolstad 2003). 
The root of  the historical problem can be traced back to 1926, the year that Iraqi 
Kurds were included as part of Iraq, the consequence of which was the fight for autonomy by 
the Kurds (Donabed 2015). The Kurds had nurtured the hope of being an independent state in 
the early 1920s, mainly because the possibility of achieving that hope was apparent in the 
Treaty of Sevres of 1920 (Donabed 2015). The post-First World War treaty was signed 
between the representatives of Ottoman Turkey after their defeat and the victorious Allied 
forces on 10 August 1920, marking the end of the war (Bolukbasi 2012). Essentially, the 
treaty marked the end and the beginning of the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire 
(Bolukbasi 2012). The treaty obliged Turkey to relinquish all its claims over North African 
and Arab Asia (Bolukbasi 2012).  
 31 
In addition, the interpretation of the treaty implied that Armenia could be independent 
and Kurds could form an autonomous Kurdish region (Bolukbasi 2012).  
However, Turkish representatives rejected the treaty and in 1923 it was replaced with 
the Treaty of Lausanne, which effectively invalidated the treaty of Sevres (Tucker 2014). 
The Treaty of Lausanne was the treaty that finally concluded the First World War. It 
was signed between Turkey’s representatives and a group of states, which included Italy, 
Greece, France, Great Britain, Yugoslavia, Croatia and Romania, among others (Tucker 
2014). One of the main provisions of the treaty was the recognition of the geographical 
borders of the modern Turkey (Tucker 2014). Consequently, Turkey managed to keep the 
largest region of Kurdistan within its territory and influence (Hall 2014). Nonetheless, 
southern Kurdistan remained annexed to Iraq, which was still under the British mandate (Hall 
2014).  
In 1922, following months of conflict, the then Anglo-Iraq guaranteed the Kurds 
within the territory of Iraq the right to form and run their own government. However, four 
months later, when the Treaty of Lausanne was established, the hope of forming an 
autonomous state with its own government was not fulfilled (Hall 2014). 
In December 1925, the League of Nations, a precursor to the United Nations, made a 
decision that Mosul should be part of Iraq (Donabed 2015). At the same time, as has been 
indicated earlier, the promise of a Kurdish state was abandoned and replaced by a promise to 
secure the Kurdish administrative, linguistic and cultural entitlements from the newly 
established government of Iraq (Donabed 2015). As a result, the Kurds resorted to unrest and 
petitioning the League of Nations to demand that they should be granted independence, a 
strategy which remained ineffective (Donabed 2015). 
The dawn of the Ottoman and Safavid empires changed the Kurdistan region; 
partitioning it into two colonies and introducing artilleries, which devastated its inhabitants. 
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During the 16th and 18th centuries, large numbers of Kurds were expelled violently to far 
corners of the Ottoman and Safavid empires (Ahmed 2012). Due to the circumstances as a 
result, the Kurdish people started voicing a desire for nationalism and a unified Kurdish state; 
they also began to defend themselves (Ahmed 2012).  
When the Ottoman Empire was divided into different regions, the League of Nations 
granted Britain mandates over Palestine and Mesopotamia (later known as Iraq), while 
France was granted mandates over Lebanon and Syria. The territories of the state of Iraq 
were defined in 1920 (Kadhim 2012). They included Lower Mesopotamia and Upper 
Mesopotamia, which came to be known as Iraqi Kurdistan (Barkan 2013). The British 
mandate formally ended in 1932 and the Kingdom of Iraq obtained its independence (Shelley 
2013). The Kingdom joined the United Nations in 1945 and it became one of the founding 
members of the Arab League (Taus-Bolstad 2003). During the same time, Kurdish leader 
Mustafa Barzani led a rebellion against the government of Iraq (Taus-Bolstad 2003). The 
rebellion failed, prompting Barzani and his associates to flee to the Soviet Union, but it 
marked the beginning of a series of uprisings by the Kurdish people to agitate for their own 
independent state (Taus-Bolstad 2003). 
The call for a unified Kurdish community led to the birth of nationalism. The Kurdish people 
started to agitate for an independent Kurdistan while still under the Ottoman Empire, but 
Kurdish nationalism became more prominent in the 20th century, when the Ottoman Empire 
was dissolved after the First World War (Ahmed 2012). 
2.3 State Conflict over decade between the Iraqi Government and the 
Kurdish National Movement!
The process of fighting and negotiation between Kurds and the Iraqi central government 
began even before the formation of an Iraqi government. In 1918, Sheikh Mahmood declared 
an independent government in the city of Sulaimani. The British army moved their forces and 
succeeded in capturing the city of Sulaimani and Mahmood was arrested (CJ Admons 2012). 
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Afterward Sheikh Mahmood was allowed to return to his city in 1922 and announced a new 
government, this time helped by the British.  
However, he turned his back and revered Britain again. Fighting started again and Kurdish 
forces were defeated and forced to escape to the border with Iran. The sheikh continued 
defending himself until 1923 when he finally entered into negotiations to end the battle (Salih 
and Abdulrazaq 2011). However, in recent history, fighting and dialogue between the 
Kurdish national movement and the Iraqi central government began in September 1961 when 
Mula Mustafa Barzani led a rebellion against Qassim's government. Two years later a 
ceasefire was declared and talks started for the first time. On 8 February 1963, Qasim’s 
regime collapsed and Arab nationalists and the Arab Baath Party took power. 
 Qasim was assassinated and Abdul-Salam Arif was declared the first President of the 
Republic of Iraq, while Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakir was announced as Prime Minister (Haider 
1998). The KDP delegated Jalal Talabani, Loqman Barzani and Salih Yousifi to negotiate on 
their behalf and claim Kurdish rights. The committee presented their written requirements 
which included the following: 
1.! Agreeing on autonomy for the Kurdistan Region  
2.! Forming a local parliament which would elect a local Kurdish government within 
Iraq. 
3.! The position of Deputy President of Iraq should be filled from the Kurdish region 
and should be elected by the KDP. 
4.! The Kurdish language should be used as the formal language in the region.  
5.! There should be a percentage of peshmerga (Kurdish fighters) in the Iraqi army. 
6.! Kurdistan'a local government should have a share or Iraq’s national resources. 
7.! The Kurdish region should include the governorates of Sulaimani, Erbil and 
Kirkuk, and the Kurdish dominated towns in the governorates of Mosul and 
Dyala.  
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Iraqi officials declared these requirements as unreasonable and impossible to achieve (Sayed 
1999). According to Sayed, this memorandum was seen as a covert declaration of an 
independent Kurdistan and, therefore, was completely dismissed (Sayed 1999). Barzani’s 
peshmerga resumed their attacks on the Iraqi army in the north of Iraq on 5 May 1963. Iraq's 
National Council of Revolution met on the 9 June to make a decision on starting a military 
operation against Kurdistan. According to Hani Al-Fakiki the civilian members of the council 
stood against this decision. However, the army officers gained the majority and war against 
Northern Iraq and Barzani was declared (Al-Fakikki 1993).  
The division between army officers and different factions of the Arab Baath Socialist 
Party increased, with disagreement on issues such as the union with Syria and Egypt, 
acknowledgement of Kuwait as a state, and the resumption of fighting against the Kurds. 
This came to a head on 18 November 1963, when Arif finally gained power and made Tahir 
Yaha the Prime Minister (Al-Rakaby 2017). In February 1964, the KDP announced another 
ceasefire and the central government and the Kurdish National Movement went through 
another round of talks. This time Barzani demanded the formation of a Kurdish region, 
including the governorates of Sulaimani, Kirkuk, Erbil and the towns of Sinjar, Zahko, 
Khanaqeen and Amidia. The KDP asked for more power and greater independence. 
Furthermore, Barzani insisted that the temporary constitution of Iraq should state that the 
Arabs in Iraq are part of the Arab nation and not all Iraq, referring to the fact the Kurds are a 
separate nation. This was completely rejected by Iraq’s central government, which argued 
that it was an attempt to divide Iraq.  
The Barzani-Yaha talks collapsed and fierce fighting resumed in April 1965 (Kathim 
& Shalal 2014). The battle persisted until Abdul-Salam Arif died when his helicopter crashed 
travelling from Qurna town to Basra on 13 April 1966.  
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The military personnel, backed by the Egyptian government, supported Arif’s brother 
the General Abdul Rahman Arif to be the president of Iraq, rather than Abdul-Rahman Al-
Bazaz or Abdul-Aziz Al-Uqaily. One of the reasons the army had for supporting Abdul-
Rahman Arif was his wish to end the battle with Kurds, which they believed he could achieve 
(Al-Hasnawy 2009). However, despite Arif and his Prime Minister’s first speech after taking 
power confirming the government’s commitment to Kurdish rights, they resumed military 
operations until the peshmerga defeated the army in the strategic battle of Handreen in May 
1966. This was the beginning of another period of peace.  
Negotiations which started soon after reached agreement on 29 June 1966. The Iraqi 
government agreed on 12 points, including a decentralized ruling system for the Kurdish 
region, acknowledgement of the Kurds as a second nation in Iraq and the return of displaced 
people and families to their homes (Al-Maathidi 2012). In August 1966, Prime Minister Al-
Bazaz resigned to be replaced by Naji Talib and then Tahir Yaha until Arif was removed 
from power by another faction of the Arab Baath Socialist Party in a military coup led by 
Ahmad Hssan Al-Bakir and Saddam Hussein in July 1968. In the period between June 1966 
and July 1968 there was no further fighting, but the Iraqi government withdrew from its 
commitment to solve the Kurdish problem. In the meantime, Barzani increased his demands 
to include a self-governed and independent administration of the Kurdish region and a 
complete retreat of the army from the area (Al-Zubaidy 2006).  
After the military coup, fighting recommenced. The Arab Baath Socialist Party issued 
a governorate law, which empowered local government in each province, established the 
University of Sulaimani and officially recognized Nawroz as an Iraqi national holiday 
(Muhedeen 2006). This was an attempt to re-start talks with Kurds. Indeed, negotiations 
restarted in January 1970 and led to the agreement of the Self Autonomy Law on 11 March 
1970.  
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Barzani and Sadam Hussein agreed to implement this law in four years ( M.Al-
Barzani 2002). However, the situation deteriorated and difficulties in implementing the 
agreement started to appear, especially as a result of Barzani’s lack of confidence in the 
government’s seriousness.  
This absence of trust peaked after a failed assassination attempt on Idris Barzani 
(Mala Mustafa’s son) in December 1970, and another attempt on Mula Mustafa himself in 
Gala, in the north of Iraq, in September 1971. As a consequence, clashes between the 
peshmerga and the army occurred in the town of Khanaqeen in the south of Kurdistan and 
dialogue stopped again in November 1971 (M.Barzani 2002).  
This time Barzani insisted that the governorate of Kirkuk and the towns of Khanaqeen 
and Sinjar should be included in the autonomous area. The Iraqi government firmly and 
fiercely refused this request.  
Battle resumed in 1974 until Mula Mustafa Barzani’s revolution collapsed after 
Algeria’s agreement with Iraq and Iran on 6 March 1975. According to this agreement, Iran 
took control of half of the Shaat Al-Arab river and stopped any support to Kurdish fighters. 
The Iraqi army controlled all of Kurdistan and Barzani escaped to the United State of 
America, where he died of cancer in March 1979 (M.Barzani 2002). In 1976, guerrillas 
against the Baath regime restarted despite the events of 1975 and the loss of hope that 
freedom for Kurdistan could be achieved.  
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which formed in Damscus in June 1975, declared a 
new revolution against the the Baath party, as bloody fighting involved most cities, town and 
villages in a new period of struggle. Thousands were killed among the Iraqi army, the 
peshmerga and civilians until November 1983 when negotiations started and a ceasefire was 
announced between the PUK and Saddam's regime (Mustafa 1999).  
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PUK delegates, led by Jalal Talabani and Nawsherwan Mustafa, visited Baghdad and 
met with Iraqi officials, including former President of Iraq Saddam Hussein, on various 
occasions. There was disagreement about the geographical border of Kurdistan and the 
degree of self-administration and independence. On 15 January 1985, the leadership of the 
PUK revealed that negotiations had collapsed and war was announced again (Mustafa 1999). 
Fighting continued until the al-Anfal campaign when most of peshmerga forces left Iraq and 
fled to Iran.  
In March 1991, after the USA and its allies liberated Kuwait, the Shia in the south and 
the Kurds in the north rose up against Saddam’s regime. Kurdish fighters and civilians took 
over most of the cities and towns in the north including Kirkuk.  
However, the Iraqi army managed to regain control in about one month. Nearly a 
million Kurds left their homes and fled to Iran and Turkey. In 1991, the Kurdistan Front 
including all of Iraqi Kurdistan’s political parties entered another round of talks after the 
second Gulf war. Mukaram Talabani, has written in detail how talks started (Talabani 2006). 
Kurdish politicians from the PUK, the KDP and other parties visited Baghdad many times By 
end of 1991, the Kurdish delegates returned to Kurdistan with no hope of an agreement and, 
once again, talks collapsed mainly because of disagreement about Kirkuk and other border 
town Ahmad 1991.  
Kurdish people elected their own local parliament and government, which was later 
known as the KRG. This situation persisted until 2003, when the USA and their allies 
liberated Iraq. Initially, Iraq was ruled by the Coalition’s administration led by Paul Bremer 
until Summer 2003. In July 2003, Iraq elected its own council which consisted of 25 
members and reflected all Iraq’s ethnicities and religions. Kurds were represented by five 
members which accounted for 20 per cent of seats. These were taken by Jalal Talabani, 
Masood Barzani, Dara Noor Al-deen, Dr Mahmood Ottman and Salah Al-deen Bhadeen. 
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 In June 2004, the council was replaced by a temporary Iraqi Government. Prior to 
2003, debate about Iraqi’s territorial stability tended to focus on the Kurdish issue and the 
relationship between the autonomous Kurdish area and the rest of Iraq (Bremer 2006). 
However, after 2003, this preoccupation shifted toward a tripartite fragmentation of Sunni, 
Shiite and Kurds.  
More decentralization was requested and was reflected in the Iraqi Constitution in 
2005, which displayed a remarkable trend toward federalism for all Iraq. The Kurds in 
particular escalated their requests and insisted on federalism within Iraq. Kurdish politicians 
linked their existence within the big home to having more independence within their smaller 
one (Visser 2010).  
The USA faced enormous difficulties in keeping security in all Iraq, mediating 
between different Iraqi politicians who mirrored a variety of sectarian groups and different 
political parties with different agendas (Cole 2003). According to Paul Bremer, the USA 
were faced with a large number of problems to solve: de-Baathification and expelling 
members of the former Arab Baath Socialist Party from the new Iraqi government, reforming 
the Iraqi army, fighting insurgency, challenging corruption, maintaining security on the street 
and stopping looting by gangs, and, last but not least, handing over or transferring power to 
the Iraqi people (Bremer 2006). In 2005, representatives of different Iraqi parties formed the 
committee tasked with writing the Iraqi constitution and each group insisted on including 
their rights in the constitution. In 2005, the Iraqi people elected their representatives for the 
Iraqi parliament freely for the first time after a long period of dictatorship under Saddam’s 
regime. The parliament voted on the constitution and most of the Kurd’s demands were 
agreed, including a federal union between the Kurdistan region and Iraq (Al-Maamoori 
2015).  
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The Kurdish people had 75 representatives in this parliament and this was considered 
a golden period for the Kurdish National Movement in their long struggle towards 
independence. For Kurds the constitution solved most of their issues apart from the 
geographical border of their region, which later became a key disagreement and pushed 
Kurds to declare their desire for independence in a historical referendum in September 2017. 
Moreover, in 2006 Iraqis elected their government and a Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, was 
elected for the first time in Iraq’s history as President of Iraq.  
In conclusion, the Kurdish National Movement have tried over years to gain more 
independence and to have more power in ruling their region. During periods of war or peace 
since the formation of the Iraqi government in 1921, Kurds have struggled for more freedom, 
liberty, autonomy and self-determination.  
Kurds did not declare their desire to have an independent Kurdistan until 25 
September 2017, when Kurdish people voted in a referendum for independence.  
 
2.4 Major Political Organizations and Activities- Kurds during and after 
Monarchy in Iraq.  
While using rebellions to fight for their own independent state, the Kurds also created 
political formations to advance their political, economic and social agenda. One of the 
earliest political organizations was the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which was 
formed in 1946 in Mahabad, Iran, to fight for the political interests of Iranian Kurdistan.  
Qazi Muhammad, the then leader of the short-lived Soviet-backed republic of 
Mahabad, formed the party (Abdulla 2012). The party was intricately intertwined with the 
politics of Iraq and Iran at the same time, particularly because Kurds were found across both 
borders (Abdulla 2012). During that period and beyond, the Soviet Union provided support to 
the growing Kurdish national struggles against the monarchical domination of both Iran and 
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Iraq (Abdulla 2012). One of the most prominent leaders of the KDP was Mustafa Barzani, 
who played a key role in advancing the Kurdish nationalist agenda (Gunter 2010).  
In 1946, when the party was established, he was selected as the leader of the party to 
lead the Kurdish revolt against the Iraqi regime; he doubled as the political and military 
leader of the Kurdish uprisings until the time of his death in 1979 (Gunter 2010). The party 
played a significant role in advancing the quest for Kurds to form their own autonomous state 
in Northern Iraq (Gunter 2010). 
Another important political organization which championed the cause of Kurds was 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which was established in 1975 as a result of 
discontent within the KDP (Izady 2015). Following the collapse of the Mahabad Republic in 
early 1947, Ibrahim Ahmad joined the Iraqi KDP (Izady 2015). Ahmad had been the 
representative of the KDP in Iran’s Sulaimani. The internal wrangles within the KDP were 
mainly due to Ahmad’s leftist politics and his support for Qazi Muhammad, which put him 
and his factions against Mustafa Barzani and his supporters (Izady 2015). 
The Kingdom of Iraq became the Republic of Iraq in 1958 after a coup led by Abd al-
Karim Qasim and Abdul Salam Arif to overthrow the Hashimite monarchy (Romero 2010). 
During the five years of his governance Qasim achieved much, withdrawing from the 
Baghdad Pact, issuing agrarian and land reform legislation and nationalizing oil companies’ 
lands.  
The only allies Qasim had were his own people and the Soviet Union, and he faced 
various attempts to overturn his rule. The most significant was an unsuccessful attempt in 
Mosul by the Al-Shawaf Movement just few months after he came to power in March 1959, 
and another failed assassination attempt in October 1959 by the Arab Baath Socialist Party. 
Qasim was later assassinated in 1963 after the Baath had captured power, with 
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as the Prime Minister and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif as the president 
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(Ciment 2015). The conflicts between the Kurdish people began around this time as the Baath 
government forces campaigned to end insurrection by the Kurds (Tucker 2010). Saddam 
Hussein coerced President Hassan al-Bakr to resign in 1979, then assumed office as both the 
President of Iraq and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (Hauss 2010). Apart 
from invading Iran, Saddam Hussein’s forces started suppressing the agitations of the 
Kurdish people, who continued to press for an independent state (Kelly 2008). In order to 
deal with Kurdish pro-independence elements, Saddam Hussein conducted the Al-Anfal 
campaigns and used chemical weapons against the Kurdish population (Kelly 2008). The 
subsequent sections examine these scenarios in depth. 
The defining moment for the KDP came during the second Iraqi-Kurdish war between 1974 
and 1975 when the Kurds were defeated. On May 1975, Talabani, an ally of Ibrahim Ahmad, 
together with members of his faction, formed the PUK and subsequently announced its 
existence through the Syrian media (Gunter 2009). The 1974 conflict was an attempt by 
Kurdish forces to fight against the Iraqi army. Since, the Kurdish forces did not have the kind 
of sophisticated weaponry possessed by the Iraqi forces, they were crushed and their plans 
quashed. The defeat of the Kurdish forces caused Mustafa and some of his supporters, 
including his son, to escape to Iran, leaving a leadership gap in the KDP (Gunter 2009). Jalal 
Talabani, who cooperated with other likeminded supporters to create the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan, filled this leadership gap (Gunter 2009). 
Around 1976, Masoud Barazani and his cronies regrouped in Europe to launch the 
provisional leadership of the KDP and to reposition themselves as a leftist movement. Later, 
Masoud Barzani returned from Iran to take up the leadership of the KDP in Iraq (Marcus 
2009). The activities of the KDP in Iraq increased, largely against the members of the rival 
party, the PUK (Marcus 2009). The KDP killings of members of the PUK mostly took place 
between 1976 and 1977 (Tahiri 2007).  
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Talabani retaliated by ordering his forces to fire upon any members of the KDP. 
However, the PUK was not able to defeat the KDP because the KDP had greater operational 
strength. Both parties were supported financially by the neighbouring states, especially Iran 
(Tahiri 2007).  
The continued internal wrangles among Kurds made it impossible for them to achieve 
their dream of defeating Iraqi regimes to become independent. This weakness was confirmed 
during the beginning of the war between Iraq and Iran, when Saddam Hussein said that the 
Kurds’ internal misunderstandings made it difficult for them to achieve their plans to form an 
independent state (Tahiri 2007). 
In 1981, a coalition of the KDP, the Kurdish Socialist Party and the Iraqi Communist 
Party attacked PUK members in Erbil (Aziz 2014). In revenge, the forces supporting the 
PUK mounted a counterattack, killing 50 communists and arresting 70 (Aziz 2014). In the 
subsequent years, Iran started to work closely with the KDP against the regime of Saddam in 
Iraq (Hiro 2001). By 1983, it became apparent that Iran would invade Iraq through Kurdistan. 
However, Iraq successfully enacted revenge by rounding up and killing about 8,000 males of 
the Barzani clan (Charountaki 2010).  
At the same time, the forces of the PUK had declared a ceasefire with Saddam’s 
regime, which proved to be fallacious as more than 3,000 PUK troops defected and joined the 
KDP to strengthen the fight against Hussein (Charountaki 2010). The Kurds realised that, in 
order to achieve their liberty, they needed to unite and work together. Consequently, in 1986, 
the existing political parties, including the ICP, the PUK and the KDP, formed a common 
unity against Saddam’s Baath Party. Jalal Talabani and Barzani finally met in Iran to form a 
common working front, the Kurdistan Front, in 1987 (Tahiri 2007).  
The Kurdistan Front made the Kurds’ forces stronger than they had been from the 
early 1960s (Tahiri 2007).  
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With the support that they received from Iran, KDP and PUK forces managed to 
capture various military and civilian regions that had been occupied by Baath forces. The 
strengthened Kurds’ forces became a real threat to Saddam Hussein (Tahiri 2007).  
Having perceived the gravity of the threats, Saddam instructed his cousin, Ali Hassan 
al-Majid, to commence attacks on Kurdish positions using chemical weapons (Anderson 
2011). The attacks led to the Halabja massacres, the worst of Saddam’s campaigns of al-
Anfal against the Kurd population (Anderson 2011). 
The history of the Kurds’ fight for independence took another turn during the Gulf 
War, which provided a perfect opportunity for Kurdish uprisings.  
In 1990, Saddam attacked and captured Kuwait, an act that was widely condemned by 
the members of the international community, especially the United Nations (UN), the 
European Union and the Arab League (Abdualla 2012). In order to remove Saddam’s forces 
from Iraq, the UN sanctioned a coalition of 34 states, led by the United States, to take 
military actions against Iraq and to remove it from Kuwait (Abdualla 2012). The intervention 
by the international community provided rebels such as the Kurds and Sunni with an 
opportunity to stage an uprising against Saddam (Combs 2015). However, the PUK and the 
KDP publicly denied that they were willing to participate in the ousting of Saddam Hussein 
by the international community’s military forces (Combs 2015). The reason for taking such a 
position was informed by the fear that Saddam might stage further chemical attacks on the 
Kurdish population (Farkas 2003). The parties were also worried that working with the 
international community against Saddam might strain their relationship with Iran, which was 
the main source of their financial support (Farkas 2003). 
The Kurds took advantage of the defeat of Saddam’s forces in 1991 to rise up against 
the regime. The uprisings were mainly in areas that were inhabited by the Kurds, which were 
what would later constitute the territory that is now controlled by KRG.  
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The United States and other members of the international community established a 
no-fly zone over the Northern Iraq to protect the Kurds (Gertler 2011). The zone later came 
under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government. 
The violence that was experienced by Kurdish people had a serious impact on women 
and children, many of whom lost their families and their own lives. Therefore, the struggle 
for the Kurdish autonomous region also involved the efforts of women. In order to empower 
women politically to fight for the rights of women, the KDP formed the Kurdish Women 
Union (KWU). The KWU has been handling women-specific political issues within Iraqi 
Kurdistan since its formation in 1952 (Hill and Hagerty 2013).  
Evidence shows that the Kurdish Women Union has actively participated in in the 
Kurdish national struggles to achieve autonomy and respect for human rights of the Kurdish 
people (Hill and Hagerty 2013). Even though its focus has been on women, the KWU has 
been fighting against violent campaigns of the Iraqi regimes against the Kurd population. 
Essentially, its involvements have focused on social, economic and political spheres of 
Kurdish lives (Hill and Hagerty 2013). 
 
2.5 The Displacement of Kurds in Iraq and Turkey.  
It is difficult to gain an exact picture of immigration from Kurdistan to the diaspora, since 
there is no independent Kurdish state that could issue birth certificates or passports. 
Approximations can be made from statistics on immigration from the geographical areas that 
are considered the Kurdish heartlands in south-eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, north-western 
Iran and northern Syria, but these can never be exact. 
The historical displacement of Kurds can be traced back to their domination under the 
Ottoman Empire. Notably, during the 20th Century, especially during the First World War 
and the Turkish War of Independence, the Christian minorities within the empire were 
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forcibly displaced from their homes (Chatty 2010). In the process, a significant portion of the 
Kurd population suffered similar fates, because some of them supported the efforts of the 
Ottomans, while many rebelled in many regions around the empire (Chatty 2010).  
In the newly created state of Turkey, the plight of Kurds became serious between the 
1920s and 1930s, when most of them rebelled against the government, causing the mass 
killings of many and the expulsion of thousands by the new regime (Chatty 2010). 
Ultimately, the conflicts between the Kurds and Turks led to the displacement of 
approximately three million Kurds, a significant number of whom remained unsettled and 
without homes (Zdanowski 2014). Kurds faced similar challenges in other countries in which 
they found themselves after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, as they fought for autonomy 
without success (Zdanowski 2014).  
In Iraq, the displacement of Kurds came as a direct effect of Saddam’s al-Anfal 
campaign and other forms of violence against Kurdish people (Voller 2014).  
Al-Anfal led to mass movements of affected Kurds both within Iraq and across the 
borders of Turkey and Iran as they escaped annihilation by Saddam’s government (Voller 
2014). A significant number of Kurds who were victims of the first al-Anfal attack in the 
Jafati valley and elsewhere managed to find refuge in Iran, primarily because the region from 
which they originated was close to Iran’s borders, making their escape from Iraq relatively 
easy (Voller 2014). Meanwhile, after the al-Anfal attack in the region of Badinan Kurds 
sought refuge in Turkey (Williams 2013). Notably, hundreds of thousands became internally 
displaced after they returned surreptitiously to different Iraqi cities and towns (Williams 
2013). Yet, as the al-Anfal campaign gained momentum, some Kurds were rescued and 
hidden by friends and family. Others took personal initiatives in order to escape and others 
got help from the Jash militant forces (Williams 2013). 
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In 1970, Saddam’s Baath Party, in a bid to consolidate power, granted Kurds a significant 
level of autonomy, which was more than Iran, Turkey and Syria had allowed the Kurds in 
their controlled territories (Aziz 2014).  However, Saddam’s regime intentionally demarcated 
Kurds’ autonomous territories to exclude areas that had oil, during the Arabization process 
(Aziz 2014). The major oil producing regions that Baath sought to Arabize included Kirkuk, 
Khanaqin and other parts of the territories, from which the party evicted Kurd farmers and 
replaced them with poor Arabs who were brought from the South (Zedalis 2012). The 
Arabization programme and al-Anfal campaign thus led to the greatest numbers of Iraqi IDPs 
and refugees in the country’s history, accounting for the majority of the 800,000 estimated 
IDPs in northern Iraq today (Romano 2005: 433) 
In 1974, the revolt by the Kurds against the Iraqi government gained further 
momentum under the leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani,  
who got strong support from Iran, the United States, and Israeli governments (Zedalis 
2012).  The revolt did not last long, because, in 1975, the conclusion of border agreements 
between Iran and Iraq and Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party lost the support of the Shah 
(Zedalis 2012). Barzani then escaped into Iran together with his party members, consequently 
leaving members of his tribe vulnerable to be forcibly evicted from their homes and 
compulsorily resettled in the desert regions of southern parts of Iraq (Zabari 2015). 
Moreover, in the mid 1970s, Saddam Hussein’s government forces acted again to 
expel more than 250 thousand Kurds from Iraqi borders with Iran and Turkey (Krassel 2005). 
In order to make the plan effective, the forces destroyed the Kurds’ villages (Krassel 2005). 
The displaced Kurds were alternatively resettled in Mujamma’at, which were areas that were 
strategically located along the highways that were considered military-controlled Iraqi-
Kurdistan areas (Kreyenbroek 2009).  
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The Mujamma’at was a term that was used to refer to concentration camps in which 
Kurds who had survived mass murders, imprisonments, and deportation were placed to await 
their fates (Kreyenbroek 2009). 
In 1987, the Iraqi regime attacked areas that were inhabited by Kurds with chemical 
weapons (Crenshaw and Pimlott 2015). During the attack period, many Kurds who had been 
injured and admitted in hospitals around the Erbil city were forcefully abducted,  
never to be seen again (Crenshaw and Pimlott 2015).  During the same period, Saddam 
Hussein’s forces, under al-Majid, came up with a three-staged programme, whose main 
purpose was to clear or collectivise villages that were inhabited by the Kurd populations.  
The first stage was conducted between 21 April and 20 May of 1987, the second stage 
was carried out between 21 May and 20 June of the same year, while the last stage was 
suspended (Crenshaw and Pimlott 2015).  
This led to the destruction of over 700 Kurds’ villages, mainly through the burning 
and bulldozing of the villages (Kelly 2008). The suspension of the third stage of operations 
was due to a lack of resources.  
However, it would be accomplished through an Anfal. The programme caused the 
death and displacement of many Kurds (Kelly 2008). 
In order to target Kurds, Saddam Hussein’s regime relied on the national census that 
was conducted on 17 October 1987. The regime offered Kurds two options, one of which was 
for them to leave their homes and accept mandatory resettlement in camps that were placed 
under the watch of the regime’s forces (Human Rights Watch n.d). The other option was to 
lose their Iraqi citizenship and, consequently, be declared military deserters and face 
execution. Essentially, the Kurds were offered forceful displacement to unproductive areas or 
the death penalty (Human Rights Watch n.d).  
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Immediately before the census of 1987, al-Masjid came up with a strategy to single 
out targets who lived in what were then government-controlled areas. He ordered his 
intelligence personnel to compile a list of families that were considered unfriendly to Saddam 
Hussein’s regime (Human Rights Watch n.d). At the conclusion of the exercise, thousands of 
women, children and old people were compulsorily relocated to the rural regions of Iraq, 
apparently to share in the plight of their peshmerga kins. Peshmerga are the military forces 
controlling the autonomous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan (Human Rights Watch n.d). The Kurds 
were continually displaced as Iraqi government forces continued to target them with all sorts 
of weapons, including chemical weapons, bombs and other sophisticated weapons affordable 
to the government. Many of the Kurds were displaced to countries neighbouring Iraq, 
especially Iran. 
Manifestly, two things facilitated the displacement of Kurds. First, the aggressive 
campaigns by the Iraqi regime to annihilate Kurds made them fear for their lives and 
consequently seek refuge in areas they felt would be safe.  
Second, the government deliberately planned to remove Kurds in government-
controlled areas in a cleansing process to pave the way for the Arabization of those areas. 
Irrespective of the reasons for moving, Kurds preferred moving to areas that were under the 
control of the peshmerga, which made them even more vulnerable to the al-Anfal campaigns, 
because the Iraqi military generally considered them enemies too; hence, they were to face 
the same fates as civilian Kurds. 
In 1991, Saddam Hussein’s regime continued its hostilities by massacring more 
Kurds, leading to more than 500,000 Kurd refugees seeking safety in Turkey in just a few 
days (Mason 2015). Moreover, because of the 1991 uprising of the Iraqi people against 
Saddam Hussein and his regime, many Kurds escaped from the country to find refuge in the 
neighbouring countries, including Iran (Mason 2015).  
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Iran alone provided asylum for 1,400,000 Iraqi refugees, mostly Kurds, who had been 
uprooted as a result of the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) and the subsequent rebellions. After 
the fall of Saddam and the invasion in 2003, United Nations estimates state that more than 
3.5 million Iraqis were compelled to leave their homes as a result of the violence that has 
engulfed their country since the 2003 war, disrupting people’s lives and the most basic 
services (Al-Zubaidi and Wimmen 2008:2). 
These events led to the displacement and dispossession of hundreds of thousands of 
Kurds, leaving many of them without citizenship and some stateless in their place of refuge 
(Chatty 2010: 233). Although reliable estimates remain difficult to obtain, prior to the 2003 
war, roughly 800,000 Iraqi refugees were residing in neighbouring countries: Iran (202,000 
registered by the UNHCR), Jordan (around 300,000, mostly unregistered), Saudi Arabia 
(5,100 in the Rafha camp near the Iraqi border), and Syria (40,000, unregistered). In addition 
to these groups of refugees and IDPs, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis received asylum 
outside the region (mostly Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia).  
All told, there may be up to three million Iraqi exiles abroad, 500,000 of who may ask 
the UNHCR for assistance to return home (Romano 2014:136). Between 2005 and 2006, 
immigration from Iraq almost quadrupled: it increased from 2,035 individuals in 2004 and 
2,448 in 2005 to almost ten thousand people in 2006 (Pelling 2013).  
In 2006 and 2007, Iraq suffered not only from high levels of violence, but also a lack 
of security which severely affected the economy, while the democratic institutions that the 
Alliance had promised to build were fragile at best. In sum, factors relating to the level of 
violence, to the economic crisis and to the lack of functioning democratic institutions 
combined to make Iraqis one of the largest refugee population in the world. 
In 2007, at the height of the most recent Iraqi refugee crisis, Sweden received the 
largest amount of Iraqi asylum applicants in any country outside Iraq’s neighbouring region 
 50 
with over 18,000 asylum seekers from Iraq arriving in Sweden that year (UNHCR 2010). The 
large number of asylum seekers from Iraq contributed to make Sweden the second most 
important country of destination for asylum seekers of the industrial countries in absolute 
numbers in 2007 (UNHCR 2011, 8). 
Kurds in the United Kingdom represent the second biggest Kurdish migrant 
population in Western Europe after Germany, as high as 200,000 to 250,000 mostly from 
Iraq. The Kurdish community in the United Kingdom is not considered to be one of main 
ethnic minorities, but the presence of a large Kurdish diaspora cannot be denied. The 2001 
UK Census did not record the number of Kurds in the UK but they are estimated to be around 
200,000 (Zalme, 2006). Unlike Kurdish communities in Sweden and Germany which contain 
a large proportion of families, the Kurdish immigrant communities in the United Kingdom 
are predominantly single males (Zalme, 2006).  
All in all, over two million people fled from Iraq between 2003 and 2007, making 
refugees from Iraq one of the largest refugee populations in the world (UNHCR 2008). The 
overwhelming majority of them were received in Syria and Jordan (Weiss Fagen 2007).  
The displacement of the Kurdish population was not just a violation of human rights, 
but also an interference with their indigenous lifestyles and cultural practices.  
The displacement of people in different directions made individuals lose their 
families, including children who never saw their parents after they fled their homes to seek 
safety. It is worth pointing out that civil strife often destroys the social fabrics and interferes 
with social processes within a community or society. Consequently, adapting to new 
environments, particularly in the context of refugee camps, becomes difficult. Therefore, the 
displacement of the Kurdish people was a social fact that negatively affected their lives. 
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Estimations of the number of Kurds in Europe!
 
Country! Institute Kurde de 
Paris!
NAVEND! Council of 
Europe*!
Germany   ! 600,000–650,000! 700,000–800000! 700,000–800,000!
France  ! 130,000–150,000! 100,000–120, 000! 120,000–150,000!
The Netherlands ! 80,000–90,000! 70,000–80,000! 70,000–80,000!
Switzerland  ! 70,000–80,000! 60,000–70,000! 60,000–70,000!
Belgium ! 50,000–60,000! 50,000–60, 000! 10,000–15,000!
Austria  ! 60,000–70,000! 50,000–60,000! 50,000–60,000!
Sweden ! 40,000–50,000! 25,000–30,000! 80,000–100,000!
UK ! 30,000–40,000! 20,000–25,000! 80,000–100,000!
Greece  ! 20,000–25,000! 20,000–25,000! 20,000–25,000!
Denmark  ! 15,000–10,000! 8,000–10,000! 8,000–10,000!
Norway  ! 4,000–20,000! 4,000–5,000! 4,000–5,000!
Italy ! 8,000–10,000! 3,000–4,000! 3,000–4,000!
Finland ! 4,000–6,000! 2,000–3,000! 2,000–3,000!
 
 
Sources: Institut kurde de Paris 2011, NAVEND 2011 and *) Russell-Johnston 2006. 
 
2.6 The brutal regime of Saddam Hussein (Al-Anfal Campaigns) 
In the historical context of Iraqi Kurdistan, al-Anfal was a policy that was adopted by 
Saddam Hussein’s government for military operations that primarily targeted the elimination 
of Muslim Kurds in the Northern part of Iran, although non-Muslim minorities were also 
targeted (Mikaberidze 2011).  
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The reason why the Iraqi government chose the term ‘al-Anfal’ was to make the 
Kurds appear as non-Muslims in order to legitimize the government’s campaigns against 
them and other groups such as Christians (Mikaberidze 2011). Al-Anfal referred to a 
sequence of eight attacks that the Iraqi government carried out against the Kurds in Iraq in 
different periods, beginning around 1988 (Mikaberidze 2011).  
At the forefront of the campaigns were the Baathists, mainly composed of the Iraqi 
military personnel under the leadership of Saddam Hussein’s cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, 
who presided over almost all the al-Anfal campaigns (Crowe 2014). 
The first al-Anfal took place from 21 February to 18 March 1988 and it commenced 
in the city of Dolli Jafayty Marg (Martin 2010). The second one happened between 22 March 
and 14 March 1988 and it began in Qaradakh District. The third one followed from 31 March 
to 14 April 1988 and it started in the Garmyan District (Martin 2010). From 20 April to 18 
April 1988, the fourth al-Anfal began in Askar District and other towns such as Dashti Koya, 
Qala and Swaka, among others (Donabed 2015).  
The fifth, sixth, and seventh al-Anfal attacks started in the districts of Rewandiz and 
Shaqlawa between 24 May and 31 August 1988 (Donabed 2015). Finally, the eighth al-Anfal 
happened between 25 August and 6 September 1988 in Badinan District (Donabed 2015). 
The sequences in which al-Anfal elements were implemented reveal a trend in which the 
government of Iraq carefully planned and executed genocide against the Kurdish population. 
The government remained largely responsible for the suffering of people who it had a 
primary duty to protect. The al-Anfal campaign resulted in the execution of thousands of 
men, women and children (Kelly 2008).  
The executions were the Iraqi government’s policy to annihilate the Kurdish 
population in Iraq, from about 1988 (Kelly 2008). The victims were tied together before 
being shot dead and left to fall into pre-prepared mass graves (Kelly 2008).  
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Moreover, the government forces attacked Kurdish towns and villages using lethal 
chemical weapons (Kelly 2008). Even though the al-Anfal campaigns of the 1980s resulted in 
genocide, scholars have contended that the genocide against the Kurds commenced in the 
early 1960s, when Arabization of the villages surrounding Kirkuk and other places was 
taking place (Anderson and Stanfield 2011).  
Essentially, the al-Anfal campaign was preceded by the disappearance of Faylee 
Kurds between 1970 and 1980, the use of chemical weapons to eliminate them in 1980s, and 
the killing of approximately 8,000 Kurds, mainly men (Anderson and Stanfield 2011). 
The root of al-Anfal can be traced back to 1926, the year that Iraqi Kurds were 
included as part of Iraq, the consequence of which was the fight for autonomy by the Kurds 
(Donabed 2015). The Kurds had nurtured the hope of being an independent state in the early 
1920s, mainly because the possibility of achieving that hope was apparent in the Treaty of 
Sevres of 1920 (Donabed 2015). The post-First World War treaty was signed between the 
representatives of Ottoman Turkey after their defeat and the victorious Allied forces on 10 
August 1920, marking the end of the war (Bolukbasi 2012). Essentially, the treaty marked the 
end and the beginning of the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire (Bolukbasi 2012). The 
treaty obliged Turkey to relinquish all its claims over North African and Arab Asia 
(Bolukbasi 2012). In addition, the interpretation of the treaty implied that Armenia could be 
independent and Kurds could form an autonomous Kurdish region (Bolukbasi 2012).  
However, Turkish representatives rejected the treaty and in 1923 it was replaced with 
the Treaty of Lausanne, which effectively invalidated the treaty of Sevres (Tucker 2014). 
The Treaty of Lausanne was the treaty that finally concluded the First World War. It 
was signed between Turkey’s representatives and a group of states, which included Italy, 
Greece, France, Great Britain, Yugoslavia, Croatia and Romania, among others (Tucker 
2014).  
 54 
One of the main provisions of the treaty was the recognition of the geographical 
borders of the modern Turkey (Tucker 2014). Consequently, Turkey managed to keep the 
largest region of Kurdistan within its territory and influence (Hall 2014). Nonetheless, 
southern Kurdistan remained annexed to Iraq, which was still under the British mandate (Hall 
2014).  
In 1922, following months of conflict, the then Anglo-Iraq guaranteed the Kurds 
within the territory of Iraq the right to form and run their own government. However, four 
months later, when the Treaty of Lausanne was established, the hope of forming an 
autonomous state with its own government was not fulfilled (Hall 2014). 
In December 1925, the League of Nations, a precursor to the United Nations, made a 
decision that Mosul should be part of Iraq (Donabed 2015). At the same time, as has been 
indicated earlier, the promise of a Kurdish state was abandoned and replaced by a promise to 
secure the Kurdish administrative, linguistic and cultural entitlements from the newly 
established government of Iraq (Donabed 2015). As a result, the Kurds resorted to unrest and 
petitioning the League of Nations to demand that they should be granted independence, a 
strategy which remained ineffective (Donabed 2015). 
During the 20th Century, the Kurds spent much of their time fighting to maintain their 
identity as Kurds within the newly formed states, following the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. They suffered persecution in all the countries where they found themselves after the 
disintegration of the empire and the formation of new states with new boundaries (Tucker 
2010). In Iraq, Saddam Hussein and his Baath party managed to kill more than 200,000 
Kurds using chemical weapons and mass shootings, torturing, and displacing millions in an 
operation that took place between 1987 and 1991 (Tucker 2010).  
Arabization was one of the main elements of Saddam’s al-Anfal campaign against the 
Kurds (Eliassi 2013).  
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It was a strategic approach that Saddam’s regime supporters used to expel Kurds out 
of their homes in areas such Kirkuk and areas where there were oil resources and to relocate 
them to the southern region of the country; also killing victims in their thousands (Eliassi 
2013). Saddam Hussein’s policy at the time was to separate the Iraqis from Kurds by shifting 
Arabs to Kurds’ seemingly fertile regions and relocating the Kurds who were not killed to 
poor regions of Iraq (Eliassi 2013).  
The Kurds were left without any form of assistance from either the government or the 
international community (Eliassi 2013). With limited resources, and sometimes the lack of 
them, the forcefully relocated Kurds were not able to cope effectively with their new squalid 
environments. Women and children were the most affected by such conditions (Eliassi 2013). 
 
2.7 The brutal regime of Saddam Hussein (Halabja Massacre) 
Halabja was a town of more than 50,000 people, the majority of them Kurds. The town 
borders Iran, a fact that explains why there was a conflict between them (Siddig 2012). The 
Halabja massacre was a result of one of the deadliest attacks by the Iraqi government on the 
Kurds. On 16 and 17 of March 1988, Saddam Hussein commanded aircrafts to drop chemical 
weapons on the town of Halabja, leading to the death of more than 4,000 people, including 
women and children (Siddig 2012). In effect, the chemical attacks on the city were a 
perpetuation of the al-Anfal element that Saddam had started earlier (Siddig 2012). The 
attacks occurred against the backdrop of the 1980-1988 war between Iran and Iraq (Bellamy 
2012). The Iraqi government accused Kurds of siding and collaborating with the Iranian 
military personnel, which, to the government, was treasonous (Bellamy 2012). Just like other 
al-Anfal events, the Halabja massacres were carried out under the watch of Saddam 
Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, who was famously referred to as “Chemical Ali” 
(Bellamy 2012).  
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While the attacks were primarily targeted at the Kurds of Iraq, the other Iraqi interest was to 
fend off Iran’s Operation Zafar 7, an Iranian offensive during the Iran-Iraq war, during which 
Iran overpowered Iraq (Black 1993). However, Iran was not able to capture the town of 
Sulaimani, due to economic and military sanctions against the country (Black 1993). Besides, 
Iran suffered a heavy loss of its military personnel following a chemical attack that was 
perpetrated by Saddam’s regime (Black 1993).  
As a result, Iran withdrew its offensive actions, allowing Iraq to recapture the town of 
Sulaimani and begin attacking Kurds with chemical weapons (Black 1993).  
While al-Anfal was primarily targeted at the annihilation of Kurds, the Halabja 
massacre was a form of a revenge for the Kurds purportedly collaborating with an enemy, 
Iran (Galip 2015). In this regard, during the initial stages of the war between Iraq and Iran, 
the Northern part of Iraq experienced unrests, whereby the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan forces with the support of Iran led a rebellion against 
Iraqi’s Baath regime between 1982 and 1983 (Galip 2015). Therefore, the collaboration with 
the Iranian government largely contributed to the chemical weapon attacks on areas that were 
inhabited by Kurdish people (Galip 2015). 
The attack took approximately five hours, after which the Iraqi government sent its 
scientists to check the extent of damages and the effectiveness of the chemical weapons 
(Ham 2010). To do this, the scientists largely relied on the position and distance of the bodies 
from the points at which the weapons were dropped (Ham 2010). Once the scientists were 
finished, all the buildings within Halabja were demolished using further explosives and 
bulldozers, as the bodies of dead Kurds were buried in mass graves. The chemical attacks in 
Halabja were not the first of their kind, but they are believed to be the worst of all the 
violence and killings that Saddam’s regime committed against the Kurds during his al-Anfal 
campaigns (Ham 2010). 
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Kurds who had successfully escaped the chemical weapons, decided to go back to 
rebuild the city of Halabja (Karber 2012). However, due to the effects of the chemicals, some 
of which are suspected to have been cyanide, Sulphur mustard and newer agents, the Kurds 
who later returned to the city have never lived a normal life (Karber 2012). According to 
researchers who have investigated the aftermath of the attacks, complications experienced by 
women resulted in stillbirth, premature delivery and miscarriages (Karber 2012).  
In addition, children born after the attacks suffer deformities from birth, meaning that 
women rarely give birth to normal babies (Karber 2012). This is testimony to the fact that the 
chemicals affected the DNA of the victims, making future generations also suffer from bear 
the attack by Saddam’s forces. 
 
2.8 The Kurdish Regional Government 
The establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government faced violent challenges as uprisings 
by Kurds in Iraq were met with forceful suppression by the Iraqi government. Just before the 
formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the establishment of the Kurdish 
Autonomous Republic, Iraq experienced more uprisings in its Shia-dominated regions, from 
early in 1999. The uprisings of 1999 were triggered by the assassination of Grand Ayatollah, 
Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr by Saddam Hussein’s brutal operatives.  
The fights between the Kurds and the government forces continued until sometime in 
October 1999, when an agreement was reached between opposing factions (Cockburn 2008). 
One of the provisions of the agreement required that Iraq should withdraw from regions of 
Iraq that were occupied and inhabited by Kurds. The result was a recognition by Saddam of a 
Kurdish Autonomous Republic in the northern part of Iraq (Jahn 2015).  
The withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the Kurdish-inhabited regions also paved the way 
for the formation of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in the autonomous area in 
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1992, as discussed in detail later in this section (Jahn 2015). Therefore, the KRG is the 
official ruling entity in the northern region of Iraq, known as Iraqi Kurdistan. The new 
government of the state of Iraq recognized the Kurdish Autonomous Region after the US and 
its allies invaded in it in 2003 (Jahn 2015). 
After the Iraqi forces had recaptured Kirkuk and other regions, and as the forces of 
the international community continued to impose a no-fly zone, both parties negotiated for an 
autonomous Kurdistan (Szajkowski 2004). Given the experiences of the past, Talabani was 
not trusting of Saddam’s promise and was against the signing of any agreement that would 
not be recognised by the international community (Szajkowski 2004). Subsequently, Saddam 
preferred dealing with Barzani (McDowall 2004). Even so, the negotiations between Saddam 
and Barzani failed to yield any result and Saddam decided to isolate the regions that were 
occupied by Kurds, so that they would not be able to import goods, nor do any export trade 
(McDowall 2004). This led to demonstrations against both the Iraqi government and the KDP 
leaders at the time (McDowall 2004). The isolation by Saddam provided the Kurds with the 
perfect opportunity to conduct democratic elections in their inhabited regions without any 
interference from the Iraqi government, which they did in 1992 (Danilovich 2014).  
In that election, the KDP won 51 seats, while the PUK won the remaining 49 seats 
(Danilovich 2014). However, there were claims of election malpractices. To avoid any 
possible conflict, the two parties agreed to share the seats equally and established a unity 
government (Danilovich 2014). The unity government ultimately collapsed in 1994, when a 
civil war broke out once again (Meho 2004). The last parliamentary caucus was held in 1996 
and two Kurdish states emerged thereafter; one state controlled by the PUK with its base in 
Silemani and another state controlled by the KDP with its base in Hewler (Meho 2004).  
Both of the two factions claimed to be the legitimate rulers and governments of Iraqi 
Kurdistan. This scenario created party rule in the region (Meho 2004), but an election took 
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place in 2005, fundamentally to end the rule that was claimed by both KDP and PUK (Bengio 
2014). The two parties decided to unite again after engaging in a civil war. Before the 
elections of 2005, the two parties formed a coalition, the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of 
Kurdistan, which also included small parties.  
The Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan won the elections with about 90% of 
the votes, enabling the two main parties to share the government positions equally to the 
exclusion of other parties; the smaller parties did not obtain the requisite number of seats to 
get a representation in the government (Bengio 2014). The coalition also won the next 
elections in 2009 (Bengio 2014). In that election, two main opposition parties emerged: the 
Change List and Reform List. It is important to note that in the 2005 elections, the President 
was elected by the Parliament. However, in 2009, the KRG decided that the President should 
be elected by the people and not by Parliament. Masoud Barzani, who had been elected by 
Parliament in 2005, contested the seat once more and won by about 70% of the votes (Bengio 
2014). 
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq adopted a new constitution in 2005, 
which recognised the legitimacy of the KRG as a constituent state in the democratic federal 
Iraq (Hill and Hagerty 2013). The establishment and recognition of the Kurdish Autonomous 
Region (Iraqi Kurdistan) under KRG has provided the Kurds with a sense of entitlement to 
their own freedom. In their history of struggle, the Kurds had for the first time the most 
powerful government of their own to advance their social, economic and political interests. 
The fourth Iraqi Kurdistan elections took place in 2013 and were supposed to include 
the election of the president (Danilovich 2014). However, Parliament decided to extend the 
term of President Massoud Barzani for a further two years (Salih 2015).  
For the first time since 1992, the KDP and PUK vied for seats independently in the 
elections of 2013 (Salih 2015).  
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There were high expectations that KDP would win the elections, because it had more 
support than other political parties, especially the PUK (Romano and Gurses 2014). The PUK 
at the time was wrought by internal conflicts and uncertainty due to the illness of its leader, 
Jalal Talabani, who had suffered a stroke (Romano and Gurses 2014).  
Nonetheless, the campaigns were disrupted by clashes that emerged due to tensions 
among the supporters of the KDP, the PUK and the Movement for Change parties. Even 
though the KDP won the elections, no party garnered enough votes to form and run the 
government alone. As a result, the KDP had to form a government with the party that came 
second in the election, the Movement for Change (Romano and Gurses 2014). 
Even though the new constitution of 2005 assured Kurds of some form of autonomous 
self-rule, some of them felt that it did not provide enough, especially when considered against 
the hope for statehood among the Kurdish population (Ahmed 2012). This implies that some 
Kurds wanted a fully autonomous state in the regions controlled by the KRG (Ahmed 2012). 
According to those who preferred a full independence to a mere autonomy, a federal structure 
would not recognise the historical, geographical and ethnic realities of Fatah, the Kurdish 
homeland (Ahmed 2012). 
 
2.9 The Role of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq 
Since the establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan and the recognition of its government within the 
territory of the wider Iraq, the KRG has played a significant governmental role in the federal 
Iraqi region (O’Leary 2006). The Iraq constitution that was adopted in 2005 divides Iraq into 
federal units responsible for their own internal social, economic and political affairs, while 
the central government of Iraq handles international affaires.  
However, the biggest issue of contention between the KRG and the central Iraqi 
government is with respect to oil resources (Bilgin 2012).  
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The KRG has signed a number of oil contracts with foreign companies, which has 
resulted in disputes, as it maintains that the contracts are lawful under Iraqi law (Bilgin 
2012).  
Nonetheless, the role that the KRG has played in Iraq was very evident in 2003, when 
its parties and the Peshermerga liaised with the United States when it led the invasion of Iraq, 
leading to the ultimate collapse of Saddam’s regime and the end of his rule, after many 
decades of brutality against Kurds (Eccarius-Kelly 2011). The death of Saddam Hussein and 
the collapse of his regime marked a critical turning point in the history of the Kurds. 
The KRG currently exercises constitutional authority over Silemani, Erbil and Duhok 
provinces. Furthermore, it has de facto authority over some parts of Kirkuk, Ninawa and 
Diyala provinces (Dabrowska and Hann 2008). As the KRG seeks to strengthen its grip in 
Iraqi regions, one significant challenge remains: the future boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Many Kurds are of the opinion that the territories of Iraqi Kurdistan should be extended so 
that it covers cities inhabited by Kurds, such as Kirkuk and Mosul (Dabrowska and Hann 
2008). The Assyrians, Turkmen and Arabs who inhabit those cities, coupled with opposition 
coming from Turkey, make the possibility of including these cities into the territories even 
more delicate. Evidently, Turkey fears that the inclusion of those territories in the Iraqi 
Kurdistan region would facilitate the founding of an independent Kurdish state, which it does 
not support (Galbraith 2008). This can be explained by the fact that Turkey has a small 
Kurdish minority, who may want to be part of a Kurdistan state. Turkey’s fear is that its 
Kurdish minority may cause political instability within its territories, should an independent 
Kurdish state break away from Iraq. However, with the increasing possibility of the 
independence of Kurdistan, Turkey is trying to change its attitude. 
The KRG has also established a movement to make it distinct from other parts of Iraq; 
the movement is referred to as ‘Kurdistan – The Other Iraq’, the main purpose of which is to 
 62 
highlight the commercial viability of Iraqi Kurdistan (Voller 2014). The movement is under 
the leadership of the Kurdistan Development Corporation, which aims to portray Iraqi 
Kurdistan as a safe investment hub in the midst of the violence and insecurity occurring in 
other territories of Iraq (Voller 2014). In this regard, its achievements include an increasing 
number of foreign investors injecting their capital in the region. In order to gain credibility, 
the KRG embarked on building the security and defence of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, 
especially along its borders with Iran and Syria (Ahmed 2012). The most important role of 
the KRG, under the leadership of President Masoud Barzani, is to represent the Kurds at 
national and international level (Charountaki 2010).  
The KRG oversees the relationships and cooperation between regional authorities as 
well as at the Iraqi federal level (Charountaki 2010). It also continues to advocate for an 
independent Kurdish state, even though it is evident that some Kurds prefer Iraqi Kurdistan to 
remain as an autonomous region within the territory of Iraq. President Masoud Barzani even 
announced that Iraqi Kurdistan would have an independence referendum in 2014, although 
this was postponed to a later date (Russell 2014). 
 
2.10 The Iraqi-Kurdish referendum: Revealing the desire for independence 
Following the peshmerga’s role in fighting alongside the international community against 
Islamic State in Iraq, the Kurdish political leadership believed the time had come to declare 
its people’s desire for an independent Kurdistan. In June 2017, Masoud Barzani arranged a 
meeting with the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and other 
political parties. Barzani believed that the USA, the countries of Europe and the rest of the 
world would back the Kurdish people’s decision as a reward for their role in defeating 
Islamic State and other terrorist groups (River 2017). The Kurdish politicians’ mis-
interpreted the rest of the world’s support for their move towards an independent Kurdistan. 
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Despite furious Iraqi, regional and international objections, Barzani announced 25 September 
as the date for the referendum.  
Instead of paving the way for statehood or strengthening the Kurds’ bargaining power in 
negotiations, it has precipitated a turnaround in the struggle towards independence (Morris 
2017).  
Some analysts suspect that Barzani’s determination was, firstly, because he thought 
this was the best and last chance to achieve the Kurdish dream of an independent Kurdistan 
and for him to be the first leader of such a state. Secondly, Barzani sought to regain his power 
as the president of the Kurdistan region by claiming legitimacy via the vote of the people. 
Finally, Barzani assumed that the referendum would solve internal disagreement with the 
opposition parties, mainly Goran and Islamic groups, about the legal period of his power, 
which would position him as a de-facto president of the Kurdish state.  
According to Hiltermann, Barzani went ahead with his decision as he feared that 
when and if the Islamic State were defeated, the diplomatic leverage the Kurds had with the 
USA and Europe would also dry up (Hiltermann 2017).  
On 25 September 2017, Kurdish people in the governorates of Sulaimani, Kirkuk, 
Erbil and Duhok voted for independence with a majority of 93 per cent. The tri-colour 
Kurdish flag was everywhere. Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani claimed a historical victory in 
the referendum and asked the Iraqi government to start talks for practical steps towards the 
division of Kurdistan, including Kirkuk, from Iraq (Chulov 2017). Next day Iraq, Iran and 
Turkey rejected the results, doubted the legitimacy of the whole process and insisting that 
Barzani should freeze the outcome immediately. On 29 September 2017, Secretary of State 
Rex Tillerson declared that the United State of America did not recognise the decision of the 
Iraqi Kurdish independence referendum (River 2017).   
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The Turkish and Iranian governments reiterated that they would assist the Iraqi 
government against Barzani’s decision.  
The Iraqi government ordered the Kurdistan Regional Government to hand over their 
international airports in Sulaimani and Erbil to the central government and stopped all 
international flights from those air ports (Zuchinno 2017).  Turkey cut off access to oil 
pipelines, choking the oil-reliant Kurdish economy. Iran has performed military drills with 
the Iraqi army on the border of Iraqi Kurdistan, near the town of Haji Omran on the 
historically named Hamilton Road in the hope of forcing Iraqi Kurds to step down (Tabatabai 
2017). The Kurdish quest for independence backfired. On the night of 15/16 October 2017 
the Iraqi army and Shiite militia attacked the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and captured it with no 
resistance. The peshmerga retreated and apart from some casualties around the town of Tooz-
Khurmatoo, no-one was killed in Kirkuk’s operation. In November 2017, Masoud Barzani 
condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kirkuk and accused a group in the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan, the second big political party in Iraqi-Kurdistan led by Jalal Talbani of conspiring 
against him and secretly signing an agreement with the Iraqi government backed by Iran 
(Pechana 2017).  
According to Michael Gunter, the Kurdistan region has significantly developed since 
1991 and especially after the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003 (Gunter 2017). A civil society 
has emerged with many newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations. Kurds have 
avoided civil war in Iraq and in contrast became a safe haven to Iraqi people fleeing from the 
middle and south of Iraq as a result of sectarian divisions and fighting. Therefore, the 
international community should not have been surprised by Barzani’s or the Kurds’ decision 
as they have concentrated on generating stability and autonomy amidst much chaos in the 
region (Gunter 2017).  
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 In contrast, according to Lisel Hintz, Assistant Professor at John Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies, and Kate Klain, Barzani miscalculated the disunity among 
the Kurdish parties and failed to anticipate the partial support of his traditional rival the PUK 
(Klain and Hintz 2017). Barzani underestimated the division among the Kurdish Iraqi Parties, 
which led the Kurdistan Islamic Group known as Komaly Islami, and the change movement, 
known as Goran, which announced a boycott of the referendum just hours before the vote 
began. Furthermore, Barzani undervalued the economic situation and the financial crisis in 
Kurdistan and the fact that government had failed to pay employees regularly since 2015 
(Klain and Hintz 2017). Moreover, the legal presidential period for Barzani ended in August 
2016 and the parliament was suspended by the KDP in October 2016. when the head of 
Parliament Dr Yousif Mohammed was not allowed to proceed to the parliament by KDP 
forces at a check point near Erbil.  
Additionally, Barzani believed that Iraq would be open to the Kurdish decision as a 
result of the peshmerga’s collaboration in the battle against ISIS.  
He also assumed that the economic relationship and business associations with both 
Iran and Turkey would force them to accommodate his resolution. In a final miscalculation, 
the KRG thought that the retirement of Masoud Barzani and the introduction of Nachervan 
Barzani, who served as a Prime Minister beside his uncle, would mute regional and 
international resistance or opposition to the referendum. However, tension and instability 
after the referendum remained high and the situation has further escalated. In the end, the 
KRG agreed to respect the Federal Iraqi Court’s decision that the vote was unconstitutional 
(Klain and Hintz 2017).  
Finally, with the slim possibility of any shift in regional support, permission from 
Baghdad, or unity among Kurdish groups anytime in the near future, as well as losing 
territory to the Iraqi army which means losing a big part of the revenue the KRG hoped to 
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generate for an independent Kurdistan in Kirkuk’s oilfields, Iraqi Kurds’ independence hopes 
now seem more distant and less likely than ever.  
 
2.11 The Present Region of Iraqi Kurdistan 
The present region of Iraqi Kurdistan was originally referred to as the Kurdistan Region, 
because the majority of the inhabitants were Kurdish people. It is currently the only 
autonomous region in the federated state of Iraq, as has been explained in earlier sections. 
Iraqi Kurdistan is not yet an independent state, which makes Kurds one of the largest 
populations in the world with no autonomous state of their own.  
However, with the latest developments in Iraq, the Kurds’ hope for their own state is 
high. The overthrowing of Saddam Hussein and the collapse of his regime in 2003 raised the 
hope of Kurdish independence. In 2005, the already established Kurdistan Referendum 
Movement conducted an unofficial independence referendum covering the three main regions 
under KRG (Voller 2014).  
The results of the referendum showed that about 98 per cent of Kurds wanted an 
independent state. However, the two leading Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, rejected 
the outcome of the referendum and instead advocated for a unitary Iraq (Voller 2014). The 
position that was taken by the two parties was clearly contrary to what they had been fighting 
for, the independence of the Iraqi Kurdistan.  
The position can be attributed to the fact that the referendum was unofficial and that it 
might have been done at the time when their political interests would not be served by 
agitating for an independence referendum (Galip, 2015). The referendum was an initiative of 
the Kurdish elites, among whom were local and international supporters who advocated for 
the independence of the KRG-controlled regions. 
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The growing likelihood of the US invasion of Iraq after the 9/11 attacks on its soil 
motivated Kurdish political leaders to abandon their differences and work together for the 
common interest of all Kurds (Romano 2006).  
They were readying themselves to take advantage of the opportunities and deal with 
challenges that would arise after the collapse Saddam’s regime (Romano 2006). The al-Anfal 
campaigns and all forms of brutality against Kurds were a policy of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. Therefore, the collapse of his Baath Party regime and his death meant that the 
historical injustices against the Kurds were also ending. Importantly, since the collapse of 
Saddam’s regime, Iraqi Kurdistan has been gaining ground with respect to its territorial 
expansions. For instance, in 2014, the region captured the city of Kirkuk and other 
neighbouring regions; Kirkuk has large oil deposits (Russell 2014). 
After Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Kurdistan’s leaders established a presence outside the 
traditional Kurdish regions. Masoud Barzani and Talabani have increased their political role 
in Iraq’s central government (Katzman 2010). Notably, the Kurds, especially the peshmerga, 
played a major role in the collapse of Saddam’s regime, playing a major role in the ground 
battle, as the United States provided air support (Rayburn 2014).  
It is worth noting that Saddam’s forces were the major obstacle to the Kurds’ 
statehood (Rayburn 2014). Therefore, after the collapse of the regime, the Kurds had the best 
opportunity advance their political, social, cultural and economic interests, particularly with 








3.1.! Social and cultural capital  
One of the main strengths of this research, which concentrates on return migration to the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) controlled region, is its highlight on narratives of 
participants’ views and experiences in their parental homeland. However, this kind of 
empirical investigation can be challenged because of its limited exploration of theoretical 
models that position return migration. It is not within the scope of my discussion to critically 
interrogate the complexity, multiplicity and diversity of migration theories. However, it is 
important to acknowledge two theories which have informed my analysis: that of social 
capital and cultural capital. The phenomenon of social and cultural capital can be seen as one 
of the reasons that stimulates refugees to return to their homeland.  
One of the main theoretical perspectives in research on return migration is the 
returnees’ impact on the development of the country of origin. King’s (1986) edited volume 
considers the impact of return migration on economic development in the host society. “The 
directionality and continuity of migration flows benefit the original sending society because 
migrants accumulate human, economic and social capital in their host country” (Reynolds 
2008: 8). Therefore, it could be stated that one of the benefits of second-generation return to 
the parents’ homeland is that it facilitates inter-generational accumulation of cultural, social 
and economic capital for the original sending society (Reynolds 2008). Reynolds indicates in 
his research the significance of cross-generational accumulation of capital achieved through 
return migration within the Caribbean region.  
Bourdieu’s The Forms of Capital (1986) outlines the concepts of cultural capital and 
social capital and has been useful for exploring the role of capital in the social sciences in 
general.  
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In his comprehensive theory Bourdieu identifies a number of different forms of 
‘capital’ that serve both as material and symbolic resources in human exchanges, and which 
returnees bring back to their home countries.  
Social capital is important for understanding the ways in which individuals are 
positioned in society. Furthermore, it is an essential concept in exploring the relationship 
between intent, opportunity and resources. The concept of social capital, which Bourdieu 
defines in terms of durable network relations (Bourdieu 1986: 248), is: ‘The sum of the 
recourses, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or 
recognition. It is built on mutual obligation and expectations, norms or reciprocity, trust and 
solidarity’ (Bourdieu, Waquant 1992:11). Bourdieu focuses on membership on formal 
organizations where people obtain skills, reciprocity, and establish contact with people of 
other groups.  
Social capital can be broadly defined as ‘the values that people hold and the resources that 
they can access, which both result in and are the result of collective and socially negotiated 
ties and relationships’ (Reynolds 2008: 15). Social capital builds connections between family 
and society. Robert Putnam (2000), often regarded as one of the founding fathers of social 
capital theory emphases the importance of social capital in relations to societies, communities 
and families. Networks of trust, values and reciprocity are significant to making family and 
community relationships work and sustaining the connections that bind societies together 
(Reynolds: 2008:15). Family networks comprised of ties of trust and reciprocal relationships 
enable social capital to be built up over time and transmitted across generations.  
‘Bourdieu’s theorizing of forms of capital has been useful in social sciences, for 
exploring the role of capital, asset and resources in the study of social stratification.  
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Within migrant groups, cultural capital is differentiated according to gender, class, 
educational status and ethnic affiliation and this influences how social and cultural capital can 
be mobilized’ (Erel 2010: 646). Weenink (2008) employs the notion of cultural capital to 
analyse how Dutch parents construct a cosmopolitan habitus for their school-age children and 
project its usefulness for a globalized job market.  
According to Koo, Ming and Tsang, ‘cultural capital usually refers to symbolic 
expressions and behavioural dispositions, such as the possession of nuanced language, 
aesthetic preferences and cultural goods’ (Koo, Ming and Tsang 2014: 4). Cultural capital, 
according to Bourdieu (1986), “appears in three states: embodied, institutionalized and 
objectified. Yet cultural capital consists also of informal education transmitted through the 
family, political parties, cultural groups, etc. The convertibility into other forms of capital 
(economic, social, symbolic) distinguishes mere cultural resources from cultural capital” 
(Erel 2010: 643). 
Bourdieu states that, ‘cultural Capital is accumulated by means of formal education 
and comprises language proficiency of culture competence and takes the form of diplomas, 
certificates or academic titles’ (Bourdieu 1986). The main concept of Bourdieu’s theory is 
that different forms of capital (social, cultural, economic and symbolic) are interlinked.  
Research has often identified cultural capital as reified and ethnically bounded, 
assuming individuals bring a set of cultural resources from the country of migration to the 
country of origin that either fit or do not fit. There is an important link between social and 
cultural capital, the latter of which comprises ways of thinking and being as well as cultural 
goods produced, that generate social resources for individuals, families and communities 
(Bourdieu 1986). Potter notes ‘return migrants are best viewed as people endowed with social 
capital, potential and realized’ (Potter 2005:14). Other studies also highlight that strong 
family ties and strong connections to the family homeland provide the primary reason for 
 71 
return over and above other economic, social and political considerations (Gmelch 1980; 
Foner 2002; Fog-Olwig 2007). 
Social capital studies underscore ‘the social embeddedness of actors in specific 
networks to get access to available resources’ (Keles 2016: 10). The cultural, political and 
economic positions of the individuals and their engagement in the homeland society 
determines such access (Coleman 1988). For instance, Woolcock discussed the ‘linking’ 
social capital and argued that it is the ‘capacity to leverage resources, ideas and information 
from formal institutions’ (2001: 13). Hepworth and Stitt (2007) found that this ‘linking’ 
social capital connects national and local decision and policy makers. Social capital theory 
has been critically and broadly tackled in previous literature (Portes 1998; Fine 2001). It can 
be summarised as the connection and relation of people who share common attachments, 
sentiments and values as members in a particular community and network for mutual 
benefits. Despite this, the relationship between network membership and individual economic 
outcomes remains contentious. Altogether, this is based on the premise that taking 
membership in social networks and engaging in coordinated actions are the most common 
social capital investment forms.!
 
3.2.! Theories of return  
While Hall stated that ‘migration is a one-way trip, there is no “home” to go back to’ (Hall 
1987: 44), historically migrants have often returned to their country of origin or parental 
roots. A significant number of migrants have returned to the land of their family roots either 
soon after arrival or some years after migration.  
The migrant’s decision to return is usually made after comparing information about 
conditions and prospects in the host country with those in the country of origin, as well as 
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information about policy interventions that constitute extra incentives or disincentives to stay 
or return (Harild, Christensen and Zetter 2015).  
A large amount of new research has been published in the last few years on return 
migration. But still many gaps remain: ‘Return migration is obviously an important 
phenomenon and therefore, the lack of empirical work on the topic is surprising’ (Klinthäll 
1999: 2). According to Christou ‘“Return migration”, as the term suggests, is understood as 
the process of migrants' return to the country/place of origin, parental/ancestral extraction, or 
to the “symbolic homeland”. This implies a voluntary decision but it may also be involuntary, 
forced on the migrant by either environmental/personal disaster or political action; in this 
case it is commonly referred to as “repatriation”’ (Christou 2002: 64). 
Whether second-generation migrants or refugees accomplish this process voluntarily 
or via repatriation is a matter of interpretation depending on the circumstances (Portes & 
Rumbaut, 2005). Thus, second-generation migrants and refugees may return home to 
reconnect with their families and friends and to regain the sense of identity or achieve any 
other personal or group goals (Ali, 2011). Alternatively, second-generation migrants and 
refugees may return home as a result of repatriation due to political crisis, criminal justice 
proceedings such as court orders, socio-economic turbulence and many other triggers 
(Chiswick 2007). Common terms often interchanged with return migration are, ‘remigration, 
re-emigration, return flow, return movement, reflex migration, retro-migration, back 
migration, counter migration, counter-current, counter-flow, counter-stream migration, 
second time migration, U-turn migration and others’ (Christou 2006: 57 – 58).  
While academic approaches related to return migration can be traced back to the 
1960s, there is no question that, with hindsight, it was in the 1980s that there was a 
stimulating scientific debate among researchers over the return phenomenon and its impact 
on origin countries (Cassarino 2004).  
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Various theoretical approaches have been applied in the conceptualisation of return 
migration beyond the Kurdish context. The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) 
and the neo-classical economic approach consider return migration notion from an economic 
view (Constant and Massey 2002). The neo-classical economic approach considers that 
returning immigrants are individuals with long-term migration strategies, which entail 
accessing better opportunities for earning and staying permanently in destination countries 
where wages are higher than in their countries of origin. Accordingly, the earning factor 
becomes critical in causing migration to countries with higher probabilities of earning than in 
sending countries. Altogether, returnees do not meet these expectations. Unfulfilled 
expectations or a failure to recognise migrant human capital motivates the return of the 
migrants to their countries of origin (Todaro 1969). The issue of preoccupation with the 
‘myth of return’ in settlement countries also inspires return, according to Gundel and Peters 
(2008). It is noteworthy that the neo-classical economic approach only focuses on labour 
migrants. Thus, this approach is limited to the consideration of return labour migrants 
following a failure that is traceable to the individual underperformance that causes exclusion 
from the labour market (Constant and Massey 2003). This approach is also rooted in 
migrants’ dissatisfaction with their expectations and inability to accomplish the goals that 
motivated their migration to other countries (Keles 2016). 
On the other hand, NELM portrays migration as a well-thought out short-term 
strategy by individuals who moved to destination countries where wages are higher than in 
their countries of origin to contribute to their households (Stark 1991). After achievement of 
their original immigration goals of increasing target earnings, savings and wealth 
accumulation abroad, such individuals return to their homelands where their social, emotional 
and family attachments are more profound (Constant and Massey 2002).  
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The overarching assumption is that their remittances, acquired training and skills, and 
their conversance with the host countries enhances the success of the returnees in using their 
cultural, social and human capital in their homelands (Cassarino 2004). These two theoretical 
approaches have clear limitations because NELM portrays returnees as financial 
intermediaries only and the neo-classical economic approach only accounts for return 
migration based on erroneous economic expectations (Cassarino 2004). Theoretical 
approaches inclined towards individualist perspectives do not account for any political, 
economic and social experiences of the returnees to the homeland. Such approaches also 
overlook the political and economic stability in their homeland that make return migration 
feasible and profitable (Keles 2016). 
The structural approach to returnee migration extended individualist theoretical 
approaches in evaluating the decision to return in the context of remittances and homeland 
realities, including societal and economic structures (Cassarino 2004). Political and economic 
structures could result in returnee success in their homelands. However, the unfulfilled 
expectations, disappointments, alienation and exclusion in their homelands could also cause 
re-emigration. Proponents of the structural approach underscore the fact that realities and 
changes in the migrants’ homelands are vital in the processes of decision-making by 
immigrants looking to return ‘home’. Additionally, these realities and changes play 
moderator or mediator roles, although negative structures and realities locally could cause 
returnee re-emigration. Nevertheless, the structural approach disregards the migrants’ 
interconnection with their countries of origin over space and time, across expansive national 
borders following the increased communication development, globalisation, transport 
technologies and transnational human mobility between country of origin and country of 
settlement. Scholarly descriptions of this condition refer to it as ‘transnationalism’.  
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These transnational networks traverse borders and comprise multifaceted associations 
with over two countries (Wahlbeck 2002; Pries 2002; Keles 2016). The emergence of the 
transnational social space continues to inspire partial transcendence of the nation-state and 
extends to many continents, societies and nation states. Consequently, this expansion has 
blurred and expanded nation states’ boundaries leading to the creation of what Keles (2015) 
describes as ‘deterritorialized identities that are not contained within the nationally-orientated 
majority culture of either the country of settlement or country of origin’ (p.25). The 
repercussions of this novel social interaction via transnational networks are evident in both 
countries of settlement and countries of origin, as well as between countries. 
Scholarly works in the field of transnationalism view return migration as a crucial part 
of transnational mobility, in addition to identifying return migration as a transnational 
circular process anchored in multi referential relationships and multi connectedness between 
the country of settlement and the country of origin (Keles 2016). Rapid advancements in 
transport and communication technologies promote the sustenance of networks and 
connectedness in and with the homeland through consumption of transnational media, regular 
(often short-term) visits and engagement in political, cultural and civic life in the homelands. 
Such transnational interaction enables descendants of migrants a high level of familiarity, 
continuity and connectivity with their homeland. It also promotes the building of networks 
and the capacity of migrants to negotiate their status, position and identity in both their 
countries of settlement and origin. Unlike the belief upheld by structuralists, NELM and neo-
classical economic proponents that returnees need adapting and re-integrating to the 
structures and society in the homeland, proponents of transnationalism view returnee 
connection and deterritorialized identity as cultural and social capital which can be used for 
accessing resources (Keles 2016).  
 76 
The shared norms, experiences, language, values, political aspirations, ethnicity and 
kinship constitute the requisite sociological glue for contributing to the sustenance of cross-
border linkages, connectedness and development of cross-national social capital and 
networks (Keles 2016). Scholars have also applied social network theories in attempts at 
explaining the strong emotional, political, financial, cultural and interpersonal 
interconnectedness of ‘connected’ migrants across nation-state borders. These multiple ties 
could suffice as motivations and opportunities for Kurdish returnees to come back ‘home’. 
As discussed, social capital entails the resources available to social groups and/or individuals, 
which is convertible to human and economic capital through mobilisation of membership, 
well-being, belonging and attachment. The main aspect of social capital in the context of 
return migration is investing in relationships and maintaining networks to ensure that 
returnees have access to the resources enshrined in networks. Interpersonal and between-
people interactions and relationships are the main components of social networks including 
those between organisations and groups (Putnam 2000).  
Laumann et al (1978) observed that network theories consider returnees as actors 
conferring ‘a subjective meaning to their embedded actions, in a given context [and] network 
relationships can be based on the principle of “complementarity”’ (p.462). This principle 
could manifest in situations where actors with different ascribed attributes, personal traits and 
resource access decide to partner with symbiotic parties (Cassarino 2004). Based on this 
understanding, returnees as portrayed in social network theories are social actors with multi 
connectedness and multi-referential traits that determine their success and failure in their 
homeland. The establishment of steady long-term linkages and involvement in these 
networks, both in real-life or virtually, influences the desire to return ‘home’. The foundation 
of such networks is common experiences, identity and ethnicity based on common interests.  
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Communality in interests allows returnees access to local homeland networks and 
affects the nature of organisation structures and networks. At the same time, returnees gain 
the capacity to fulfil their expectations. 
There are conceptual problems regarding the definitions of return migration. 
Neoclassical economics and the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) approaches 
view return migration either as an ‘anomaly, if not the failure of a migration experience’ or a 
‘calculated strategy (Kılınç 2013). As Cassarino states, 
In so far as the neoclassical approach to international migration is based on the notion of 
wage differentials between receiving and sending areas, as well as on the migrant’s 
expectations for higher earnings in host countries, return migration seems to be viewed as the 
outcome of a failed migration experience which did not yield the expected benefits. In other 
words, in a neoclassical stance, return migration exclusively involves labour migrants who 
miscalculated the costs of migration and who did not reap the benefits of higher earnings. 
(Cassarino 2004:255).   
 
In other words, return is a consequence of their failed experiences abroad or because 
their human capital was not rewarded as expected. In contrast, the structural approach brings 
the success/failure paradigm a step further, while arguing that the area of settlement, once 
return takes place, shapes the adjustment process of returnee (Kılınç 2013). In other words, 
return is not only a personal issue, but above all a social and contextual one, affected by 
situational and structural factors. Hence, the return migrant’s success and failure is analysed 
by his/her expectations of the home economy and society and the ‘reality’ of these cases in 
the homeland. Research has identified various reasons why refugees return home and these 
replicate across the world (Saito, 2007). Cassarino points out that: ‘This structural approach 
argues that return is not solely analysed with reference to the individual experience of the 
migrant, but also with reference to social and institutional factors in countries of origin. In 
fact, return is also a question of context’ (Cassarino 2015: 257). 
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Furthermore, return is not only conceptualised via individual experiences of migrants, 
but also with reference to social and institutional factors in home countries (Kılınç 2013). 
Thus, the return migrant’s success and failure are analysed by his/her expectations of the 
home economy and society and the ‘reality’ of these cases in the homeland. Cerese presents 
four different categories of returnee, highlighting their aspirations, expectations and needs:  
 
1.!  Return of failure: relates to those migrants returning because of a failure to 
integrate into the host countries, owing to discrimination from the host society or 
having personal difficulties in being an effective part of the society they live in or 
adapting themselves to host communities.  
2.! Return of conservatism: pertains to those migrants who left home with the aim 
of returning home with enough money to buy property in their home country.  
Because of these aspirations and targets, conservative returnees only tend to satisfy 
their personal needs, as well as those of their relatives. 
3.! Return of retirement: refers to those migrants who decide to return to their 
homeland when they are retired and their intension is to buy land or property in the 
home country and spend their old age there.  
4.! Return of innovation: this refers to those migrants who integrated well in the 
host country and use the skills that they have acquired during their stay in the host 
country when they return to their homeland. (Cerase 1974) 
Cerase’s (1974) categories of returnees obviously represent an attempt to indicate that 
circumstances or contextual factors in the homeland need to be taken into account to identify 
whether a return experience is a success or a failure. There is no doubt that Cerase’s 
explanations have been vital to subsequent approaches to returnees and return migration.  
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3.2.1 Return from an economic perspective 
One of the issues raised by migration theories is the relationship between remittances and 
return migration. In economic terms, migrants return to the country of origin with 
particular types of economic remittances which in turn impact on local development and 
future migration flows (Jones 1998; Carling 2002). There are refugees who return in pursuit 
of economic prosperity, after finding that the living and working conditions in the host nation 
are untenable (Ali, 2011). One example is the research on second-generation return migration 
from the UK to the Caribbean conducted by Reynolds, which outlined the economic benefits 
of return. These young people felt that they were in a better position to utilise the skills and 
qualifications gained in the UK to set up their own businesses and develop their 
entrepreneurial skills in the Caribbean (Reynolds, 2008).  
Research shows that fluctuating economic conditions across the world are known to 
either absorb or shed labour from the markets (Anthias, 2008). When the latter takes place 
and migrants run out of employment opportunities, one option is to return to country of origin 
if there are no other jobs at hand (Saito, 2007;Waldinger et al., 2007). This factor explains 
why many migrants abroad keep multiple part time jobs, as a cushion from the risk of 
unemployment, which predisposes them to harsh living conditions and imminent return home 
(Stark, 2004). Moreover, when there is organizational restructuring such as the 
mechanization of previous manual jobs, the desire to return home can be triggered when 
individuals cannot find alternative placements.  
 
 3.2.2. Emotional Reasons  
Research has identified emotional reasons and length of time lived abroad as a major factor in 
the return home of migrants (Christou 2006; Engbersen et al. 2014). Over time, migrant 
might begin to feel detached from their home community, culture and lifestyle which can be 
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a major trigger for their return home (Dupree, 2002). For example, refugees from 
Afghanistan who seek opportunities in neighbouring nations may decide to return after 
decades of goal accomplishment (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008). While away, these refugees 
often feel ‘home sick’ and have a strong desire to reconnect with family and friends face-to-
face as a departure from the telecommunication mode (Ali 2011). Depending on the strength 
of assimilation and success in changing nationality in the host nation, migrants have the 
privilege of returning to their home of choice (Saito 2007; Alba 2005). The study of second 
generation return from Germany to Turkey by King and Kılınc is characterised much more 
by whole-family return. This route to return was the most common feature amongst their 
sample, accounting for half of the participants’ relocation to Turkey. Returning through this 
mechanism generally brought the second generation to Turkey whilst they were teenagers, 
either still at school or at the end of their school years. Usually they were not consulted; they 
were simply presented with a fait accompli. Most were not happy with the decision, wanting 
to remain in Germany with their friends and classmates (King and Kılınc, 2014) 
 
3.2.3 Epidemic outbreak 
Research shows that an epidemic outbreak in a host nation can trigger migrant return back 
home (Sirkeci 2012). The recent outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus in parts of West Africa 
caused second-generation migrants to return home from nations identified by the World 
Health Organization as high risk. This epidemic caused panic among the second-generation 
migrants and thousands returned from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and other neighbouring 
nations. However, when they reached their homes, there was thorough screening and 
isolation for those who showed symptoms. This situation caused significant apprehension 
about their identity and sense of belonging (BBC, 2014).  
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3.2.4 Political Reasons 
Research has cited political extremism and ideology as a major cause of second-generation 
migrant return (Al-Ali et al, 2001). Many second-generation migrants seek to live and work 
in nations with high standards of democracy. However, after living there and having children, 
there may be political regime change, as a result of election or a coup. If the new leader is 
autocratic and disrespects human rights, second-generation migrants could be forced to return 
home and face a culture shock if there was no prior orientation (Dupree, 2002). Specifically, 
when there is violent political unrest, such as the current situation in parts of the Middle East 
like Syria and Yemen, this causes serious human displacement; the second generation can be 
confused, angry, disorientated and disillusioned because the timelines for returning home are 
not under their control (Gebremedhin & Mavisakalyan, 2010). 
 
3.2.5 Family Reasons  
Research has shown that many second-generation migrants return home to marry and protect 
family wealth. Depending on the cohesion within the family, some second-generation 
migrants who seek to maintain close roots with their homes are opposed to intermarriage with 
host nation citizens (King & Christou, 2008). The issue of migrant return for marriage is 
evident among some Muslim communities, especially in tribal places such as Afganistan, 
where arranged marriage is the norm. Parents of Afghan second-generation migrants in Iran 
expect their children to marry spouses, follow the guidance and criteria of their parents in 
choosing a partner, and behave in a manner that ensures a satisfactory conjugal life (Abbasi-
Shavazi et al, 2008). Overall, the choice of marriage partners can be a case of personal 
discretion or a community decree that some second-generation migrants must comply with, 
leading to a return home.  
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3.2.6 Career failure  
Career failure, compounded with nostalgia and reaching retirement age, is a common reason 
for second-generation migrant return to the country of origin (Horst, 2006). Many people 
who decide to immigrate to nations like the United States of America have big dreams 
informed by prior information or perceptions about the nation. However, depending on their 
skills and qualifications, some second-generation migrants fail and are forced to return home 
(Al-Ali et al 2001). Additionally, when second-generation migrants remember the things they 
expected to achieve but failed, many resort to return home even if the feeling of shame 
prevails (Engbersen et al. 2013). In addition, some careers are specific about the retirement 
age of employees. Hence, second-generation migrants who reach that age and have no 
savings or alternative income must return and settle back home where living conditions are 
more affordable (Saito, 2007). 
Case studies of the reasons for return to Greece by second-generation migrants from 
nations like Germany and Sweden shed some light into this research area (Panagakos, 2003). 
Apart from migrants who were returning home after war, there is evidence that labour 
fulfilment is a major factor (Glatzer, 2001). The case of Eritrean returnees serves as a good 
example of how labour shortages have resulted in a return of second-generation migrants. 
However, a significant number of cases of repatriation have lead migrants to return home and 
these too are of socio-economic importance, especially because the returning second-
generation migrants do not feel at home due to the forced repatriations (Kibreab, 2002).  
 
3.3 ’Home’ and ‘Belonging’ – the generational dynamic  
3.3.1 The notion of home, homeland and place     
This section will include a brief discussion of the various ways that notions of home, 
homeland and place have been discussed in the literature.  
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Very often the idea of place is dominant in migrants’ constructions of belonging. It also plays 
a fundamental role in collective and individual identity narratives that remain loyal to a place 
and reference a place of common origin or homeland, be it real or fictive (Lovell 1998).  
Home is no longer considered to be located necessarily in one place; instead, multi-scalarity 
of belonging characterises the current theorisations of ‘home’ (Blunt & Dowling 2006: 257).  
Brah (1996: 192) claims that the concept of diaspora involves a notion of home, with 
displacement and dislocation from that home is at its core; although, she explains that home 
is ‘a mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination’. This means that home ‘is a place of 
no return, even if it is possible to visit the geographical territory that is seen as the place of 
“origin”’. Furthermore, she argues home to also be ‘the lived experience of a locality. Its 
sounds and smells, its heat and dust [...] all this, as mediated by the historically specific 
everyday of social relations’. Therefore, home appears to have two meanings for Brah – it 
can be an imagined, mythic place located at a distance, yet at the same time feeling at home 
in a place can stem from lived experiences in that particular place (Lovell 1998). According 
to Brah, the feeling of ‘home’ is constructed around experiencing a certain locality, around 
being familiar with its materiality and physicality – for instance, its landscapes and roads. 
Brah also suggests that social relations constitute a sense of home in a locality. Antonsich 
argues that the sense of ‘belonging’ is an emotional feeling, it comes to be attached by an 
individual to a particular place. “In this context, place is felt as ‘home’ and, accordingly, to 
belong means to find a place where an individual can feel ‘at home’” (Antonsich 2010: 6). 
Furthermore, he states that” ‘home’ here does not stand for the domestic(ated) material space 
only, ‘home’ here stands for a symbolic space of familiarity, comfort, security, and emotional 
attachment” (Antonsich 2010: 6). 
According to Brun and Fabos, “home and place are complex and interrelated notions 
to which the experience of forced migration adds an additional layer to the puzzle of 
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belonging and identity” (Brun and Fabos 2015: 6). Brun emphasizes in her article that, for 
refugees and forced migrants, place is a specific articulation of social relations stretched out 
beyond one location (Brun 2001). A place encompasses physical, social, economic, and 
cultural realities; a home in this understanding is ‘a particularly significant kind of place with 
which, and within which, we experience strong social, psychological and emotive 
attachments’ (Easthope, n.a.).  
Home is the place where a person feels at ease; it is a comfortable and familiar 
environment where individuals can be themselves (Kebede 2010:12). However, home is not 
merely about a place; it “is the association of an individual within a homogeneous group and 
the association of that group with a particular physical place” (Warner 1994:162).  
This shows that home relates to both place and society. Kebede states that ‘identity is 
a sociocultural marker, when a person identifies him/herself as belonging to a particular 
group, he/she is also pointing out that he/she does not belong to the other group’ (Kebede: 
2010: 10).    
‘The increased scholarly interest in home in the social sciences and humanities has led 
to a critical scrutiny of the often taken-for-granted and idealized notion of home as haven. 
Home is now established as a more unsettled and problematic entity where tension and 
conflict are replete’ (Brun and Fabos 2015:7). ‘Home may be a house, but it may also refer to 
family, community, nation, and a number of other sites with which we associate and 
experience contingent acceptance. Home is thus not a site protected from the outside world; 
rather, its boundaries are porous and may be defined in relation to wider social and political 
locations. Home may be understood as a site in which power relations of the wider society, 
such as relations of gender, ethnicity, class, and generation are played out’ (Brun and Fabos 
2015:7).  
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Established conceptions in which home was the steady physical centre of one’s 
universe - a safe and still place to leave and go back to (whether house, village, region or 
nation) – are now recurrently challenged by more fluid and fragmented processes of 
identification and belonging (Rapport and Dawson 1998: 6). Home is often related to 
relationships and family, self, safety. (Mallett 2004) associations which shift the anchors of 
‘belonging’ away from the purely geographical. Taylor has shaped the concept of ‘home’ 
according to four main perspectives: the spatial, temporal, material and relational, to reveal 
that “home for the refugee is complex, multiple and in process” (Taylor 2009: 2). What the 
refugee loses when they are displaced is not only the “physical property of the spatial home; 
but also, the networks and social capital of the relational home; the framed memories, 
repetitions of daily life and future potential of the temporal home; as well as the tastes, scents 
and embodied experience of the material home” (Taylor 2009: 4). 
Furthermore, La Vecchia defined the concept of home according to three main 
perspectives – physical, social and cognitive (La Vecchia 2011).  “In the first case, home is 
coincided with the country of origin or a specific territory in which a homogeneous 
community, with a specific culture, lives and organizes itself to develop a peculiar identity 
and practices” (Warner, 1994).  Klis Van Der & Karsten (2005) pointed out that home may 
be both a spatial and a social place. The spatial place is composed of a physical unit or a 
house which is grounded in a geographical space, for instance, the birth place or the home 
country. On the other hand, the social place, the household, is the social construction, in 
which people who belong to the same family interact with each other. Home is therefore a 
place of identification defined in terms of social relationships (Fullilove, 1996). It is a place 
in which a set of practices, in a repetition of habitual social interactions are created and 
recreated (Rapport & Dawson,1998:27).  
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Other social scientists preferred to analyze the concept of home via its cognitive 
perspective, and therefore associate it to pleasant memories, intimate situations, a place of 
warmth and protective security amongst parents, brothers and sisters, loved people (Sarup, 
1994: 94), or nostalgia and longing for self and origin (Ray 2000; Akhtar 1999). 
According to Christou (2006), the term home is the feeling to connect with one’s 
cultural roots, while associating with what the people do, believe and identify with. 
Therefore, the term home has an aspect of cultural orientation, which binds a person to 
behave in a certain manner (Dupree, 2002). If a person conforms to a prescribed culture or 
community, there is a feeling of being at home, whereas an alternative conduct is perceived 
as a person of alien or external origin (Saxenian, 2006).  
A person who does not feel at home has a sense of insecurity and dissociates from 
random identity (Favell, 2008). The concept of ‘home’ became a global phenomenon, instead 
of regarding home as a stable, safe and physical centre of the universe to where return to 
(Rapport & Dawson, 1998: 27), new studies highlighted how the notion of home becomes 
more and more mobile. It is simpler to understand how second-generation migrants and 
refugees feel whenever they are away anticipating return (Gillhespy & Hayman, 2011). The 
idea that people are encapsulated into demarcated territories with specific cultures is no 
longer suitable in the world in which people and borders move. Therefore, home does not 
have a crystallized vision, but it can be extrapolated from a specific territory to others in 
which people experience special attachments and develop a specific identity (La Vecchia 
2011:25).  
For instance, Habib (1996) considered her personal experience of Lebanese living in 
an exile, from which she argued that home changes over time and it is not only related to a 
geographical place. During her travels across different countries such as Greece, France, 
Cyprus and United States, she was able to find a piece of home in all of them.  
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Also, Black (2002) explored the case of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
argued that it would be more appropriate to refer to the ‘concepts’ of home rather than the 
‘concept’ of home, because “home can be made, remade, imagined, remembered or desired; 
it can refer as much to beliefs, customs or traditions as physical places or buildings. But, in 
order to get its significance completely, people need to think about it as a concept in flux” 
(Black, 2002: 126).  
Alinia (2004: 330), in her study on the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden, determines that 
‘their transnational networks and communities, social relations and activities regarding the 
politics of location have in this process become their “home”’. The fact that Kurdistan does 
not exist as a state can lead to feelings of ambivalence toward the societies of departure, 
geographically located within the states of Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey (Alinia 2004: 211–
212). According to scholars the connection with the society of departure can differ 
tremendously from one member of a given generation to the next. Brah (1996: 193) considers 
a significant question in this regard: ‘What is the difference between “feeling at home” and 
staking claim to a place as one’s own?’. She differentiates between the homing desire and the 
desire for a ‘homeland’ (as not all diasporans aspire to return to the homeland) and offers a 
distinction between ‘feeling at home’ and declaring a place to be home (Brah 1996: 197).  
Eliassi (2014) defines the meaning of “homeland for younger and older generations of 
Kurds living in Sweden. He notes that homeland for the older generation ‘is something real, a 
physical place from which they have lived experiences and to which they have real and 
material bonds. For the younger generation or second-generation, on the contrary, homeland 
is imaginary, something they “create” according to their wishes and needs or experienced in 
reality through trips made by the second-generation” (Eliassi 2014:78). Alinia (2004) also 
highlights that the notion of homeland distinguishes several different positions among the 
first generation of the Kurdish diaspora based on ideological and political beliefs and 
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orientations. Alinia writes: ‘[T]here does not exist any given place that they all can refer to 
when they are facing the question about where/what their homeland is. Their meaning of 
homeland is a blend of political discourses and individual wishes, conceptions, longings and 
experiences. Their attachments to place are multiple: Sweden, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, 
the place of birth, Kurdish diaspora communities, and “Kurdistan”. “The political notion of 
homeland and home are associated with different political discourses but also with politicised 
narratives of belonging that are produced in the diaspora space” (Alinia 2004: 329). 
Therefore, understandings of homeland can differ greatly, depending on several factors, 
among them the diaspora’s historical context, the current state of the perceived homeland, 
and individuals’ personal experiences. 
In general, it could be said that for the second-generation there is no existence of an 
emotional and political homeland, but “homeland can be described as more than one place 
both real and imagined. Homeland, in the sense of the places to which they are emotionally 
attached, is inaccessible for many of them in different ways. It is also often associated with 
traumatic memories, danger, and risk” (Alinia 2004: 219). 
Research reveals that many refugees learn about their homes from narratives or other 
types of media (Engbersen et al 2013). Some of the important lessons they learn include 
language, dressing, food, lifestyle and others. Therefore, even if refugees are away from 
home, it is common to find them dressing in national colours and learning or speaking their 
indigenous languages (Al-Ali et al 2001). Others cook and eat traditional foods while 
enacting any ceremonies or functions that underpin the lifestyle of their ‘homes’. However, it 
is common to find refugees mixing the attributes of home with cultural norms of the host 
nation, as long as it enhances a sense of homeliness (Christou, 2006). 
A survey on second-generation Greek-Canadian returnees established that nearly 30% 
of women went back to Canada within weeks of being in Greece because they did not feel at 
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home. The primary motive for returning to Greece was to get a feel of the real Greek 
lifestyle, which was not possible in Canada. Additionally, married female respondents 
indicated a lack of spousal respect in Canada (Panagakos, 2003). Therefore, common reasons 
for people returning home are ethnic identity and closing the gender gap (Kilinc, 2014).  
Studies show that for second-generation migrants who live abroad for a long time, the 
desire to see their homelands is influenced by what they hear or read on social media (Favell, 
2008). If the images are positive, second-generation migrants will often want to associate 
with home and the converse is also true. Many second-generation migrants struggle to 
understand how the natives of their host nations talk and treat them, and this quickly 
degenerated to the feeling of not being at home (Smith & Bakker, 2007).  
In this way, home becomes a link between the second-generation migrant and their 
cultural roots, as far as the recognition of identity is concerned (White, 2013).  
 Refugees seek their own space of belongingness, where their comfort is guaranteed 
and security of basic needs assured (Teerling, 2011; Saito, 2007). Refugees get inspiration 
from their culture, which stimulates the consciousness of belongingness and fulfilment when 
they return home. When refugees are abroad for a long time, they do not feel at home because 
the relatives and friends who enhance the sense of belonging are physically absent (Crul & 
Schneider, 2010). This feeling of a lack of belongingness could delay the refugees’ 
adaptation to the host nation because their heritage is far away in their homeland (Sardinha, 
2011). The fact that refugees live far from home creates a feeling that some part or their roots 
are missing, hence the gap in belongingness (Horst, 2006).   
Many second-generation migrants or refugees have chosen to return to their home at 
some point in time (Abbasi-Shavazi et al, 2008). This urge to return to the ancestral or 
parental home is driven by strong roots and contacts (Saito, 2007).  
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The rationale of returning home is to re-establish the cultural linkages and reconnect 
with people, after having been away for a significant period (Engbersen et al., 2014). Some 
second-generation migrants or refugees may choose to return home permanently (Ali, 2011), 
while others with stable occupations abroad may choose to return home during summer 
holidays, as a tourist every other year (Wessendorf, 2007). Whereas there are significant 
studies on the justification for second-generation migrants and refugees to return home, many 
gaps also exist and the reasons extend from poor empirical research to incompetent analysis 
of the circumstances (Sirkeci, 2012).  
When second-generation migrants have been away from ‘home’ for a long time, there 
is a cultural detachment between the individual and their community still living in the 
ancestral land (Collyer, 2005).  
The most obvious way to achieve closure is for the second-generation migrant to 
return home, to visit or permanently, to strengthen their sense of belongingness. The urgency 
of this closure depends on the bond between the second-generation migrant and the 
community, and it increases with the second-generation migrants’ age (Crul & Schneider, 
2010). The duration of the stay at home by the returning second-generation migrant does not 
matter as long as there is reconnection with the home culture and heritage (Kanna, 2010). For 
second-generation migrants, there is greater sense of belonging achieved by going back home 
in person, as compared to accessing narratives while abroad. Many returning second-
generation migrants consider this step as a great milestone of personal development, because 
the state of belongingness is as important as that of tracing one’s identity (Al-Ali et al 2001).   
 
 3.3.2. Problematizing the notion of ‘belonging’ and ‘home’ 
This part begins with problematizing the notion of ‘belonging’; then follows to connect 
‘belonging’ to the notion of ‘home’.  
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Hedetoft reveals the contradictory notion of ‘belonging’ and ‘migration’ by declaring that 
‘“belonging” denotes “roots”, “stasis” and “traditionalism” in the context of bounded 
territoriality and national identity, wheres “migration” is linked to “mobility” and 
“postmodernity” in the context of porous borders and the insecurities attendant of 
globalization’ (Hedetoft 2004: 15). This contradiction is a useful starting point for the 
discussion when examining ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ in the case of the second generation 
because it can also clarify the contradictory nature of ‘return’ to ‘home’.  Hedetoft claims 
that, ‘the English word “belonging” is a fortuitous compound of “being” and “longing”, of 
existential and romantic-imaginary significations and associations, configured in multiple 
ways by the international system of nationalism as simultaneously a political and a cultural 
ordering principle’. (Hedetoft 2002:15)” 
Belonging is equated with ‘feeling at home’, both in academic discourse (see for 
example Yuval-Davis 2006) and in everyday language. As Michael Ignatieff (2001) points 
out, ‘belonging is about emotional attachment, about feeling “at home” and, about feeling 
“safe”’. Most importantly, ‘home’ and ‘belonging’, thus conceived, carry effective rather 
than cognitive meaning; the statement, ‘home is where we belong’, really means ‘where we 
fell we belong’ (Hedetoft 2004). Yuval-Davis (2006) has produced one of the most 
comprehensive studies of the notion of belonging.  In her research, she has distinguished 
between a sense of belonging and the politics of belonging.  
 
3.3.3 Sense of belonging and the politics of belonging  
In researching the notion of belonging, it is important to understand how, as an emotional 
feeling, it comes to be attached by an individual to a particular place to generate what 
Antonsich (2010) called in his research “place-belongingness”. He states that ‘home’ here 
stands for a symbolic space of familiarity, comfort, security, and emotional attachment 
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(Antonsich 2010) . This seems indeed the way in which the term is used by those authors, 
including Yuval-Davis (2006, 197), who refer to belonging as feeling ‘at home’. Yuval-Davis 
argues that ‘identity narratives can be either individual or collective, with the latter often 
serving as a resource for the former’ (2011: 14).  In this connection, the emotional and the 
political dimension, along with individual and collective aspects, need to be considered in the 
conceptualisation of belonging.  
Yuval-Davis (2006:197) argues that the term ‘belonging’ refers to “emotional 
attachments at individual level and to feelings of being at home, and it entails several levels 
of analysis”. The latter stems from the abstract form of community and refers to specific 
political projects that construct the boundaries for the political community of belonging 
(Yuval-Davis 2006a).  
To understand the sense of belonging, Yuval-Davis has differentiated between three 
major analytical levels on which belonging is constructed: ‘The first level concerns social 
locations; the second relates to individuals’ identifications and emotional attachments to 
various collectivities and groupings; the third relates to ethical and political value systems 
with which people judge their own and others’ belonging/s’ (Yuval-Davis 2006: 197). 
The social location to which people belong positions them differently in society on 
the basis of its internal power grids and the contextual meanings that the intersecting 
locations carry (Yuval-Davis 2006. For example, the gender, race, class or nation, age-group, 
kinship group or a certain profession that an individual belongs to are classified differently 
within the grids of power operating in one’s society (Yuval-Davis 2006). The second level is 
identification and emotional attachment. Identities and emotional connections can be 
examined from narrative and performative perspectives.  
(Yuval-Davis 2010: 271) pays attention to the dialogical dimension of identity 
constructions, stating that the identity construction here is both reflective and constitutive, in 
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that it encompasses both individual and collective ‘in an in-between perpetual state of 
“becoming”’.  
‘Therefore belonging, is not just about social locations and constructions of individual 
and collective identities and attachments but also about the ways these are valued and judged, 
it’s about ethical and political value’ (Yuval-Davis 2006:203). On the other hand, 
Antonsich’s (2010) research on individual feelings of place-belongingness leads him to 
highlight five factors which can contribute to generate such a feeling: auto-biographical, 
relational, cultural, economic, and legal.  
‘Auto-biographical factors refers to one’s past history – personal experiences, 
relations and memories which attach a particular person to a given place’ (Antonsich 2010: 
8). ‘Relational factors refer to the personal and social ties which enrich the life of an 
individual in a given place’ (Antonsich 2010: 8).  
For cultural factors, language is usually considered as the most important (Antonsich 
2010: 9). Therefore, language can be seen as a factor of ‘intimacy which resonates with one’s 
auto-biographical sphere and, as such, contributes to generate a sense of feeling “at home”’ 
(hooks 2009: 24).  
‘Economic factors matter since they contribute to create a safe and stable material 
condition for the individual and her/his family’ (Antonsich 2010:9). These economic factors 
are important not  from a financial  perspective, but also make a person feel that s/he has a 
stake in the future of the place where s/he lives. “Legal factors (e.g., citizenship and resident 
permits) are an essential component in producing security, which is regarded by many as a 
vital dimension of belonging” (Antonsich 2010: 9). 
In order to be able to feel at home in a place is not just a private matter, but also a 
social one. People’s sense of belonging would certainly be damaged, if the person feels 
excluded or rejected from a society or not welcomed by the community who live in that place 
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Antonsich 2010: 12).  As put by Yuval-Davis and colleagues, the ‘sociology of emotions’ 
should come to terms with the ‘sociology of power’ (Yuval-Davis 2005, 528). The politics of 
belonging refers to ‘specific political projects that construct the boundaries for the political 
community of belonging, the boundaries that separate the world population into “us” and 
“them”’ (Yuval-Davis 2006a).  
“Membership (to a group) and ownership (of a place) are the key factors in any 
politics of belonging” (Crowley 1999: 25). Therefore, the politics of belonging also struggles 
to determine what is involved in belonging, in being a member of a community, and what 
roles specific social locations and specific narratives of identity play (Yuval-Davis 2006). 
According to Antonsich, ‘even when political belonging is granted, this might still not be 
enough to generate a sense of place-belongingness’, belonging is indeed a ‘thicker’ concept 
than citizenship (Antonsich 2010). 
Empirical researches reveal that in order to belong, “people should feel that they can express 
their own identity and be recognized as an integral part of the community where they live, as 
well as being valued and listened to” (Sporton and Valentine 2007:13). This means that the 
role of political institutions is not sufficient, if the rest of the society fails to ‘grant’ this 
recognition.!
 
3.3.4 ‘Home’ and ‘belonging’ for second-generation migrants  
Empirically, the relationship between ‘belonging’ and ‘home’ clarifies more about people’s 
attachments to locations and the norms of these locations. Hedetoft defines ‘belonging’ in 
terms of the notion of ‘home’ and indicates that: 
‘belonging’ is a concrete, innocent, almost pristine notion, closely interwoven with 
and imbricated in the notion of ‘home’. In fact, our home is where we belong, 
territorially and culturally, where ‘our own’ community is, where our family, friends 
and acquaintances reside, where we have our roots, and where we long to return to 
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when we are elsewhere in the world. In this sense, belonging, as already pointed out, 
is a notion replete with concreteness, sensuality, organicist meanings and romantic 
images... In the ways that it circumscribes feelings of ‘homeness’, it is also a 
significant determinant of individual ‘identity’, that elusive but still real psychological 
state of feeling ‘in sync with’ oneself under given external conditions. Most 
importantly, ‘home’ and ‘belonging’, thus conceived, carry affective rather than 
cognitive meaning; the indicative and simplistic statement above, ‘home is where we 
belong’, really means ‘home is where we feel we belong’ (Hedetoft 2002 4-5). 
 
After this conceptualization, he asks an essential question: ‘But what, for instance, if where 
we feel we belong (our “cultural” or “ethnic” home) does not match objective ascriptions of 
membership (our “political” or “civic” home), because “belonging” separates into its two 
constituent parts: “being: in one place, and “longing” for another?’ (Hedetoft 2002 4-5). The 
concept of ‘home’ is related to a ‘feeling’ of belonging.  
This ‘belonging’ might be created through family, school, media, politicians, but it will be 
assumed that not everyone gets affected by these factors in the same intensity.  
According to Hedetoft (2002) the term belonging is associated with how a person 
feels at ‘home’. Regarding second-generation migrants and refugees, the term belonging is a 
very strong bond or perspective that binds a person to other people, a place, culture, region 
and other varied familiarities (Dupree, 2002). Therefore, when a second-generation migrant 
or refugee belongs, there is a notion of entrenched roots and this always pulls back from far 
distances across the globe (Crul & Schneider, 2010). This implies that belonging is a 
synergistic realization where a second-generation migrant or refugee asserts their place in an 
organic society or group beyond romantic conceptualization (Saito, 2007).  
Studies indicate that a sense of belonging makes refugees stay connected abroad and 
back home with their families and friends (Sardinha, 2011; Saito, 2007). Belonging 
stimulates the refugees’ right of ownership of homeland, espoused as a deep cultural value. 
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Belonging often ranks high among refugees’ priorities when faced with decisions such as 
staying abroad or return home. Refugees with high regard for heritage express a deep sense 
of belonging alongside their home traditions (Sardinha, 2011). Furthermore, refugees with a 
high sense of belonging often have deep roots irrespective of where they are abroad and will 
return home at one time (Long & Oxfeld, 2004). 
Refugees share views with their relatives and friends back home as a sign of their 
belongingness (Crul & Schneider, 2010). Family (immediate and extended) is at the core of 
refugee belongingness and this inspires the need to return home either permanently or 
temporarily while alive (Sardinha, 2011). Some refugees demonstrate deep loyalty to their 
countries and a desire to return home after long stays abroad as a sense of belonging 
(Anthias, 2008). Some refugees after returning home no longer harbour the feeling of being a 
‘stranger’ because the surrounding community enhances their sense of belonging (Saito, 
2007). The realisation that home, where the refugees’ ancestors came from is also another 
dimension of belongingness creates the urge to return (Crul & Schneider, 2010). There is a 
deep sense of belonging when a refugee returns home and is able to communicate in the 
native language with the community (Sardinha, 2011). This belongingness calms down the 
refugee’s previous worries about failing to reconnect with their ancestors. This sense of 
belonging is a dream that many refugees have been reflecting upon for long time (Laliotou, 
2004).  
Research shows that the concept of refugee belongingness is a constant personal 
negotiation between the reasons for being abroad and the cultural roots back at home (Saito, 
2007).  Some of the common negotiations are the merits and demerits of returning home as 
compared to continuing to stay in the host country (Sardinha, 2011). The refugees’ familiarity 
with the host nation and home culture is another negotiation as it defines the extent of 
belongingness (Thomson & Crul 2007).  
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The reality between the refugees’ agony of staying abroad and the nostalgia about 
what could have been achieved but failed, deepens the refugee’s urge to seek belongingness 
from their homes, more often than staying abroad (Crul & Schneider, 2010). The restriction 
facing many refugees abroad, compared with the freedom back at home, are defining 
moments of belongingness and come to play when deciding whether to return home (Teerling 
2011). Depending on the standards of living, the refugee’s feeling of gaps between unfamiliar 
events of the host nations compared with their homeland trigger a reflection about 
belongingness and often, many will settle for returning home (White, 2006).   
The end game is the sense of belonging where the refugee comes back home to 
express emotion at being reunited with family members (Razum et al. 2005). This explains 
why some returnees shed tears of joy at the airport as soon as they reconnect with the loved 
ones who create a deep sense of belonging (Sardinha, 2011).  
On their return home, refugees are able to take charge of their destiny, a process that 
was elusive while abroad, due to lack of belongingness (Panagakos, 2003). Simple acts like 
limited mobility for refugees who have stayed abroad for a long time create anxiety about 
belongingness and feeling unwanted due to their conditional stays (Duvell, 2005; Kanna, 
2010).  
Research shows that depending on the cultural background of the second-generation migrant 
who is returning home, there could be some ceremonies performed on arrival to enhance the 
sense of belongingness (Bascom, 2005). The feasting and celebration go a long way in 
reintegrating the son or daughter back to the community and the entire event comforts the 
second-generation migrant’s emotions with a great sense of belonging. The cultural activities, 
gifts and artefacts given to the returning second-generation migrant are welcoming gestures 
from the community and go a long way in enhancing a sense of belonging. There could be 
some traditional dances and performances during this ceremony as these makes the second-
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generation migrant identify with and belong to the community after returning home. During 
the welcoming phase of the return of the second-generation migrant, events are synchronized 
to speed reintegration and belonging to community. It does not matter if the second-
generation migrants are of multi-racial decent, the feeling of belongingness prevails upon 
returning home and experiencing the authentic cultural roots of their ancestors (Laliotou 
2004). Indeed, home is intrinsically linked to the processes of inclusion and exclusion and to 
subjective experiences of them. In other words, feeling at home is directly linked to our 
struggles to belong. The notion of belonging is often equated to – and readily conflated with 
– the concepts of identity and home. The connection between home and identity is 
complicated, especially in the case of second-generation. Next chapter will highlight the 
concept of identity and its complicity to second-generation returnees.    
 
3.4 The concept of identity 
3.4.1 Defining the term identity 
Stets and Burke define identity at its core as, ‘the categorization of the self as an occupant of 
a role, and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and expectations of that role and 
its performance’ (2000: 2).  
Furthermore, identity can be taken as a term, ‘to reference how a person understands his or 
her relationship to the world, how that relationship is constructed across time and space, and 
how the person understands possibilities for the future’ (Norton, 2000: 5). A third viewpoint 
states that identity encompasses, ‘one’s conception of self in the world’ (Mooney et al., 2011: 
174).  Moreover, it is claimed that in post-structural perspectives, identity is, ‘fluid, context-
dependent, and context-producing, in particular historical and cultural circumstances’ 
(Norton & Toohey, 2011: 419). 
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Concerns of identity could be problematic for asylum seekers, refugees and another 
migrant groups in general. “Finding oneself dislocated from the place where one was born 
and grew up, from the community where one’s ancestors had deep connections and ties, and 
perhaps where one feels that one belongs, is difficult to deal with” (Kebede 2010:4). The 
process of relocation from one place to another can be very challenging when the social 
perception in the host countries emphasizes this feeling of belonging.  
However, many second-generation migrants might integrate into the host countries’ 
culture easily compared to their parents’ generation (Rumbaut 1994; Ying and Han 2007). 
The host society may identify them as an asylum seeker, refugee or immigrant, or simply as a 
foreigner or outsider who has another place of birth or another place of belonging. It is also 
when this happens, i.e. when self-identification fails to match the labels placed on a person 
by outsiders, that issues of identity occur (Du Bois 1994; Howard 2000; Kumsa 2006). 
The fully unified, completed, secure and coherent identity is a fantasy. Instead, as the 
systems of meaning and cultural representation multiply, we are confronted by a bewildering, 
fleeting multiplicity of possible identities, any one with which we could identify ourselves – 
at least temporarily (Hall 2006:251). Usually it has been acknowledged that individuals 
“form and reform their identities as they pass through different stages of their lives.  
During childhood, a person’s self-awareness grows and alters, while in adolescence 
this awareness of ‘who I am’ becomes more complex, beginning to take into account the 
physical, cognitive and social changes that occur” (Kebede 2010:5). Generally, the process of 
identity formation might be difficult, but this process becomes more complex in the case of 
the second-generation.  
Identities are fixed to the space and social environment of a given time. Thus, a 
person could have multiple identities with each one having a particular dynamic of its own. 
On many occasions, these different identities intersect.  
 100 
Therefore, identities will always be fluid and change in accordance to the shifting 
relations a person has in temporary moments in time and place (Kebede 2010). 
As Howard states, ‘identities are relational, defined by their difference from 
something, processual, and multiple’ (Howard 2000:386). Also, as Park notes, identity is not 
a thing out there to be discovered and reserved, and it is not an end in itself but rather is 
located in the lifelong process of becoming ourselves (Park 1999). Furthermore, Côté (1996) 
stated in his research that social identity can be ascribed, achieved and/or managed: “These 
terms can be defined as follows:  ‘ascribed’ means assigned on the basis of some inherited 
status; ‘achieved' is used in the sociological sense by which social position is to be 
accomplished on one’s own; and ‘managed’ means reflexively and strategically fitting 
oneself into a community of ‘strangers’ by meeting their approval through the creation of the 
right impressions” (Côté 1996: 420-421). 
He claims that, in premodern society, ‘social identity is largely determined by one’s 
characteristics or attributes (like race, sex, parent’s social status)’; in the early-modern, it is 
‘increasingly based on personal accomplishment and material attainment’ (both of which are 
ostensibly based on appraisals of merit); while in the late-modern society, it becomes a matter 
of impression management (that is, in certain social encounters, situational appraisals can 
become more important than one’s social background or accomplishments) (Côté 1996). For 
Côté (1996), managing identity is the most important element, but he may be underestimating 
the role that ascribed and achieved statuses play. It could be said with certainty that achieved 
social identities are actually just as important. 
Gee (2000) notes that identity can be observed in four different ways: Nature-iIdentity 
as a state developed by nature (skin colour, for example); Institution-Identity as a position 
authorized by authorities (which I refer to as institutionalized identities, for example, 
‘refugee’); Discourse-Identity, which is an individual trait recognized in discourses (‘the 
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rational individual’); and finally Affinity-Identity which includes experiences shared in the 
practices of groups ( Gee 2000:100). Though Gee would agree that all of the above elements 
are vital.    
While it is difficult to describe the concept of identity and the ways in which they are 
formed, in general terms, “identities are formed and reformed through interrelated but 
different channels” (Kebede 2010:12). Obviously, identities are also formed through a 
person’s own character and sense of self (Côté 1996). Similarly, it has been proposed that 
identity is not actually a simple narrative that an individual tells him/herself about who he/she 
is and that it is something much more than discovering our inner ‘selves’ (Hall 1995). Hall 
argues that identities “actually come from outside, they are the way in which we are 
recognized and then come to step into the place of the recognitions which others give us” 
(1995:8).  
According to research, second-generation migrants and refugees grapple with two 
paradigms of identity (Waldinger, 2004). These are the self and/or place identities (Walsh, 
2007). Broadly, self-identities refer to the person’s class, gender, sexuality and ethnicity 
(Kilinc, 2014). Self-identity leads second-generation migrants and refugees to question who 
and what they are, especially when facing difficult life decisions such as repatriation from a 
foreign country, uncertain refugee status or detention by authorities from the host nation 
immigration offices (Christou, 2004; 2006). This implies that self-identity troubles the 
consciousness of second-generation migrants and refugees when faced by some complex 
problems or events while abroad as they deliberate return home (Hutnyk, 2005).   
The self-identity paradigms evolve from a second-generation migrants’ past or 
perception of themselves in relation to others today (Dimitriu, 2003). Therefore, second-
generation migrants may seek answers on how their self-being or transformation determines 
their fate in life and their compliance with cultural orientations (Al-Ali et al, 2001).  
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The quest for self-identity extends to how second-generation migrants and refugees 
synchronize with cultural aspects, whether they are moved emotionally when certain events 
occur, how they connect with communities and their political inclinations (Engbersen et al 
2013). This implies that self-identity has some underlying aspects often ignored by scholars 
and researchers during observational studies (Long & Oxfeld, 2004). On the other hand, 
place identities are factors that make people distinct simply because of the place of origin 
(Samers, 2004; Walsh, 2009).  
In the case of the children of forced migrants, the connection between home and identity is 
complicated. Therefore, it is essential that special attention is given to place identities. 
Second generation migrants and refugees can choose to identify with a place due to its 
people, events, cultures or language (Dupree, 2002). The common phrase referring to a 
person who is unclear in a conversation as ‘sounding Greek’ is an example of geographical 
identity due to language diversity (Christou, 2006). Researchers who investigate place 
identity, defined it as ‘interpretation[s] of self that uses environmental meaning to symbolize 
or situate identity. Like other forms of identity, place identity answers the question, “Who am 
I?, ” doing so by countering, “Where am I?,” or more fundamentally, “Where do I belong?”’ 
(Cuba and Hummond 1993: 548). Place identities are formed as a result of feeling at home in 
the geographic space in which one is situated. However, people do not always have this kind 
of choice available to them and it is as a result of accident (i.e. the place of one’s birth) and 
other circumstances including one’s socioeconomic status and presence of diasporic co-
ethnics that people live in certain neighbourhoods and countries (Kebede 2010:12). 
The purpose of this chapter has been to bring altogether literature that deal with issues of 
identity formation and then put this into a general framework that can contribute to a better 
understanding of the experiences of the second-generation returnees belonging and identity 
formation.  
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The next section, identity and translocation positionality, refers to the field of transnational 
positionality which brings into focus contemporary forms of identity construction.   
 
3.4.2 Identity and translocational positionality as a theoretical context 
The notion of belonging is often associated with the concepts of identity and home. My aim 
in this section is to outline how those concepts are understood and conceptualized within the 
scope of this study. As mentioned in an earlier chapter “‘belonging’ can mean having 
multiple homes, not necessarily in one particular geographical locality – or even any 
geographical locality, for that matter. The question of belonging naturally brings in the 
question ‘Do/can you belong?’, which emerges from the intersubjective relations of 
individuals’ surroundings and the reactions to the individual’s perceived positioning that such 
surroundings produce” (Toivanen 2014:37).   
The term ‘translocational positionality’ tries to clarify some of the difficulties discovered 
within intersectionality approaches and attempts to push the debate forward on theorising 
identity and belonging. I will focus in this section on the field of transnational positionality 
which brings into focus contemporary forms of identity construction. I will also reflect on the 
concept of intersectionality which provides a more integrated analysis of identity. According 
to Yuval-Davis (2010), identity is a contested subject. When examining classed identities in 
my thesis, it is essential to define what is meant by the use of the term. Much has been 
written on the definition of identity in different disciplines, and reviewing all the literature is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. (Brubaker and Cooper 2000) who claimed that the notion of 
identity is becoming less useful because it tells both too much and too little about a person, 
on the other side  Anthias believes that people have ‘multiple locations, positions and 
belongings in a situated and contextual way which does not end up as a thoroughgoing 
reification or deconstruction of difference’ (2008: 6). Her use of the term translocational is an 
approach to understanding processes, ideas and experiences relating to the self and others, 
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and it addresses the shortcomings derived from identity, mainly its treatment in the literature 
as a fixed concept which does not illustrate the processes and formations of social locations 
(Anthias 2002: 494–495). 
‘Positionality’ comprises a set of relations and practices that imply identification, 
performativity or action (Anthias 2002: 501). Positionality combines social position and 
social positioning. Anthias (2000) believes that there are three locales in which migrants are 
placed: the homeland from where they have migrated, the society of migration and the 
migrant group. Anthias discusses the concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘belonging’ in the light of her 
concept of ‘translocational positionality’. She emphasizes that the understanding of the 
notion of ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’ is changing because national borders are challenged by 
newer migration flows (with refugees, asylum seekers, skilled migrants etc.) where ‘there 
exist complex relations to different locales; these include networks involving social, symbolic 
and material ties between homelands, destinations and relations between destination’ 
(Anthias 2009: 5). She states: 
The concept of translocational positionality addresses issues of identity in terms of 
locations which are not fixed but are context, meaning and time related and which 
therefore involve shifts and contradictions. As an intersectional frame it moves away 
from the idea of given ‘groups’ or ‘categories’ of gender, ethnicity and class, which 
then intersect (a particular concern of some intersectionality frameworks), and instead 
pays much more attention to social locations and processes which are broader than 
those signalled by this (Anthias 2009:6) 
 
For example, an Iranian woman is not fixed to a particular identity, as there is no 
fixed identity such as being a woman or being an Iranian that could define one in this sense. 
Her positionality in terms of a sense of belonging should be seen in the social locale in which 
she finds herself in her daily experiences, for example when she is working in a hospital or 
when she finds herself at home with her family.  
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The other locale, according to Anthias, is the country of origin. Positionality should 
be understood in relation to processes: for example, to a great extent the experience of being 
Iranian is embedded in the experiences of growing up in Iran or in an Iranian family in the 
diaspora. Positionality is not fixed or static and is constantly changing because it is being told 
and retold in different places and times and for different audiences: for example, the ways in 
which Iranian women activists inside Iran define the notion of an Iranian woman are different 
to those of Iranian women outside Iran, because the audiences, the social setting and the 
migration processes all affect such narratives. ‘Who we are’ is produced at the time the 
stories are narrated and in relation to the multiple audiences for whom they are narrated 
(Fathi 2017:37). 
Anthias trusts that by looking at the narratives of location (such as race, gender or 
class) in different locales (geographical and diasporic locations), the concern with identity 
being a fixed possession of individuals rather than a process will be eliminated (Anthias 
2008; 2010). Anthias argues that unless we take an intersectional approach to the study of 
social class, the underlying inequalities that tend to be hidden in the form of hierarchical 
stratification will not be revealed (2005). From this, one can understand that the sense of 
belonging and not belonging to certain groupings or social locations is not only local and 
situated but is also intersectional.  
Furthermore, Anthias illustrates that ‘identity; and ‘belonging’ have a difference in 
emphasis: ‘Identity involves individual and collective narratives of self and other, 
presentation and labelling, myths of origin and myths of destiny with associated strategies 
and identifications’ (Anthias 2009: 6).  
When one is identifying oneself, the emphasis seems to be on ‘who are you/how you 
identify yourself’ – i.e., on the collective narratives of self and other that are associated with 
identifications (Toivanen 2010:37).  
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It has been argued that a feeling of belonging presupposes access, whereas an 
individual can identify with collectivities without necessarily being considered part of them 
(Anthias 2009). Therefore, a sense of belonging is considered to emerge from and become 
activated in situations of denied membership, with exclusionary boundaries to identity 
categories, and especially from subjective experience of mechanisms of difference. Feelings 
of belonging are based on notions of exclusion, inclusion, access, and participation to a 
greater degree than identity (Anthias 2009a). 
On the other hand, as Anthias argues, ‘“belonging” is more about experiences of 
being part of the social fabric and the ways in which social bonds and ties are manifested in 
practices, experiences and emotions of inclusion’ (Anthias 2009a: 8). To belong is to be 
accepted as a part of a community, to feel safe within it and to have a stake in the future of 
such a community of membership (Anthias 2009a: 8). Theoretically and in practice, 
identity is situational and fluid. It changes depending on where a person is 
geographically located and with whom she or he is interacting at a particular 
time.  
 
3.4.3 Reconsidering transnationalism through the second generation 
The concept of transnationalism is used in migration studies to describe the broad variety of 
connections between migrants and their homeland. Until recently, little attention was given to 
whether these ties would be continued by the migrants’ children, the ‘second generation’. 
‘Generational research on transnationalism is still in its infancy and as a result there are 
many, essentially unexplored, possibilities’ (Somerville 2008).  
Most scholars have agreed that transnationalism may be important only for the first 
generation, but not for their children (the second generation).  
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Furthermore, they have admitted, that transnational ties will restrict themselves to the first 
generation only and they were of the opinion that the children of immigrants are not likely to 
engage with their ancestral homes with the same intensity and frequency as their parents, nor 
will they be as influenced by homeland values and practices (Levitt 2009). “Portes  states that 
transnational activities are a “one-generation phenomenon”, but that the involvement of the 
immigrant generation can have resilient effects on the second generation. Similarly, Rumbaut 
finds overall, that despite variability among different national-origin groups, the level of 
transnational attachments among the second generation is quite small” (Somerville 2008:24).  
Because most of the children of immigrants have no plans to return to live in their ancestral 
homes, and because they are not completely fluent in their parents’ mother tongue, many 
scholars conclude that transnational activism among the second generation is of little 
importance (Levitt 2009: 1227). 
A recent study of the second generation in New York City found that transnational 
practices varied by group, according to geographic distance between the home and host 
countries, homeland politics and the frequency of visiting and remitting money home 
(Kasinitz 2008). Differently, other scholars argue that the second generation maintain some 
knowledge of their parents’ native language and do some traveling back and forth to their 
parents’ country of origin, so ties may continue, but the magnitude and frequency is unclear 
(Somerville 2008).  Although I agree that the children of migrants will not engage in their 
homeland with the same regularity as their parents, we should not dismiss outright the strong 
potential effect of being raised in a transnational social field. When children are raised in 
families and participate in organisations in which people, goods, money, ideas and practices 
from their parents’ countries of origin circulate in and out on a regular basis, they are not 
only socialized into the rules and institutions of the countries where they live, but also into 
those of the countries from which their families come (Levitt 2009).  
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“Transnationalism constitutes an attempt to formulate a theoretical and conceptual 
framework aimed at a better understanding of the strong social and economic links between 
migrants host and origin countries” (Cassarino 2015:262). “Transnationalism further suggests 
that migrants return to their homeland because of their social and historical attachment to the 
place and they identify with it as their ‘home’ or native soil” (Kılınç 2013: 22). Cassarino 
argues that, ‘common ethnicity, common origin, common kinship linkages appear to be the 
main factors which lubricate transnational activities and define transnational identities’ 
(Cassarino 2015).  In contrast Portes relates the transnationalism to economy rather than 
ethnic, kinship, national ties. He claims that “immigrant transnationalism is not driven by 
ideological reasons but by the very logic of global capitalism” (Portes 2001).  
The following academic works are found relevant firstly in terms of discussing the 
second-generation Iraqi-Kurds’ return and secondly for connecting the previously debated 
theories together. The first one is Wessendorf’s work on the second-generation Italians in 
Switzerland that she introduces the concept of “roots-migration” to describe the second 
generation’s return to the parental homeland (Wessendorf 2007). Her findings demonstrate 
that roots-migration is related to the second generation’s transnational practices while 
growing up and the nostalgic imagination for their parental homeland. However, once they 
return, the reality in the parental homeland can be shocking and the returnees’ struggle start 
in order to integrate into the society and culture that they always perceived as their own. The 
second one is Levitt’s Roots and Routes: Understanding the Lives of the Second Generation 
Transnationally. She criticises that it is not only the first generation who practices 
transnational lives but also the second generation. She argues that the second generation 
keeps ties with the ancestral homeland, though not with the same intensity as their parents, 
and the reason is “the strong potential effect of being raised in a transnational social field” 
(Levitt 2009). She also stresses the importance of understanding the lives of the second 
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generation through family structures, gender relations, religious, class differences and kin- 
based strategies.   
The third one is ‘Rethinking transnationalism through the second generation’ by 
Helen Lee (2011). In her article she explores the transnational practices of second-generation 
Tongans in Australia, using the research findings to reconsider some of the existing 
assumptions about what constitutes transnationalism. Lee (2011) has identified in her 
research three specific forms of transnationalism relating to the second-generation. The forms 
are described as the following: intradiasporic, indirect and forced transnationalism (Lee 
2011:295). Intradiasporic transnationalism refers to the ties maintained across different 
diasporic populations, which can occur independently of the host-home connections that are 
the primary focus of transnational studies (Lee 2011: 295). The migrant population do not 
have any direct connection to their homeland, however their indirect engagement occurs 
through activities such as contributing to family remittance pools, fundraising activities and 
church donations, which ensure that they remain enmeshed in transnational webs of 
connection, both intradiasporic and with the homeland (Lee 2011). ‘This indirect 
transnationalism can include involuntary involvement, or forced transnationalism, a term that 
also describes practices such as sending children and youth from the diaspora to the 
homeland against their will’ (Lee 2011: 295). Both of these forms of transnationalism can be 
discovered in the migrant generation, but they more usually characterize the transnational 
engagements of the second generation. 
Firstly, there were arguments in the literature that transnational migrants felt at 
‘home’ both in their country of origin and the host nation. Only recent work on the ‘second 
generation’ has shown that for the children of migrants, this may not always be the case, even 
when they maintain transnational ties. Transnationalism has become an important dimension 
for the second generation and can be experienced in significantly different ways by migrants 
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and their children. Glick-Schiller et al. argued that the term ‘transnational’ describes people 
who ‘take actions, make decisions and feel concerns within a field of social relations that 
links together their country of origin and their country or countries of settlement’ (1992: ix). 
In their definition they did not mention the frequency of such actions, but they make it clear 
that they regard transnationals as intensely engaged with their home country in ways that 
affect their everyday lives (Lee 2011). 
This is an important statement in terms of migrants, especially when we think about 
second generation – ‘identity ‘, ‘belonging’ and the concept of ‘home’ do not essentially take 
their roots from the feeling of attachment to their parents’ home country. A second-
generation Turkish-German might feel belongingness for religious understanding of Islam 
and relate more to the religious practices of Turkish people, but the same person might not 
feel belonging to the gender norms of the Turkish society. On the other hand, these home and 
host countries we mention are not homogenous in terms of norms, culture, ethnicity and 
religion either. The person might not feel safe within the gender norms of the general Turkish 
society, but let’s say he/she might claim that he/she feels safe in a specific city, or a specific 
community in that city or town (Kilinic 2013).  
An increase in transnationalism, the individual’s and family’s ability to visit their 
parental homeland and build connection with their families across national borders, has led to 
questions about its impact on identity especially for the second generation. One consequence 
of transnationalism is that identity is influenced by social relationships that are maintained 
across national borders and in more than one national context. In other words, by definition 
transnationalism means: ‘identities and cultural production reflect their multiple locations’ 
(Byng 2017).  
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Accordingly, the visits of the second generation to their parental homeland can 
increase their identification with that nation and decrease their identification with the nation 
where they are raised. 
Second-generation Iranians in the United States of America defines their religious and 
national identities as synonymous (McAuliffe 2007). A comparative study of Turkish second 
generations in Australia finds that they have a sense of not fully belonging (Zevallos 2008). 
However, when they visit Turkey their Australian identity is more valuable than their Turkish 
one. In other words, being Muslim is more important than being Australian but being 
Australian is more important than being Turkish (Zevallos 2008). Western cultural values and 
democratic ideals allow for religious choice.  
The research indicates that second generation migrants can have transnational 
identities. It also shows that identity can be fostered by social networks, travel and other 
transnational activities. Further research suggests that transnational orientations among the 
second generation can develop depending on the social context of the family in which they 
were brought up (Chams 2015). The family is the primary socializing agent and plays an 
important role in shaping the identity of the second-generation (Tuan, 1998).  
In general, we can say that transnationalism is a vital phenomenon for both first and 
second-generation immigrants. However, research findings on the significance and 
prevalence of transnationalism among the second generation has varied. Some studies find 
considerable evidence of transnational activities amongst the second-generation, while others 
hold that members of the second generation only loosely tie their ethnic identity to their 
parents’ country of origin. This research has addressed this contradiction in the literature, 
seeking answers to the following questions: Do second-generation individuals have 
transnational identities? Exploring identity construction among second-generation migrants 
illustrates the importance they place on ties to their parents’ homeland in their construction of 
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identity and belonging in diaspora countries. The second generation still feels a personal 
connection to their parental homeland, and they express this connection through their identity 
options, their clothing choices and their dual allegiances. The children of migrants are able to 
stay connected to their parents’ birthplace at the same time that they build a strong 
connection to their own country of citizenship. It is through frequent transnational 
communication and information flows that the second generation is able to remain embedded 
in both in dispora country and homeland, and which facilitates their process of identity 







Social scientists use different methods to describe, discover and understand social life. The 
research methodology is a vital component of the process of research, providing the 
philosophical grounding for the research methods. Furthermore, the methodology contains 
values, assumptions and criteria utilised in interpreting data and drawing conclusions (Bailey 
1995). Specifically, the conducting of qualitative research, such as this research, entails 
efforts to understand the manner in which participants construct the world socially and the 
meanings they accrue from such constructions (Creswell 2014). The notion of the constructed 
world’ means that people live in a private, social and relational world, which is viewable and 
constructible from various perspectives. Systems of meaning, language and memory, among 
others, are channels for constructing and shaping the world. This renders data collected 
through the qualitative framework diverse, rich and complex (La Vecchia 2011). 
This chapter sets out to discuss the association between the methods and the research 
methodology employed in this study. It contains information on the rationale behind the 
application of qualitative methods in data collection. Additionally, I will use this chapter to 
elaborate on the practicalities related to the entry strategies into the research field and the data 
collection and analysis procedures. Questions related to reflexivity and positionality feature 
in this chapter along with discussions on validation, representation, ethical considerations and 
approaches towards ensuring validation in this qualitative research using a narrative 
methodology. 
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4.2 Narrative Methodology 
Narrative modes informed the research methodology, which facilitated the development of 
this work.  
Narrative modes underscore the idea that a person lives a storied life and that the 
sophisticated nature of human experiences is best understood through story gathering. In 
accordance with Connelly and Clandinin (1990), narrative constitutes both a method and a 
phenomenon. Bruner (1987) who is among the epistemological founders of narrative methods 
offered an overarching summary concerning the role played by narratives in assisting people 
to comprehend their life experiences. He argued that life narratives offer a reflection of the 
prevalent theories concerning ‘possible lives’, which form a portion of a person’s culture. In 
fact, one vital means for the characterisation of a culture entails use of narrative models that 
avail life through the description of a life course. Furthermore, he states that ‘the tool kit of 
any culture is replete not only with a stock of canonical life narratives, but with combinable 
formal constituents from which its members can construct their own life narratives’ (Bruner 
1987, p.15). 
Narratives are evident at both macro and micro levels. Macro levels include 
institutional, cultural or societal stories, whereas personal stories define the micro level 
(Squire, Andrews and Tamboukou 2008). Personal narratives assist in constructing the micro 
level narratives although they are subject to the influence of macro level narratives. 
Narratives are reproducers, constructors and mediators of cultural conceptions and personal 
meanings (Eerola 2015). When narrative approaches expanded, which is known as the 
‘narrative turn’, narrative methods began featuring in various social science disciplines 
(Squire, Andrews and Tamboukou 2008; Brannen 2013). 
As opposed to referring to one single approach, narrative methods refer to a 
combination of various approaches whereby researchers study the research subjects as 
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narratives or understand them in the narrative context (Eerola 2015). The fundamental stance 
of narrativity centres on telling as a familiar and innate means through which people can 
produce meanings and portray their views concerning the world.  
Therefore, narrative methods apply in gaining an advanced understanding of the way 
people tell their lives. Due to the socially organised nature of narratives, narrative methods 
are applicable in gaining advanced insights about how the lives of people connect to the 
broader social context (Eronen 2012). 
Various other researchers who have underscored the significance of narratives in lived 
experiences also motivated the application of the narrative method. Riessman (2008) 
highlighted the universality of the narrative impulse within all places, societies and ages. 
According to Bruner (1987), narrative understanding is the fundamental mode for cognitive 
functioning, further proposing that narratives organise memory and structure experience and 
perception. Hiles and Cermak (2008) suggested the essentiality of narrative to the process of 
making meaning, through which actions and events become understandable. Specifically, 
events do not feature as stories. Instead, the experiences of an event become stories upon 
shaping, ordering and giving meaning. Polkinghorne (1988) hailed the use of narratives by 
arguing that they provide a means for understanding one’s own actions and those of others, 
organising events meaningfully as a whole and linking events and outcomes over a period. 
It is essential to understand that narratives may present as multiple, whereas several 
narratives are capable of giving meaning to one event. People can use narratives for recalling, 
arguing, justifying, persuading or dissuading, engaging and entertaining. It is possible for 
such storytelling to engage audiences in the narrator’s experiences and this could lead to the 
creation of experiences for the audience. Speakers form a story by constructing events 
through the narrative process. Such a story is both interactive and situated (Chase 2007).  
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Elliot (2005) admitted to the social nature of stories in the sense that they involve 
listeners and speakers. The listener’s social world shapes the narratives due to the 
construction of narrative via interaction. According to Squire (2009), one speaks to imagined 
others that understand the story whether one is the storyteller or the telling of the story is to 
self. This implies that during the engagement with second generation Iraqi Kurds in this 
research, the world within which their stories of returning home exist would define their 
experiences and interactions with both home and foreign lands. 
Cultural story repertoires that structure and frame the narratives of individuals also 
shape narratives (Elliot 2005). These narrative frameworks may prove to be less or more 
restrictive. In some contexts, narratives are bound to adhere to a standard pattern like in the 
formal medical consultation setting. This connects with Foucault’s (1990) work on the 
institutional environments, which add to the redefinition of the contemporary regulated self. 
Elliot (2005) proposed that cultural narratives are capable of offering guidelines that affect 
stories. However, cultural narratives are incapable of determining individual narrative content 
that has been constructed actively. On the other hand, it is possible to maintain the stability of 
public narratives with time. Altogether, public narratives may also change and the 
interrelation between these new personal and extant public cultural narratives might develop 
alternative probabilities. Riessman (2008) detailed the way stories are capable of creating 
social change, such as in the case of resistant feminist movements. 
There is significant research concerning narrative’s role in constructing, maintaining 
and renegotiating self-identity through stories told by people about themselves and other 
people concerning who they are (Riessman 2008; Hiles and Cermak 2008; Elliott 2005). 
According to Riessman (2008), people are likely to edit and revise their memories concerning 
the past to suit their present identities. In Polkinghorne’s (1988) view, identity comprises 
both a self-narrative concerning the past of an individual and the construction of expected, 
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incomplete future stories. In this research, it was in the best interest of gaining as much 
insight as possible from second generation Iraqi Kurds returning home, based on their 
identities in relation to Iraqi Kurdistan and their foreign ‘homes’ and the role their past 
played in defining their present and future experiences. 
 
4.3 Rationale for narrative methodology 
In this research, the rationale behind the application of the narrative methodology connected 
with the aim of producing knowledge concerning the returning home of second-generation 
Iraqi Kurds. Despite the inherent difficulty in drawing direct inferences from narratives 
concerning lived realities, the use of narratives can provide insights concerning the manner in 
which things are said, lived through and experienced. In this research, narrativity features in 
numerous forms across various research process phases. I was drawn to narrative 
methodology based on the conviction that it offered an approach that appreciated the complex 
nature of life without any attempts at reducing it. In the context of this study, this connected 
research with practice and practicality. This is because, as a sociologist, there is an obligation 
to expose contradictions, complexities and the messy nature of life and the situations that 
offer multitudes of possibilities instead of scaling down lives to one issue. 
Likewise, I had no interest in fragmenting lives and experiences through isolation and 
categorisation of other aspects of the lived experiences of second-generation Iraqi Kurds. 
This rendered the narrative methodology and subsequent analysis as an approach that 
respects the stories of the participants and is capable of contributing towards the development 
of an understanding of the accounts of second-generation Iraqi Kurds from their own 
perspectives. The application of narrative analysis also incorporated the flexibility of the 
researcher’s role in the co-construction of the stories told by the second-generation Iraqi 
Kurds returning home.  
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This was in line with the theoretical foundations of narrative methodology, which 
appreciate that narratives are inherently social (Squire, Andrews and Tamboukou 2013). 
Of course, it was also possible to select other qualitative methodologies such as 
interpretative phenomenological analysis or discourse analysis that is able to integrate 
narrative interviews for data collection. However, I concluded that this did not fit with the 
epistemological stance presumed in this research. It was my opinion that the theoretical 
approach implicated in interpretative phenomenological analysis fails to embrace fully the 
socially constructed characterisation of the interactions happening in the research interview. 
In addition, there is a separation and removal of the words used by participants in the process 
of analysing excerpts from their interview context in the case of interpretative 
phenomenological approach. Moreover, there is a loss of the latency of gaining rich 
descriptions of all individuals and agencies possible through the pooling of statements of 
multiple interviewees (Parker 2008). 
Concerning discourse analysis, language features as performative and functioning to 
request, order, accuse or persuade (Potter and Wetherell 2007). In so doing, this constructs 
positions that establish the power that one meaning position has over another. The 
conceptualised accomplishment of this is through inferring interpretive repertoires that could 
be embedded culturally. Analysing the text and talk of individuals highlights the discourses 
that they draw upon and the means through which they construct identities. In spite of this 
approach being capable of demonstrating the social discourses’ functions, it overlooks the 
way an individual might assert agency in his or her life (Emerson and Frosh 2009). Thus, I 
rejected discourse analysis as a methodological approach. 
Instead, this led to the adoption of the version of critical narrative analysis proposed 
by Emerson and Frosh (2009), as a development of the linguistic approach to narrative 
described by Gee (1991).  
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This approach embodies the retention of the crucial gains of discourse analysis 
through social construction and understanding. It also includes an emphasis on the active 
construction processes of an individual in their narratives. Interpreting meaning commences 
with the close examination of the way a participant speaks the narrative (Emerson and Frosh 
2009).  
Riessman (2008) found this approach to be valuable in research that entails analyses 
of extended experience narratives. These may include flash forwards, flashbacks, asides and 
multiple episodes. Riessman (2008) indicated that this approach assisted her in identifying 
thematic issues in two studies concerning divorce and infertility among Indian women. 
There are three principal methodological issues necessitating consideration in this 
thesis. The first issue relates to the relations between the cultural and personal narratives of 
the second-generation Iraqi Kurds. Secondly, the role narrativity played in analysis. Finally, 
there was the research topic’s intimate character. The subsections that follow below contain 
discussions in line with these three principal methodological issues. 
 
 4.3.1 Relations between cultural and personal narratives 
Since narratives are locatable on both a personal and a cultural level, they may present with a 
narrow or broad scope, be explicitly told or protected and internal (Eerola 2015). In the 
context of this research, the interest was at both levels. In other words, the research was 
concerned with narratives told by second generation Iraqi Kurds and the cultural narratives 
presently circulating in relation to their experiences of returning home. Subsequently, the 
purpose was not to extract the inner narratives of their returning home experiences or 
interpret what lies underneath them. Instead, the purpose was to analyse such experiences 
within the frames of extant and diverse cultural frameworks. 
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Narratives in this case were understood as social constructions whereby personal 
feelings, meanings and experiences feature in the narratives with respect to the cultural and 
external norms and expectations. This statement has common grounds with the profound and 
popular conceptualisation developed by Abbott (2009). Abbott (2009) asserted that narratives 
represent events that comprise a story, which defines what happened, expressed through the 
way one tells it (narrative discourse).  
In other words, second generation Iraqi Kurds produce narratives based on personal 
experiences albeit negotiated with respect to cultural understandings of returning home. 
Previous research also presents numerous discussions concerning the association 
between cultural and personal narratives. As cultural and social habits and norms influence 
the narratives one produces, Ewick and Silbey (1997) describe narratives as ‘social acts’ that 
are generated based on situation within a given social context. There are various alternatives 
for telling within the cultural stock of stories (Ewick and Silbey 1997). However, some 
alternatives are relatively more established (Bamberg and Andrews 2004). Master, 
hegemonic or dominant narratives might appear as common knowledge for most individuals 
over a large geographical area, or they might be localised and occupy hegemonic positions 
for a select few only. They may also be useful in making sense of an individual’s own life, in 
addition to narrating that life to other people (Hänninen 2004). 
 
4.3.2 The role narrativity played in analysis 
I viewed the interview accounts offered by second generation Iraqi Kurds about their 
returning home as narratives. Equally, I constructed narratives from the accounts of the 
participants and outlined the highlights for understanding the experiences of second-
generation Kurds returning home. This implied that two narrative approaches were employed 
in the execution of the research methodology.  
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These included a narrative analysis and an analysis of narratives. Polkinghorne (1995) 
distinguished between these two approaches. In the case of narrative analysis, the researcher 
analyses data as narratives and generates narratives as results. In terms of analysis of 
narratives, the researcher collects and examines the narratives as raw data and generates 
typologies and classifications. An example in this research is that I gathered the data through 
the narrative interview method as elaborated in the data collection section. Additionally, I 
analysed the common aspects of the stories given by the participants and constructed the 
summarised narratives from the accounts offered. 
 
4.3.3 The research topic’s intimate character 
Narrativity was selected as the framework in this research due to the opportunities it provides 
in terms of getting close to the experiences, private accounts and feelings of second-
generation Kurds returning home. This approach guided the data collection process of the 
interview, it also constituted a general precept in the analysis of the accounts of second-
generation Kurds returning home. Frank (2002) expressed that individuals can construct their 
lifespans as timelines through narratives. Abbott (2009) added that individuals could 
naturalise and normalise the events and experiences in their lives. Loseke (2007) underscored 
the significance of narratives in creating coherence through connecting irregular occurrences 
into meaningful wholes. Narrative approaches have been employed in many studies 
concerning life changes and life stories, in the same way that personal narratives of second-
generation Kurds returning home were used in this research (King, Christou and Ahrens 
2010; Hyden 2008). 
For example, social scientist Hänninen (2004) asserted that studying life changes 
using narrative methods assists researchers in capturing the meanings people accord to the 
experiences they consider most sensitive in their lives.  
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Since returning home for a second-generation Iraqi Kurd is a considerable personal 
experience and a substantive life change for most, analysing these accounts within the 
narrative framework enabled me to apprehend the expectations, hopes, meanings and wishes 
that were expressed in different and more comprehensive terms. 
 
4.4 Practical considerations of the research framework 
Even at the early stages of conceptualizing this research, I appreciated that introduction to the 
initial Iraqi Kurdish informants would be a delicate matter. Negative attitudes or 
misrepresentations could affect the subsequent research process phases negatively. Therefore, 
I appreciated that the issue of trust required continuous consideration from the onset. The 
evolution of the research framework from theoretical conceptualization into practical 
implementation, as described in this section, explains the considerations made. 
Prior to commencing the interview process, I embarked on pilot interviews with Iraqi 
Kurdish participants. It is important to indicate that I have been working as a lecturer at 
University of Sulaimani for three years. I also exchanged ideas with other researchers at the 
University of Sulaimani and gained useful insights by building contact with second 
generation Iraqi Kurds who are back in Kurdistan. I also met Iraqi Kurdish researchers, 
politicians, writers, academics, students and aid workers who offered further insights into the 
issues set for exploration in this research. 
The main purposes behind these interactions are threefold. Firstly, the interactions 
offered a general picture of the lives of second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning to the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) region. Secondly, the interactions proved useful for 
the organization and systematization of the interview guide to ensure adequate addressing of 
the specific research aims and objectives. Thirdly, pilot interviews were accompanied by 
fieldwork experience allowing me to understand preliminary information concerning the 
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returning Iraqi Kurds in terms of potential diversity of experiences. These interactions and 
the positive responses, therefore, inspired the confidence that appropriate informants for this 
research would be accessed. 
Being a qualitative researcher, I was convinced that exploring the experiences of 
people through narratives accrues the value of providing vital information on unexpected 
phenomena. For instance, it was expected that the participants might share experiences about 
their return to Kurdistan without being openly prompted. Such experiences may contain 
information about when coming back to Kurdistan became easier or the main triggers of the 
return to Kurdistan at a given period. However, I paid particular attention to looking beyond 
the literal meanings of return by trying to discover the fears, possibilities, motivations and 
hopes that occurred while living in other countries. 
Specifically, emphasis was placed on constructing and deconstructing the complex 
matter of return through the discovery of diverse distinctions. Therefore, Iraqi Kurds’ voices 
emerged as an integral aspect of this research in answering different questions and getting 
insights into situations that have been previously unexplored. Accordingly, I found it 
necessary to employ open-ended interviews to analyse the narrated experiences of returning 
Kurds. The principal rationale behind semi-structured interviews is that the two have the 
capacity of capturing aspects and processes that may be impossible to cover in depth using 
quantitative research methods. 
My role was not to pursue the extent of truthfulness in the stories shared by the 
participants. Instead, I was focused on understanding the reason why some of the stories 
shared by the informants were more important than others and how such stories defined the 
experiences of the second-generation returning Kurds. Fundamentally, the idea behind this 
research and the subsequent processes was to discover perceptions concerning the 
participants’ lives without demands for truthfulness and accuracy.  
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The use of narratives was found to be helpful in situating people in new locations and 
capturing their perceptions towards return, home, belonging and identity. Simultaneously, 
narratives allowed me to better contextualise stories associated with relocated individuals, 
particularly because most of the participants in this research had faced, or were facing, 
complicated political issues (Vecchi-Mikkola 2013). 
 
4.4.1 Sample selection 
Since this research is about second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning home, it is vital to define 
who they are prior to considering the sample selection techniques. King and Christou (2008) 
expressed the challenges in defining the terms second-generation and the aspect of ‘returning 
home’ in a similar study. This was mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, second generation 
migrants are not exactly migrants, as they were born in the host (foreign) society of their 
migrant parents or spent most of their life in the host country. Therefore, second generation 
return migrants ‘are not “return migrants” in the strict sense, but first-time emigrants to their 
parents’ country of origin’ (King and Christou 2008, p.2). The second reason is that there are 
heated contentions concerning who constitutes the second generation among other broader 
debates about the utility of the ‘generation’ notion in migration and population studies. 
Strict or conventional definitions of the second generation implies that they are 
children born to two immigrant parents in a host or foreign country. This renders the parents 
the first generation. However, King and Christou (2008) spelt out complications when it 
comes to relaxation of this definition and inclusion of questions such as children with a single 
immigrant parent or children brought into host countries whilst still very small. In order to 
ensure ease of identification and relevance to this study, the second generation in this 
research were defined in the strict sense of children born to two Kurdish parents while in a 
host or foreign country or those who left the KRG region before the age of five years old.  
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I employed both purposive and snowball sampling techniques to recruit the sample 
for this research. Also known as judgmental sampling, purposive sampling entails the 
selection of participants that I consider to be holders of information that is relevant to the 
research topic, aim, objectives and questions (Creswell 2014). Emmel (2013) stated that 
researchers employing purposive sampling are reflexive and make decisions in reaction to the 
theoretical developments or empirical findings occurring in the study. Similarly, my decision 
to apply purposive sampling resulted from an understanding that second-generation Iraqi 
Kurds were represented as being different from other Iraqi Kurds, including first generation 
Iraqi Kurds. 
Purposive sampling mimics qualitative research in terms of its iterative nature, with 
the research questions being typically limited to studying a core phenomenon within a 
specific context (Guetterman 2015). This research was focused on the core phenomenon of 
returning home to the KRG region by second generation Iraqi Kurds, which explained the 
suitability of the purposive sampling in this regard. Maxwell (2013) further explained that 
researchers using qualitative research and purposive sampling do not intend to generalise 
from the sample to the bigger population. Instead, they focus on explaining, describing and 
interpreting the phenomenon in question. Similarly, I focused on explaining, describing and 
interpreting the experiences of second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning home. 
Thus, sampling in the case of this research was not a matter of representativeness of 
opinions. Instead, it will be a question of ensuring richness of information gathered, as 
explained by Patton (2015). On the other hand, suitability and adequacy were paramount in 
the recruitment of second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning home to the KRG region. In 
accordance with Creswell (2013), three considerations were made in this research in relation 
to purposive sampling. First, the definition of the participants as second-generation Iraqi 
Kurds returning home to the KRG region.  
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Second, I employed critical case sampling in terms of the selection of the sampling 
strategy. Critical case sampling strategy entails the selection of a small number comprising 
vital cases which would yield ‘the most information and have the greatest impact on the 
development of knowledge’ (Patton 2015, p.276). Third, the sample was limited to 20 
interviewees from the KRG region where several hundred Kurdish second-generation 
returnees who were born and brought up in Europe and neighbouring countries were 
estimated to be living at the time of this research. 
Although Guetterman (2015) decried the contingency of sample sizes on numerous 
considerations, Creswell (2013) recommended collection of extensive details concerning a 
few individuals or sites in qualitative research approaches. He recommended observation of 
one or two cases for narrative inquiry. However, Emmel (2013) cautioned against depending 
on these proposals and urged for the consideration of additional factors. Although Emmel 
(2013) did not offer any examples of the additional factors that require consideration, 
Creswell (2013) indicated that the development of a collective story using narrative inquiry 
might necessitate a different sample size, which I interpreted as being more than two. 
Given this standoff in sample size suggestions, I reviewed previous studies such as 
King, Christou and Ahrens (2010) and Vecchia-Mikkola (2013), which are similar to my 
study, for further guidance. Vecchia-Mikkola (2013) used a sample size of 48 in a 
comparative piece of research, whereas King, Christou and Ahrens (2010) featured 50 
participants comprising first and second-generation Greek Germans. This implies an average 
of 24 and 25 participants for each group in the two studies, as they were comparative studies. 
Thus, I estimated a sample size of 20 for this study, which focused on just one group of 
participants, was well within the range. 
In order to achieve the projected 20 interviewees, I also employ the snowball 
sampling strategy.  
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Snowball sampling allows researchers to contact informants that help in suggesting 
subsequent potential participants in the research (Creswell 2014). Patton (2015) described 
snowballing as a useful sampling technique for reaching otherwise unreachable participants. 
Sociological and ethnographic researchers often employ this technique to access populations 
that are difficult to access (Vecchia-Mikkola 2013). Being a lecturer at University of 
Sulaimani for over three years was an advantage I used to execute the snowball sampling 
technique to recruit unknown or inaccessible second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning home. 
The relationships established with the Iraqi Kurdish community and specifically with 
second-generation Iraqi Kurds who are already back in Kurdistan eased the access to their 
‘colleagues’ that had also returned. Researchers at the University of Sulaimani were only to 
be consulted when the second-generation Iraqi Kurds known to me were not able to assist in 
enlisting an adequate sample. This is because it might have been easier for me to build trust 
with second generation Iraqi Kurds that have returned and are unknown to me through ‘some 
of their own’ with whom they share similar experiences.  
4.5 Data collection 
Both secondary and primary data were collected in this research. Secondary data, including 
migration and return home triggers and factors, were sourced from the university library, 
migration databases, credible websites, books, journals and other academically viable data 
sources. In order to ensure maximum accounts of the experiences of the participants, primary 
data were collected through interviews. 
 
4.5.1 Interviews 
Most qualitative research resources (Creswell 2014, 2013; Bryman 2012; Silverman 2011) 
discuss three types of qualitative research interviews. These include structured, unstructured 
and semi-structured interviews.  
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Edwards and Holland (2013) indicated that structured interviews lean more towards the 
quantitative end and are more applicable in survey-based studies. The other two, semi-
structured and unstructured, are the types that qualitative researchers dwell on the most. In 
other words, the principal characteristic of interviews in qualitative research entails increased 
flexibility and reduced rigidity in terms of structure. In brief, the basis of structured 
interviews is a questionnaire that contains sequential questions that the interviewer poses in 
the same sequence and similarly for all research subjects with little room for flexibility, if at 
all. The principal goal revolves around neutral interviewers obtaining comparable 
information from possibly huge number of interviewees. Typically, researchers using 
structured interviews lean towards positivist paradigm, its methodical demands for practising 
and subsequent statistical data analysis methods (Edwards and Holland 2013). 
Semi-structured interviews entail the interviewer posing similar questions to the 
interviewee although with some alteration in terms of sequence. In addition, interviewers 
using this type of interview to collect data normally follow up additional enquiry lines that 
may be more focused on the subject (Marsh 2013). Semi-structured interviews assume a less 
formal form. The benefit is that any difficulty experienced with questions can be countered 
by changing the wording and assisting in the gaining of further information. However, semi-
structured interviews are most suited for interviewing groups that might have difficulty 
comprehending the questions posed during the interviews (Marsh 2013). 
Unstructured interviews are also known as focused or non-standard interviews. While 
using unstructured interviews, the interviewer prepares a topic list that they desire to 
deliberate on with the respondent (Marsh 2013). Unstructured interviews allow interviewers 
the freedom of phrasing questions the best way they deem fit and using any order, which 
renders the interviewing more conversational and increasingly open.  
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The main challenge associated with this interview form relates to the difficulty in 
managing the interview focus especially for inexperienced interviewers (Marsh 2013). 
In spite of the huge differences in tradition and style of qualitative interviewing using 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews, both interviewing forms have three principal 
shared features. First, they both feature interactional dialogue exchange at least between two 
parties in either face-to-face or different contexts (Bryman 2012).  
Second, both feature a topic-centred, thematic, narrative or biographical approach in 
which the researcher has the issues, themes or topics that they plan to explore, but with a 
flexible and fluid structure. Finally, both unstructured and semi-structured interviews see 
knowledge as contextual and situated. Such knowledge requires the researcher to make sure 
there is emphasis on all relevant contexts in order to guarantee the production of situated 
knowledge. Through interaction, in a co-production process that entails knowledge 
reconstruction or construction, understandings and meanings are created (Mason 2002). 
There are several strengths associated with the use of interviews as primary data 
collection methods. According to Gobo (2011), ethnography is an increasingly well-known 
data collection method made popular by the dominance of the interview society. Qualitative 
interviews bridge the gap in the necessity of methods that are capable of giving insights into 
the meanings that groups and individuals attach to their experiences, events and practices, 
and social processes. This has triggered the understanding and appreciation of the relevance 
and value of qualitative findings and research in contextualising people’s lived experiences 
(Neale, Henwood and Holland 2012). These were critical benefits in relation to the lived 
experiences associated with the returning home of second-generation Iraqi Kurds. 
Mason (2002) contended that qualitative interviews allow for the exploration of four 
main issues that are otherwise invisible to researchers. The first one is the weave and texture 
of everyday life.  
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In this research, the everyday life of second-generation Iraqi Kurds that had returned 
home was core to the development of the research itself. The second issue relates to the under 
experiences, imaginings and understandings of research participants. The third benefit relates 
to the uncovering of issues related to the way social processes, relationships, institutions or 
discourses work. Finally, there is the issue of uncovering the importance of the meanings 
generated by the social processes, relationships, institutions or discourses (Mason 2002). All 
these benefits were applicable in this research due to the detail and depth required of such 
research, as indicated by Edwards and Holland (2013). 
On the other hand, qualitative interviews have several challenges. First, qualitative 
interviews are impossible to replicate naturally because of their social interaction nature. The 
social dimensions include the social and physical space, power relations between the personal 
and social levels, the context and location, and the complexity of interviewee and interviewer 
emotions (Crow and Pope 2008). This challenge also implicates the criticism towards 
qualitative interviews concerning their subjective nature. However, the issue of subjectivity is 
irrelevant because ‘subjectivity is often the focus and the vehicle for research using 
qualitative interviewing’ (Edwards and Holland 2013, p.97). Other challenges are often cited 
in comparison to the quantitative data collection methods and include issues such as the time 
and other resources required to complete qualitative interviews (Bryman 2012). 
Based on the understanding of the various interview types, the unstructured interview 
form was most suited for this qualitative research. This is because the topic of returning home 
for second generation Iraqi Kurds required sensitivity, as well as general concerns regarding 
scheduling, openness to share the stories freely and to allow for probing opportunities to 
gather deeper and more insights (Marsh 2013). Specifically, narrative interviews, which ‘are 
characterized as unstructured tools, in-depth with specific features, which emerge from the 
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life stories of both the respondent and cross-examined the situational context' (Muylaert et al 
2014, p.185) were adopted for this research, as elaborated in the next section. 
 
4.5.2 Narrative interviews 
Silverman (2011) indicated that we have been dwelling in an interview society where 
interviews are gathered and used in making sense out of the accounts, emotions, thoughts, 
feelings and lives of people in general. Therefore, it appears that narrative research and 
interviews have numerous common elements. Nonetheless, a closer examination of 
interviews would reveal that interview data are often gathered with an inclination towards 
obtaining ‘truths’ and facts (Hyvärinen and Löyttyniemi 2005). This is different from 
narrative interviews, which pursue intimate and personal experiences (Eerola 2015). 
Gathering of facts is not the aim of narrative interviews whereby researchers make deliberate 
efforts to offer space and room for narratives and narration. This happens through 
encouraging or prompting interviewees to generate narratives or posing questions that are 
capable of inducing narrative speech (Brannen 2013). 
In narrative methods in general, there exists no ‘pure’ approach for conducting 
narrative interviews (Eerola 2015). Therefore, the narrativity magnitude present in the 
narratives generated through the interviews, for instance, could differ from thin to thick. 
Alternatively, there may be less of more narrativity (Fludernik 200). In the context of this 
research, the terms narrative interviewing and narrative interviews relate to two significant 
issues. The first one entails the provision of adequate space for second generation Iraqi Kurds 
returning home to narrate their lives and experiences in confidential settings, as narrowly or 
as widely as their comfort allows. The second one relates to the position of the researcher as 
the keen listener.  
 132 
Consequently, the data for this research were gathered through undertaking qualitative 
research interviews that are orientated narratively with 20, second generation Iraqi Kurds that 
have returned home. 
The expectation was to generate conversations with the interviewees in manners that 
would privilege their processes and perspectives of making meaning with respect to their 
experiences. In the narrative interviewing approach, the interviewer served as a good listener 
and the interviewee as the storyteller. In the implementation of this narrative approach, the 
agenda of the interview was subject to alteration depending on the experiences of the narrator 
and the stories shared.  
The suitability of the narrative interviewing approach for this study is because of the 
focus on the stories constructed by second generation Iraqi Kurds concerning their returning 
home experiences. Subsequently, an interview guide with a loose structure was deemed 
suitable in allowing for what Emerson and Frosh (2009) described as ‘flexible and rich talk' 
(p.32). This was useful in enabling the participants to make choices concerning the desired 
narratives that they presented to the researcher (Billington 2009). 
I rejected the conventional question and answer interview structure because such an 
approach restricts the answers the interviewee can give and subsequently suppresses the 
stories they may choose to share (Mishler 1986). Assuming a conventional approach to the 
interviews and posing predetermined questions would most likely constrain the responses of 
the participants through imposing my agenda into the research conversations. Moreover, such 
a conventional interviewing approach could have caused me to make unfounded 
presumptions concerning the topics of the stories that the interviewees offered. The topics 
emergent in the interviews originated from my research focus and this might have reduced 
the credibility of the research. This is because it was difficult for me to foretell the story that 
was specific to any given interviewee (Chase 2007). 
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Furthermore, adoption of a conventional interviewing approach would undeniably 
have formed part of the joint story construction that shaped the conversations between the 
researcher and the interviewees, due to the questions and responses given by the researcher. 
However, the open, narrative interview approach assisted in enabling the participants to 
participate actively in the process. It also developed conversations that steer clear of a 
conventional, rigid question and answer approach and transcend into a mutual exchange that 
produces discourses that are constructed jointly (Mishler 1986). 
To aid the participants in recollecting previous experiences, I incorporated life history 
frameworks (Riessman 2008) to generate an understanding of returning home networks 
within the initial interviews with participants. According to Elliot (2005), people are likely to 
encounter considerable difficulty in producing accounts of broad experiences in lives that 
span numerous years. The structuring of experiences into frameworks can lead to the 
development of a guide that will in turn assist the participants in recalling their stories and 
talking about specific situations and times in their lives. Furthermore, Riessman (2008) 
reiterated that some participants might not want to create lengthy life accounts with strangers 
and that production of life history grids might relieve some pressure that participants might 
experience from the researcher during production of an extensive story. The introduction of 
history networks was achieved by asking all participants to consider their times at the 
host/foreign country and to divide their returning home history into sections. The sections 
were then assigned titles and recorded as returning home grids. 
Following the construction of the ‘returning home’ grids, I asked the respective 
participants to share more about all the chapters they voluntarily identified within their 
respective grids. The structure was significantly loose and involved simple requests like 
prompting the interviewees to share any significant episode or memory from the time of the 
grid chapter.  
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It also involved prompting participants to take lead in narrative constructions in the 
most meaningful manner to them. The undertaking of this exercise borrowed heavily from 
the guidelines provided by Hollaway and Jefferson (2000). These authors argued that the best 
narrative interview questions invite participants to speak concerning specific situations and 
times as opposed to prompting them about their entire life over a lengthy period. Reference to 
the chapters created in the ‘returning home’ grids ensured that this was accomplished. 
The advice offered by Emerson and Frosh (2009) concerning the significance of 
inviting participants to speak as much or as little as they wished was ensured through 
consistent reminders and non-coercive probing where necessary.  
I was aware that the introduction of history grids and chapter structures might have 
influenced the way participants told the stories. Additionally, the history grids and chapters 
might have included chapters that the participants might rather leave out. An attempt was 
made at maintaining an informal style of conversation and use of common languages. 
Specific attention was also given to engagement within the conversations, as opposed to 
being preoccupied with the collection of obvious stories. Various authors (Elliott 2005; Chase 
2007; Riessman 2008; Squire 2009) recommend this approach, which was found to be 
helpful in the creation of a relaxed environment and in building positive relations within 
which natural conversations emerged. 
 
4.5.3 Narrative interview process 
Specifically, the 20 interviews were conducted in Kurdish, Arabic, German and English for a 
period of six months. I also followed the participants’ lead and listened out for the emotions 
that they expressed at different stages of sharing their stories. Each interview took between 
30 and 120 minutes and this was dependent on the amount of information the participants 
were willing to share, as well as their availability.  
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In all cases, meetings and conversations preceded the interviews where the ethical 
considerations presented later on in this chapter were then shared. I aimed at giving the 
interviewees the freedom of choosing the interview venues. The rationale behind this 
approach was to ensure the creation of a comfortable situation for the interviewees. In 
general, I found that cafes, workplaces and homes were the most preferred interview venues. 
Altogether, I remained flexible in welcoming other venues. 
Following prior authorisation by the participants, interviews were recorded for 
eventual transcription, which included symbols to represent silences, pauses, elation, 
overlapping speech and intonations as recommended by Esterberg (2002). 
 Participants declining to be recorded were excluded from this research considering 
the potential difficulty in analysing unrecorded proceedings. In all interviews, I consistently 
encouraged the informants to respond to prompts that focused on life in Iraq, conditions and 
memories of their experiences, the desire to return home and life experiences in host 
countries. 
The skills required for proper narrative interviewing were approached as a continuous 
learning processes. Thus, it is likely that my interviewing skills advanced with regular 
practice and continued interviewing. I considered the narrative interviews as conversation 
forms and the interviewer role within the metaphorical descriptions of a traveller and a miner 
(Kvale 1996). These metaphors denote the implications of various theoretical understandings 
associated with interview research in general. 
The miner refers to the modernist notion of buried metal needing excavation and the 
researcher as either seeking objective facts or essential nuggets of meaning. The traveller 
reflects the concept of an interview being a conversation, as the researcher/traveller poses 
queries and leads the subjects into telling their own stories in relation to their lived world, 
thereby wandering with them.  
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This investigative process results in new knowledge and an alteration within the self-
knowledge of the interviewer through the process of self-reflection. Time, space and the 
individuals involved all bind the meanings. 
Esterberg (2002) equated the interview process to an empathic dialogue between at 
least two people living similar experiences, as opposed to a mechanical process of asking 
questions. Interviewers are expected to display active listening and ensure the conversation 
goes on. In order to guarantee this, I made sure that there were no sudden interruptions or 
transitions. For example, the interview topic was not changed suddenly in the event that an 
interviewee shared a difficult or emotionally tasking experience. Instead, I kept listening 
carefully and tried to comprehend the rationale behind the telling of that particular story. In 
some instances, this necessitated halting the recording to allow the interviewee enough time 
to gain composure upon breaking down due to sad memories. 
4.5.4 Data collection limitations 
The data gathering technique adopted in this research is not without limitations. In spite of 
concerted efforts to create an informal and relaxed atmosphere and promote participant-led 
storytelling, the research situation itself, the researcher’s questions and the need to record the 
interviews may have in some way affected these efforts and discounted their results. In any 
form of social interaction, it is unavoidable that people will introduce their expectations and 
histories concerning their encounter. Temporal and cultural contexts might mediate such 
interaction in terms of expectations and histories. Having stayed in Sulaimani, I appreciate 
the unavoidable introduction of self, expectations, thoughts and previous experiences into the 
research on my part and that of the participants. 
Phoenix (2009) highlighted the processes through which participants in research 
might bring their histories concerning past positioning and their expectations of the 
interviewer and the interview itself into the context of the research.  
 137 
This author argued that interviewees might have presumptions concerning the 
interviewer’s cultural identity, for example. In turn, this might cause them to modify what 
they share and how they say what they share based on these presumptions. Such an encounter 
in the context of research might cause difficulty in digressing from more formal interview 
sessions. 
Equally, some experiences and interviews were somewhat uncomfortable for me. For 
example, one interviewee failed to meet my personal expectations in terms of the form a 
narrative interview might take. However, it was in my best interest to ensure that I welcomed 
little information as much as he did immense information. This is the true nature of narrative 
interviews because their strengths do not rest in the quantity of information shared by 
interviewees, so much as the relevance of the information shared.  
The diversity of the experiences the interviewees shared was treated as reflecting both 
the contextual and social variations of conversing with different individuals on different days. 
They were also interpreted as the individual processes of the co-construction roles played by 
the interviewer and interviewee in the narrative context. 
During the interviews, I was at times nervous about whether or not I was eliciting 
adequate stories from the participants. Additional questioning was deemed necessary to 
varying extents within the various interviews in order to elicit narratives inasmuch as this 
differed among interviewees. Reflecting on Squire’s (2009) assertion, co-construction might 
resemble engagement in an ordinary conversation and this was reassuring for me in those 
narrative interviews that felt as such. Squire (2009) suggested that narrative interviews are 
whole interviews. Thus, researchers should not worry about gathering stories that skew the 
research towards some form of direction. 
Sometimes, there is difficulty in putting jumbled or ambiguous thoughts into words, 
especially in cases where an individual suffered considerable loss (Riessman 2008).  
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In the case of second-generation Iraqi Kurds, this could be the case owing to the 
displacement of the first generations due to war in Iraq. This could have made the interviews 
sound somewhat confused while listening to the recordings. For difficult conversations such 
as those, I did not probe the interviewees to continue sharing their experiences unless they 
felt comfortable to continue talking about such events. 
 
4.6 Coding and data analysis procedures 
Coding constitutes one of the most crucial procedures in the process of analysing qualitative 
data. There are many coding practices exemplified by qualitative researchers. The inspiration 
behind most of these methods is traceable to constructivist or interpretive approaches that 
might yield different results and implications in the manner of comparing and 
conceptualising categories (see Charmaz 2006; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Often, coding 
refers to the sorting and labelling of data. Coffey and Atkinson (1996) suggested that coding 
involves compression of bulk data into units that are analysable through creation of 
categories from and with the data. Essentially, coding is the process by which researchers 
reach advanced specificity levels and potentially generate a theory through synthesis of the 
original categories. Therefore, the central category comes up spontaneously because it 
features predominantly in the citations during the process of constant data comparison. Thus, 
sub-categories and core categories need to be interconnected. However, they also reflect the 
significance of findings in relation to the research problem and questions (Bryman 2012). 
Coding for this research commenced with a social mapping task that emerged during 
the preliminary interactions with informants and potential participants. The collection of 
interview data and the participation in events constituted the initial, simultaneous data 
analysis and comparison. This allowed for advanced outlining and organisation of an 
increasingly structured plan for the systematisation of the projected interview guide. 
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Furthermore, early coding and the eventual field notes enabled the research to isolate relevant 
and crucial information in relation to key words used by Iraqi Kurds or the variation between 
second-generation Kurds and other Iraqis. 
Upon completion of the pre-coding stage, I started collecting and analysing narrative 
interviews and gathering secondary data. In fact, coding in this research was a considerable 
process that commenced with the first interview transcription. The coding of line after line as 
recommended by Charmaz (2006) formed the first approach to the virtual dissection of the 
interviews into data pieces. This allowed for the clarification of relevant and common themes 
or categories exemplifying the patterns of meanings. Simultaneously, redefinition of 
categories by drawing comparisons to get to a coherent pattern took place. Through interview 
comparison, I reduced the notes gradually until the realisation of a central theme.  
In the coding process, I compared raw data and transformed it into categories that 
were later interpreted. For instance, some central emergent themes were seemingly 
influenced by other sub-categories and sub-themes. 
The overarching consideration was that interviews were narratives that represented 
the social products that people produced in a given context. Likewise, Lawler (2002) argued 
that narratives comprise social products that people produce in the specific cultural, historical 
and social locations. In line with Eastmond (2007), the narratives migrants offer are not 
necessarily transparent versions of ‘truth’. Thus, narratives in this research were treated as 
dynamic interplays between story, life and experience. By focusing on interviews as 
narratives, I attempted to interpret the past beyond providing a mere description. Specifically, 
Riessman (2004) stated that the truths represented in narrative accounts might not be faithful 
denotations of the previous world. Instead, they might be the shifting links that the migrants 
forge between the past, present and future. 
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A thematic analysis form offers data interpretation through shifts from complexities to 
the stories migrants share (Creswell 2013). Researchers must detect and select common 
themes among the stories. Specifically, a theme connects with categories or sub-themes that 
manifest following discussions as a hub. However, interactions between informants and 
researchers might also result in the construction of themes. Sub-themes in this research 
offered valid arguments and consistency within the general discussion. This was with respect 
to the connected categories or themes and in relation to the research questions in this study. 
 
4.7 Validation and representation 
The interpretation and analysis of the data collected and the presentation of findings posed 
some level of challenge. The complexity of these tasks seemingly increases when one deals 
with huge amounts of qualitative and rich data.  
In line with the recommendation by Gurd (2008), an iterative approach was employed in the 
case of this research. This approach entails switching back and forth between theory and data. 
Nonetheless, I believed that it was important to contextualise the life and the lived 
experiences of other people. This was possible through their temporal, historical, political and 
sociocultural contingencies in Kurdistan, Iraq, where the research took place. As advised by 
Skeggs (1995), I served as a ‘filter’ to select information critically in accordance with the 
specific Kurdish context and time. This is because all research situates the researcher in the 
representation process that is historically located in the theoretical frameworks and debates. 
Additionally, data analysis deals with interpretative tasks whereby contextualisation and 
translation of formal discussions into sociological concepts occurs. 
In qualitative research studies, it is important for researchers to present their findings 
with creativity and descriptiveness. Whereas creativity connects with critical data 
interpretation, descriptiveness is about explaining the findings (Patton 1990).  
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Discussions concerning validity and reliability largely apply in quantitative research. 
However, these concepts also apply in qualitative research during data analysis. Social 
scientists like Bryman (2012) and Creswell (2014) prefer to overlook these concepts, as they 
find them considerably oppressive and largely connected with a positivist philosophy. 
Generally, reliability speaks to the ‘consistency from one measurement to the next’ (Gilbert 
1993, p.27). Winter (2000) defined external reliability as the extent to which the study can be 
replicated. Winter described two shared ideas concerning validity. These include the accuracy 
of the means of measurement, as well as whether such measures actually measure that which 
they are intended to measure (Winter 2000). 
I concur with Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) view that authenticity and trustworthiness 
are better criteria for validating a qualitative research than reliability and validity. Both 
criteria presume a relationship between informants and the researcher based on genuineness 
and trust. Lincoln and Guba (1985) expressed that dependability, confirmability, credibility 
and transferability are the criteria that address trustworthiness. Dependability demonstrates 
similarities with the reliability concept in quantitative research. It refers to data stability over 
a period and under particular conditions. In qualitative inquiries in particular, results are 
difficult to replicate. Nonetheless, a researcher might learn and get inspiration from past 
qualitative studies by considering them as prototype models according to Shenton (2004). For 
instance, applying overlapping methods like in-depth descriptions might assist in ensuring 
dependability through provision of clear and logical explanations. 
Confirmability concerns the researcher’s good faith in data provision. Through this 
criterion, the researcher demonstrates the integrity and neutrality of the interpretations they 
draw from the data (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Confirmability requires that the research 
process progresses towards reducing the researcher’s overarching influence. Consequently, 
this leads to increasingly objective findings as opposed to subjective ones.  
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This relates to the broadly held perspective that personal thoughts and concerns are 
difficult to confirm. However, the desire to ensure that the narrative process was participant-
led in this research infiltrated the data analysis procedures, where regardless of the mode used 
to analyse the data, the participants’ feelings and emotions were captured in the data, hence 
the eventual findings. 
Credibility implies that research conduct is in line with the good practice rules in 
settings where the research engages with people in informal and formal conversations 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985). Specifically, studies are considered credible due to the researcher’s 
efforts in presenting the research to the audience in a clear and transparent manner. For the 
current study, the researcher assessed and optimised credibility through prolonged interaction 
with informants, their environment and the datasets obtained. The research also commenced 
with the interactions with Kurdish natives within the University and its environs to serve as a 
filter for the selection and understanding of the study sample.  I kept memos as data backups 
and a journal that assisted in maintaining the course of the project in line with the targeted 
objectives. Upon completion of interviews and collection of field data, I tested the research 
credibility through cross-checking of both interview and fieldwork data. This enhanced the 
confidence in the interpretations and the conclusions that arose from the data. 
Transferability implies that the qualitative research should offer the possibility of 
transferring the findings to different, appropriate contexts by other researchers (Marshall and 
Rossman 2006). Transferability underscores the extent to which the research findings apply 
in the broader domain beyond the studied research population. Although qualitative research 
studies are not as generalizable as positivist studies, they might offer helpful findings and 
inferences that might guide future research. The use of narratives in this research 
demonstrated using quotations and later interpretations might offer a better understanding of 
the research processes to researchers investigating other issues related to second-generation 
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groups returning home. The explicit, detailed nature of the research methodology and the 
techniques employed in the development of this research make it easy for future researchers 
to employ the findings of this research in other contexts. Furthermore, the sampling of 20 
econd generation Iraqi Kurds that have returned home is considered an adequate 
representation of the collective experiences of this group of people in Kurdistan. 
 
4.8 Ethics and ethical considerations  
Overall, qualitative researchers conduct research about, by and for people. Based on this 
rationale, a discussion concerning ethical principles is necessary. Issues related to ethics 
might have support from professional bodies and organisation like the British Sociological 
Association (BSA), the Social Research Association (SRA), or the International Sociological 
Association (ISA) that outline various research ethical codes.  
These ethical codes outline the expected conduct of the researcher in relation to the research 
subjects (Bryman 2012; Esterberg 2002). 
According to Esterberg (2002), informed consent and confidentiality are amongst the 
most pertinent issues especially for inexperienced researchers. Since qualitative research and 
especially narrative research is conversational, it is critical that data collectors sustain clear 
boundaries between what the participants tell them and what they tell participants (Mack et al 
2005). It is important to understand that conversation entails giving and taking. Researchers 
garner diverse information from numerous participants and simultaneously assure 
participants about protection of their privacy and protection against harm. Thus, in ensuring 
the participants’ confidentiality, I did not disclose private data, which identifies participants 
directly or is traceable to them (Bryman 2012). 
Informed consent demonstrates that individuals taking part in the process of research 
have received adequate and clear information concerning the specific research and the 
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process involved in the research, which helps them agree to participate based on such 
understanding. In relation to this, people can consciously consider whether they would like to 
participate in the research or otherwise. This requires furnishing participants with adequate 
information concerning the purposes, benefits and risks attributable to the participation in the 
study (Bryman 2012; Mack et al 2005). Through the informed consent, the participants were 
informed that participation in the research was voluntary and did not attract any incentives. 
Additionally, participants were reassured that they could vacate the research at any stage 
without penalty or other repercussions on their side. 
Upon familiarisation with the people of Kurdistan and the potential participants, I 
began seeking general information that was deemed helpful in assisting me to outline the 
research context better. At the commencement of the interviews, all informants were asked to 
respond to simple questions like city of origin, arrival in Kurdistan, age, names, education 
and work experience. The idea behind this information was to ensure that I and the informant 
developed a high level of rapport prior to commencing the narrative interview. Some 
participants offered nicknames or single names and avoided surnames. Others offered their 
full names without hesitation, whereas others provided fictional names without explanation. 
The understanding was that those who chose to hide their true identities had substantive 
reasons for that and there was no need to probe further, as this would not affect the outcome 
of this research. 
Nonetheless, I explained the motivation behind this research. In order to safeguard the 
confidentiality of the participants, I accepted the use of nicknames and single names. The 
reassurance concerning the protection of their anonymity also seemed to encourage the 
participants to share in-depth stories. For example, the incidences of sentiments such as ‘this 
is off the record’ emerged regularly, which implied that this was an inside story that the 
informants would not share under different circumstances that did not prioritise anonymity. 
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In order to respect these requests and further cultivate more confidence in the process and 
myself as researcher, the tape recorder was paused. However, I made notes about such 
incidences in the event that it was relevant to the research. 
 
4.9 Positionality and reflexivity  
Obviously, my thesis did not provide a fieldwork setting according to the ‘classical’ 
understanding, which used to be associated with the study of ‘non-western’ or ‘non-






Returning to KRG region to conduct my fieldwork posed several problems for me. What 
constitutes the ‘field’ versus ‘home’ is a problematic distinction, as returning to KRG to do 
fieldwork was by no means returning ‘home’. The field sites were divided between different 
cities. Yet strong family ties to Sulaymanya city (where many relatives still live) also made 
me feel very familiar with such settings. While similar historical and political processes 
might locate me with my research participants, the ‘native’ can be the ‘other’ through a class 
privilege (Lal 1996). I was acutely aware of my class and educational privilege (through 
material and symbolic differences). As such, I was simultaneously an insider, outsider, both 
and neither (Gilbert 1994; Mullings 1999). The borders that I crossed, I feel, are always here 
within me, negotiating the various locations and subjectivities I simultaneously feel a part of 
and apart from. The ambivalences, discomfort, tensions and instabilities of subjective 
positions became important to be reflexive about and work through, where the contradictions 
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in my positionality and in-between status had to be constantly reworked as I undertook 
fieldwork. The researcher’s and the research participant’s location, along with the value 
accorded them, are seen as influencing the research process and interaction situations; 
therefore, they need to be reflected upon (Toivanen 2014:54). !Lykke’s (2010: 50) broad 
definition of intersectionality expresses the view that intersectionality, besides being 









In this chapter, the disclosure and explanation of the narrative methodology has been 
presented. The choice of the narrative methodology and the rationale for this choice have also 
been included in line with the aim of uncovering the experiences of second-generation Iraqi 
Kurds returning home. The relationship between cultural and personal narratives, the role of 
narrativity in the analysis and the intimate character of the research topic explained the 
choice of narrative methodology. The procedures for employing purposive sampling 
technique as the primary sampling technique were explained.  
Additionally, the use of snowballing as the sampling technique when an inadequate sample 
was unreachable was also justified. The participant interaction processes used to develop the 
‘returning home’ grids ahead of the open interviews and the development have been detailed. 
The limitations associated with data collections were also outlined before the disclosure of 
the coding and data analysis procedures.  
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The measures taken by me to ensure validation and representation of the data collected has 
been accounted for in detail. These were covered through the aspects of credibility, 
transferability, confirmability and dependability of this research. Finally, the ethical 
considerations adhered to in the implementation of the research methodology constituted the 
last section.  
! !
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5.! Research findings and analysis 
 
5.1 Narratives of Return  
This section assesses the previously analysed phase of the second generation’s life in the light 
of their return experience. The narratives of return show that the second generation had 
mixed feelings about the return. Concealment in the veils of history and ongoing struggle and 
resistance against oppression are central characteristics of the way of life for Kurdish 
descendants, regardless of generation (Zalme 2013). In the decades towards the end of the 
20th Century, Kurds suffered from the peaking of racial discrimination and violence against 
them especially during the Ba’ath regime. The atrocities the Kurds suffered under Saddam 
Hussein also left scars on their identity and Kurdish refugees in foreign countries still 
encounter difficulties in figuring out their identity, belongingness and home.  
Two major atrocities under the Saddam regime account for the brutality extended to 
the Kurds. The first one is the Anfal (systematic genocide campaign) of huge rural areas in 
Kurdistan resulting in the killing of over 180,000 civilians. In addition, Anfal resulted in the 
destruction of 4,500 villages in the late 1980s. The second incident was the chemical 
bombing of the Halabja town of Iraqi Kurdistan killing over 5,000 unarmed individuals and 
injuring thousands in March 1988. To date, thousands still suffer from the exposure to 
mustard gas. The events subsequent to the 1991 Gulf war included an uprising by the Kurds. 
The Iraqi regime responded ruthlessly to the uprising in a bid to crush the revolt. Following 
the unsuccessful Kurdish revolt, nearly two million Kurds fled to the Iraqi mountain borders 
and neighbouring countries to evade the military attack. The intervention of the international 
community came after this and led the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 688. This 
resolution was the first international legal protection of the Kurds (Cook 1995).  
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People in the diaspora have undergone the emotional experience of being outside their 
motherland in different ways. Diaspora research has for a longtime investigated questions 
concerning the formation of identity. These questions are about adaptation and assimilation, 
homeland and nationalism, and the integration processes. There seems to be a pattern in 
discussions about diaspora especially in accordance with the minority/majority axis with 
respect to postcolonial exile communities in the West, particularly Britain and Europe. 
Therefore, cultural and social commentators take significant interest in the communities in 
the diaspora that live between two worlds. The two principal streams of such interest entail 
the notion of ‘home’ and adaptation in the societies that receive them (Zalme 2013). 
It is possible to apply nearly every category and feature identified by scholars with 
respect to what constitutes a diaspora community (Cohen 1997) to the Kurds (Wahlbeck 
1999). In spite of the considerable numbers of exiled and displaced Kurdish communities 
outside Kurdistan, the studies conducted about the return of such communities are few. 
Moreover, available studies in this respect mainly focused on the returning home of first-
generation Kurds. The generations of Kurdish people returning from their foreign refuges 
comprise students, asylum seekers, exiled intellectuals, labour migrants, refugees and 
individuals that returned to join their families (Zalme 2013). Numerous commentators on the 
return and diaspora topics pertaining to Kurds (Wahlbeck 1999; van Bruinessen 1999) concur 
that the political situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is the principal reason for the growing Kurdish 
diaspora. 
Van Bruinessen (1999) takes the research further by noting that the second-generation 
that are growing up or were born in Europe show more interest in the political activity and 
national identity of Kurdistan than their parents. The main reason behind this trend is 
retaliation for marginalization and exclusion in host societies, which reinforces their sense of 
belonging to Kurdistan.  
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Additionally, there are indications that the efforts of mobilising Kurdish elites 
motivated numerous Kurds to accept their ethnic identity. According to Wahlbeck (1999), 
Kurdish refugees continued suffering alienation from their host societies even after many 
years in exile. They also continued relating to Kurdistan both psychologically and 
emotionally in numerous various ways. Nonetheless, the connection to Kurdistan also 
provided quite tangible information, capital, people and idea flows between Kurdistan and 
the settlement countries (Wahlbeck 1999). 
Motivations for return for second-generation Iraqi-Kurdish migrants also include the 
desire for inclusion. However, some second-generation returnees face exclusion even in 
Kurdistan upon their return. From a different perspective, Keles (2016) states that networks 
have limited capacity to motivate return migration to the homeland, when the economic and 
political stability improve considerably in the homeland and when economic, political and 
social structures enable and promote returnees’ participation. A variety of research on 
transnationalized economic and social networks within the diaspora is available. Such works 
centre on a shared ethnic identity, claims of sovereignty and territorial attachment for either 
an imagined or a real homeland. Altogether, this research finds that the factors motivating 
Kurdish returnee migration to Kurdistan is sophisticated and the aftermath too complex to be 
captured in single theories. Without refuting the role of social networks in motivating 
returnee migration to Kurdistan, the findings of this research complement the arguments by 
Keles, which indicate that ‘social networks are social fields and each social field accepts only 
members with similar taste, social and political interests, culture, and class background’ 
(2016: 11). Social networks, therefore, are not entirely inclusive, but also associative and 
exclusive, thereby rendering such networks discriminatory and selective.  
The networks that existed before the return migration of second-generation migrants 
to Kurdistan, including political, social, friendship and family networks, must exert a 
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significant amount of influence over return migration if they are to deliver emotion and 
economic benefits. It is often stressed in the migration literature that the key motive behind 
return migration consists of a mixture of positive and negative quality-of-life factors (Boyle 
et al. 1998; Gmelch 1980; Michalos 1997). The narratives of return indicate that second 
generation Iraqi Kurds had mixed feelings about return. Although, most of them felt that the 
Kurdistan region was their ‘home’, they were often disillusioned once they returned to KRG.  
This research shows that family and social relations, political factors, hostility and 
discrimination in the countries of settlement, nationalism, patriotism and the interaction 
between these factors motivate the decision to return. Below present the results of the 
narratives in relation to the thematic factors that caused second-generation Kurds to return to 
Kurdistan.   
For more than half of my interviewees, return took place because of social elements. 
Second-generation Iraqi-Kurds returning both from neighbouring countries and European 
countries made their way back because of social factors. These were mainly related to 
themselves directly or their family. Social bonding and connection with their roots and their 
relatives were the main basis or ground for returning.  
For the other half of my contributors, non-social factors such as the political situation 
and the living conditions in the host country were the main reason for making the decision to 
return. 
For those returning from neighbouring countries, hostility and discrimination 
(exclusion) were more common reasons for return compared to those Kurds living in 
European countries. This experience of exclusion cultivated a desire to be accepted and a 
return to Kurdistan seemed the best choice.  
The last theme revealed in the narratives refers to patriotism and nationalism. Mainly, 
this factor of return comprised the urge to return and contribute to developing Kurdistan 
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The following sections explores each theme with narratives and analyses them through 
previous research exploring second-generation return.  
5.2 Motivations for Return  
5.2.1 Family and social relations 
As it has been indicated in other research, most first-generation immigrants have harbored a 
plan to return to their home country since the beginning of their immigration. The narratives 
of my participants show that the most of the return to the KRG region took place after the fall 
of Saddam’s regime, when the families took the decision to return back to their homeland. 
The factors influencing return in the case of second-generation Iraqi Kurds returnees is much 
more characterised by whole-family return. This route to return was the most common 
feature amongst my participants. The results from the narratives indicate that the motivations 
for return related to family and social relations have different dimensions. Certainly, the 
analysis of my data indicates that for the second generation who have taken the decision to 
return to the KRG region, this migration is facilitated through social relationships and 
resources which are generated and sustained through family networks. It is these family 
networks which make the difference between the dream or intention to return and the actual 
reality of doing so. 
The need to establish a relationship with her grandmother and restore a more genuine social 
life in Kurdistan informed the return of the 27-year-old Zhwan who could not recall her 
migration to Iran seventeen years ago when she was five months old, as captured in the 
narrative below: 
I can say the factor influencing returning was my grandmother’s sickness. At the 
beginning of our migration, she was with us in Iran. As I said due to my uncle, she 
was my paternal grandmother. She stayed for a while and then returned to Sulaimani, 
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and she returned to Iran again. After a while my uncle was released. He returned to 
Kurdistan, and there was nothing which made us stay in Iran, so my mother thought 
that it is better to be with our family and relatives. Besides, it was hard to study there 
at the university for we were considered as foreigners. We had a green card, and 
somehow our life was difficult, so they decided to return and establish a new life here. 
When we returned, it was 1998. The situation was better than 1995 when there was 
another battle in Sulaimani and people evacuated the city for the second time. I 
suppose they went to Sairanban. And there was another economic crisis, but when we 
returned the situation gradually improved. As I remembered the situation was 
somehow better than before. 
 
Concerning the social aspect of return for Zhwan, expectations of establishing relations with 
her parents’ family contributed to the decision to return to Kurdistan.  
Sazan moved with her family to Germany, through Iran and Austria, at five years old. 
Family was also the motivation for their return because her ‘father lived in Kurdistan alone, 
so my mother couldn’t live without him’. The experience was similar for Dila who returned 
with her family to Kurdistan at the age of 16, after moving to Germany in 1995: 
We moved to Iran then later to Germany where we stayed for about 15 years. Then 
my father got work with the Kurdish government after the ousting of Saddam Hussein 
and the installation of the Ba’ath regime. 
 Although life was really good in Germany because I did not know any better, my 
mother and uncles whom we had moved with said that they had to return to Kurdistan 
to be with my father and other members of the family. I remember my uncle crying 
when he remembered the good times they used to have with friends in Kurdistan and 
how all that disappeared in a flash that did not look real to him. My aunt comforted 
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him by saying that we have to go back home to relive that great Kurdish life we (more 
like they) had left behind and dearly missed. 
 
Some of the family and social factors that motivated the return of the families to Kurdistan 
were rather tragic. The loss of family and friends known to the migrants caused them to 
return to Kurdistan. This is a rather interesting factor considering that the existing studies 
have been keener on portraying social and family ties with the living. Instead, the narratives 
of 21-year-old and 26-year-old Pale and Rona indicate that their families moved back to 
Kurdistan to ‘reconnect’ with dead friends and relatives. According to Pale: 
Although it made little sense to me because I lived in Sweden nearly all my life, 
having moved there at 2 years of age, my mother and father kept talking about how 
their continued stay in Sweden erased their history following the numerous deaths of 
their friends and relatives. In particular, the death of my uncle (brother to my father) 
really influenced the return to Kurdistan. My father was in depression for days and he 
kept saying that his family was being punished, while he was having a good life in 
another people’s country. We returned when my parents received reports that my 
mother’s best friend in Kurdistan was gravely ill. My mother even went back to 
Kurdistan before we could pack properly. We followed her about a month later. 
 
Rona’s narrative was not considerably different from Pale’s: 
My elder brother and aunt, who moved to England before I was born in 1988, kept 
telling me about how great their social lives were in Kurdistan with their families. 
Then after some time, the narratives changed and they started talking about how so 
and so had died due to this or that and how they regretted not being able to pay their 
last respects.  
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My elder brother once said, ‘how can we be so far away and those so close to us are 
dying without us being there to pay them last respects’. They began saying how 
important it was for them to start saying their goodbyes to their departed friends and 
family. Although this did not make sense to me at that time, when we returned and 
they started making visits to the graves and paying tributes to their friends and family, 
I realised how important Kurdish family and sense of community was to my family, 
which is my heritage. We still pay homage to those departed friends and families.  
In my study more than half of my participants stated social elements as their reason 
for returning home. The finding of my data shows that for the second generation who have 
taken the decision to return to the KRG region, this movement is facilitated through the 
family networks and capitals which are created and sustained through family relationships. 
Social bonding and connection with their roots and relatives were the main basis or ground 
for returning.  
 
5.2.2 Political factors 
The political factors that relate to the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan, especially the perceived or 
imminent stability, was another cause of the return of migrant Kurds from their countries of 
settlement. Mainly, the political factors referred to the role of the government of Iraq or the 
existing regime and how stable it made Kurdistan look or feel to the migrants while in their 
countries of settlement. Rawa, who left Kurdistan at six years old in 1999, could not recall 
everything about his migration. However, his movement to Europe was influenced by a 
political problem in Kurdistan. Rawa could recall the factors that led to the idea of returning 
to Kurdistan, including the stability that friends in Kurdistan assured him of following the 
establishment of the Gorran Movement for Change, as revealed below: 
 156 
I always thought of Kurdistan. There were some factors which led me to think of 
returning. I thought when I get a job, I should live far away from home. Moreover, 
there were so many Arabs with me in college, I had a lot of foreign friends, there was 
always something to make me think what is the reality of our lives, and whether the 
things I learnt from my parents, home, and my friends, are absolutely the same in my 
own country, or they taught me something which did not exist in real life. I wanted to 
touch those things which I learnt from my childhood. Once we returned to Kurdistan 
for a trip, after 11 years. We visited Kurdistan because my grandmother was dead. 
We returned to conduct her funeral and we stayed for about 30 days. After I 
graduated from college in 2013, I decided to return to Kurdistan completely, because 
the situation in Kurdistan was stable and the Gorran Movement for Change was 
established. They wanted to make some changes and reform Kurdistan.  
 
The fall of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of the Ba’ath regime motivated Sarnj to 
move back to Kurdistan in 2007. The role of networks and advanced communication 
technologies was implicated in the reasons for return expressed by Sarnj, who had a steady 
job with a municipality in Sweden. The decision was also related to the collapse of the 
Saddam Hussein regime, as expressed in the following narrative: 
We kept in touch with our families and relatives. We called them and we always sent 
money and helped them. We were aware of everything which happened in Kurdistan 
including surgery, illness and funerals. We began to think about our return after the 
uprising of Kurdistan. The events of 2003 and the collapse of Saddam’s regime 
especially reinforced the idea of returning. It reinforced our desire to return, and we 
considered that there is an opportunity for jobs with companies, which employ you as 
an international employee. 
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 I was far from the subject, but my husband longed to come back, as I remember he 
did active searches for jobs. Although, I was so sceptical, I was excited to come back. 
I always remember my last words with my boss; ‘I think I am in an ocean, and I do 
not know what has been hidden below it’. My boss responded, ‘But at the end you will 
reach the coast and survive, and I imagine that you will achieve more in your life'. 
The achievements were not only financial but scientific achievements as well. 
 
As for Tofan, her family returned to Kurdistan because the government took the initiative to 
register refugees and assured them that Kurdistan would be safe upon their return: 
We returned to Kurdistan, because the government registered our names and asked 
the refugees to return to their homeland. There were a lot of refugees who asked them 
to register their names and returned to Kurdistan on their own. It was not obligatory 
or forcing people to return. We were free to return or not, and to choose the way we 
preferred to come back to Kurdistan. Some of them returned from Haji Omaran 
international border, some others from Bashmakh international border. We had good 
feedback from people who had earlier returned to Kurdistan. We were told that the 
region is growing rapidly, with a lot of opportunities for work in both the public and 
the private sector. Furthermore, we were watching the improvements in people’s 
lives, mainly financially.  
 
Ali’s story from Iran related to a difficult childhood in Iran and a lack of freedom:   
In Iran, I have bad memories related to an enormously laborious childhood. In 
Iran there was no freedom. You might be asked to show your identification card at 
any time whilst walking on the street. Iran is an army or warrior country. Even if I 
passed by the house of Hamay Faraji in Saqqez, they asked for ID, which I did not 
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have. So it put in me fear of being arrested or anything like that.  I was working in a 
bakery. Once they realized I did not have ID, they arrested me. They said, ‘he is from 
Iraq’. They know that I am an Iraqi Kurd, so no one asked where I am from. It makes 
me so depressed. In most of the companies where I worked, I said ‘I am Iranian’ in 
order not to be arrested. Almost all the companies had an insurance card, which I did 
not have as I was an Iraqi Kurd. Moreover, I could not work in governmental 
companies. They sometimes did searches in the companies to find Kurdish workers. 
Once I worked in the Imam Khomeini relief foundation. It had been 15 days since I 
commenced my work. They searched for Iraqi people who worked in the company and 
I escaped the company via roofs of the other buildings. I set myself free from being 
arrested. I could not return to the company afterwards, because I was disguised as 
Iranian. If they arrest me, they will ask for identification card. I sometimes made 
excuses by saying that I left it somewhere or at home. 
 
5.2.3 Hostility and discrimination in a foreign land 
Many scholars have highlighted the racism, exclusion and discrimination faced by refugees 
and immigrants in the West. This situation became even worse after the attack of September 
11th, especially for Muslims and for people from the so-called Muslim world (Alinia 2004). 
Everyday racism, in the form of labour market discrimination, is demonstrated by some 
studies. Moreover, (Alinia 2004) has highlighted her research, showing that people born 
outside Europe are subjected to systematic and structural discrimination in society and 
especially in the labour market. Furthermore, she stated that the possibility of getting a job, 
your income and your job sector can all be determined by your origin, not by your 
qualifications (Alinia 2004). On the other hand, according to my participants, the rights of 
second-generation Iraqi-Kurds have been denied more deliberately in neighbouring countries 
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than in European countries. They believe that the Kurds are suffering from discrimination 
and exclusion in political, economic, social and cultural areas of life. Kurds have no share in 
the distribution of power or regarding economic development. 
Karwan was born in 1970 and moved with his family to Iran in 1974, and later to 
Germany. He reported that the experiences of exclusion were more obvious in Iran than in 
Germany. In fact, Karwan described the treatment of Kurds in Iran, using terms like racism 
and oppression: 
The reason behind our return was the discrimination of East and West, including 
Iran, Europe and America. They did not care for Iraqi people. Although my wife is 
Persian, I myself went to Iran to be employed. We had no rights to have a job and 
work. I sometimes asked them to employ me. I went to Tehran, I went to the Ministry 
of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and they made fun of me, and said: 
‘our Iranian citizens are jobless, how do we offer you job opportunities?’ Those 
things were the main reasons behind our return. Besides, we realized that we will not 
have any future in Iran. Even if we spent the rest of our lives in Iran, we did not have 
a bright future. In Iran there were a lot of pressures, forces and oppression. When 
some of the Iranians came here and viewed the freedom, they were astonished. They 
were impressed with the level of evolution and the expansion of cities and towns. 
Moreover, they were impressed with the progression in education, human rights, 
people's financial circumstances and job opportunities, and finally democracy and the 
autonomy of people to freely express themselves. In contrast, we learnt racism in 
Iran, because most of those who were in Iran, they have more belonging to Iran and 
consider themselves Persian. 
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An expression of bitterness and anger against Iran, compared to the perceived experiences in 
Europe (Germany), was evident in Karwan's narration of his experience in Iran. It is 
noteworthy that Karwan preferred Germany because of the communication with relatives and 
better living standards and higher levels of inclusion in Germany for Kurds than in Iran: 
Kurds have more rights in Europe, more than Iran. Thousands of Iranians migrate to 
Europe in order to set themselves free from that situation, to have freedom of 
speaking, clothing, befriending and everything. I assume those who went to Europe 
from their childhood are different from those who went from their thirties or forties. 
The latter acquire things very slowly compared to the children. Besides it depends on 
their educations. However, it depends on the personality of the person. There are 
people if they live in Europe for a hundred years, their mentality will not change. 
  
Karwan stated that being a Kurd in Europe is not problematic in the same way that it is in 
neighbouring countries. You can be a Kurd and work actively for your Kurdish identity in a 
quiet, peaceful environment. However, to the majority of society you are just an immigrant 
and are excluded from the national community through cultural, ethnic and racial boundaries. 
Although, Karwan has not denied the feeling of discrimination he has been exposed to in his 
everyday life in both countries.  
Ali was separated from his parents during the Kurdish exodus and survived on his 
own from the age of eight or nine years. He lived alone for 14 years and returned to 
Kurdistan when his parents came looking for him in Iran and found him. Ali recollected the 
suffering caused by exclusion and hostility in Iran from different perspectives, including 
work and social life, as captured in the narrative below: 
I worked in a house. People called the owner Mrs. Baharwand. She said her nephew 
was killed in the Iraq war and she is ready to arrange a marriage between me and her 
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nephew’s widow who was a Turkish girl, since there were many Turkish in Karaj. I 
did not reveal that I am Iraqi Kurd, I showed myself as Iranian everywhere to avoid 
being arrested and mistreated. She was in Karaj. They decided to get me married to 
their daughter officially. The Hamay Faraji family said,’we are not your real parents, 
an identification card is required in this cases', so I told them the truth. I said, ‘I am a 
refugee from Iraq’. So when they realized that I am an Iraqi Kurd and do not have an 
identification card, they called off  the wedding, for they really hate Saddam Hussein 
and Iraqi people. Although I told them that Kurds are afflicted by the tyranny of 
Saddam Hussein and I am a Kurd, but they insisted on their decision.  Life in Iran 
was very difficult and opportunities for work were almost none. Iraqis had no chance 
to live a normal life. Even for Iranians themselves, Iran was a hell. I met many who 
expressed their wish to leave the Islamic Republic of Iran and live in Europe or the 
United State of America. Many had their relatives living in different parts of Europe 
or USA and dreamed to see them there. Life in Iran is hard and I would never think of 
going back there! 
 
For Sindis who left Kurdistan at the age of six and moved with her family to England, the 
exclusion was not as clear as it had been for Ali in Iran. According to her, English people 
were welcoming and the refugee protection system ensured that they had access to selected 
opportunities. However, the exclusion they suffered was more in the social and employment 
realms: 
While in England, we were not discriminated against in a directly evident way. 
Instead, there were some silent and unspoken exclusions from many social activities. 
For example, we were not welcome and did not feel welcome in English parties and 
other social gatherings that required English-only people.  
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However, I did not mind this so much because even in Iraq, some events would only 
require a certain pool of people and not everyone. England was accommodating and 
they tried to include or assimilate us into their system as much as they could. 
However, we would encounter hostility from some natives who felt that we were 
taking advantage of their country and it really hurt to hear them saying that we 
ruined our country so that we could take advantage of their kindness. 
Once while in a supermarket, I recall a man (probably in his mid-forties) 
walked up to me and asked me where I was from. When I told him I was from 
Newcastle, he asked me with a firmer tone, ‘I mean what is your home country?’ I 
told him that I was from Iraq and he said to me, ‘Why won’t you just go back to your 
country and leave ours to us?’ It was very humiliating, although a woman standing 
next to him intervened and said, ‘It is not her choice to be away from home… you (to 
the man) should be happy you don’t have to seek asylum because England was 
burning…’ This was very encouraging and it shows the situation in England. Some 
people will make you feel like you do not belong there and others will vouch for you 
and be truly compassionate with you. In England, there were a lot opportunities to 
mix or integrate with the host community. You almost feel equality in the chance of 
getting jobs. The system is protective and tries to prevent or stop any kind of 
discrimination including, sex, race, ethnicity or others. The British society is an open 
one which had mixed a long time ago with other nations. There is a lot of cultural 
blending. In conclusion, although a minority will have some un-friendly feeling 
toward foreigners, the majority of local people are empathetic and sympathetic to us. 
 
The social disadvantage and economic circumstances faced by second-generation Iraqi 
Kurdish returnees could be understood as demonstrating their failure to advance towards a 
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full and successful life in their parents’ home country. Many of the second-generation Iraqi 
Kurds in this research identified the limited social and economic opportunities they faced as 
part of their everyday lives in diaspora countries. 
Their racialized and pathologized status impacted on their understanding of home and 
belonging. In this instance, many second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning home to their 
ancestral homeland represented as return as a ‘survival strategy’ and as an alternative and 
important path towards achieving economic success and opportunities they felt were denied 
to them while living in diaspora countries. The second generation were motivated to return 
back home to their ancestral homeland to achieve these ambitions for themselves and their 
children. 
 
5.2.4 Patriotism and nationalism 
For some of the returnees, the factors driving their return to Kurdistan were associated with 
the fact that they were patriots and nationalists who wanted to develop Kurdistan and be part 
of the change they wanted for a stable nation. In some instances, returnees expressed their 
desire to apply the skills they had gained in foreign countries to develop Kurdistan. For 
example, second-generation returnee Darya, who was born in 1988, came back to contribute 
towards developing Kurdistan even though he was born in England and not Kurdistan: 
I was born in London and I finished my study there. I returned to Kurdistan in March 
2013. I was 25 years old when I came back. Every year we visited Kurdistan once or 
twice since 1997. We visited our relatives. But in 2013, I came to a decision to return 
to Kurdistan. I graduated from college, I left England and went to Lebanon to work. 
My degree was in Media and I worked in that field too. Eventually I came to ask why 
should I use my experiences and what I have learnt in England in Lebanon? So I 
returned to Kurdistan. I have so many friends here and relatives.  
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Actually I think that Kurdistan is a place where I can be successful in my field, and I 
longed to benefit those who work with me and teach them what I learnt’. 
 
Darya’s narrative further explains his reason for returning to the KRG region: 
For me, returning to Kurdistan, is a matter of transferring my experience in the best 
way I can to help in the prosperity of my homeland. Returning was a national duty 
and a participation in re-building a country which was demolished as a result of 
years of internal and external war. Returning for me was a duty, that I have always 
thought that I have for my mother country. Once I decided to come here, I thought 
there should not be a way back although the idea visits my mind on bad days. I would 
love to see a prosperous, thriving and strong Kurdistan in all aspects of life.  
 
Darya’s story is similar to that of Dashti who was born in 1984 and migrated to Holland at 14 
years of age. His family migrated following the deterioration of the situation in Erbil in 1996, 
which brings Dashti memories of suffering and affliction. Through transnationalism 
(Wahlbeck 2002;  Keles 2016) facilitated by advanced communication technologies, Dashti 
would get constant updates about the situation in Kurdistan. This further motivated him to 
return to Kurdistan to help in rebuilding the KRG region and Iraq at large. However, Dashti 
criticised transnational communications for under-representing the situation in Kurdistan. 
Dashti’s return narrative also matches the position expressed by Van Bruinessen (1999) that 
second-generation Kurds take more interest in the political developments in Kurdistan than 
their parents:  
 The reason behind my return was that I always want to be a factor of making 
changes in a place, not being in a place where my existence does not bring much to 
the table. I thought that if I stayed in Holland, I would not have influence and be 
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outstanding, since there were thousands of professional academic pharmacists likes 
me in Holland. However, I noticed the health sector in Kurdistan and pharmacology 
in particular were at a basic level. I viewed an opportunity in that field both 
academically and professionally. I made an effort which was both enjoyable and met 
people's needs. Simultaneously, it removes me from the routines of Holland where 
every day and week are the same. I was at an age to think and rejuvenate my life; I 
was really bored with the life in Holland. 
 
Young Kurds’ involvement in transnational activities and practices is quite diverse. It may 
include short- or long-term visits to the Kurdistan region (especially often the de facto 
Kurdish state in northern Iraq (KRG) region), long-distance communication with friends and 
relatives, transnational political activities and staying informed of what happens in the 
Kurdistan area by following news in Kurdish and/or about Kurdistan (Toivanen 2014).  
Moreover, second-generation Iraqi Kurds had the opportunity to use the variety of digital and 
social media tools to stay connected with close family members, other relatives and friends in 
Kurdistan, but also with people, especially family, who belong to Kurdish diaspora 
communities in Europe and neighbouring countries. 
Dashti’s narrative about his connection through digital median and social networking 
was : 
When I was in Holland I was always aware of the situation in Kurdistan from the 
media, newspapers and TV, and I was in touch with relatives and friends. I had good 
relationships. I was aware of Kurdistan’s situation. However, it is very hard to know 
every detail of people’s lives, to which degree they elucidate everything for you, and 
how much you experience that life.  
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In the case of 28-year-old Navdar, the patriotic and nationalist angle of return was different. 
This is because Navdar was consistently challenged by his older family members and 
pestered about how long he was going to build foreign nations while his own was dying and 
needed him. In this way, patriotism grows and compels return as it becomes genuine 
patriotism: 
Although I stayed in Germany for more than 20 years, I would occasionally visit 
Kurdistan because my father and my other relatives were staying in KRG. My father 
and grandfather have remained nationalists and they said that their first-born sons 
had to be patriotic to Kurdistan regardless. Whenever I came visiting, they would 
always talk about how I should not continue building other people’s nations and 
pretending that it is my homeland. They insisted that true men in our family lineage 
lived and died fighting for Kurdistan and its stability. For about five years, my father 
and grandfather would pester me about when I was planning to return to Kurdistan 
and help in its restoration like a real nationalist and patriot. Eventually, I agreed to 
come back and offer my contribution to Kurdistan. Now, after I came back, I feel that 
there is no place I would rather be in except Kurdistan. I love this place and keep 
thanking my father and grandfather for showing me the right path for a patriotic 
Kurd. Although I will at times go to Germany to visit my friends, I always return to 
Kurdistan and hope to never migrate again in future. There was a feel of belonging 
that I missed in Germany. A feeling that I never experienced until I was back home. A 
feeling greater than anything, a feeling of being myself and no one else. A feeling of 
exploring my origin, my culture, and my reality. Over here I don’t need to introduce 
myself as my family are quite well known over here. Whenever, I mention my family’s 
name, people appreciate the role of my father and grandfather in the history of 
freedom fighting for Kurdistan. Over here, I feel everyone is my relative and friend. 
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 I very much respect and highly value my father’s and grandfather’s counselling and 
advice to return back. I am glad that their suggestions were true and helped me in 
making the right conclusion. 
 
5.2.5 Social and economic capital of return 
Returning back to the ancestral homeland was anticipated by many of the second-generation 
Iraqi Kurdish participants. The motivation and decision to return among the second-
generation relied upon specific circumstances such as these young people’s continued family 
ties to the region (and the cross-generational networks and resources that emerge from this); 
particular stages in the life-course for the second generation (single professionals or parents 
of young children); levels of educational qualifications and past work experiences (Reynolds 
2008). Most of the participants who had skills or degree-level qualifications decided to return 
to their homeland. The second-generation returnees were among has access to social and 
economic resources generated through their family networks and socio-economic factors. 
Social capital is a particularly useful concept in exploring this issue of relationship between 
intent, opportunity and resources. Social capital creates bonding networks within family and 
community.  
The analysis of my data reveals that for second-generation Iraqi Kurdish returnees, 
who have taken the decision to return to the KRG region, this return is accelerated through 
the social connection and capitals which are created and obtained through family network.    
It is these family networks which make the difference between the dream or intention 
to return and the actual reality of doing so. Other researches have also emphasized that strong 
family binds and strong networks to the family birthplace provide the main reason for return 
over and above other economic, social and political considerations (Reynolds 2008).  
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Furthermore, there was a perception among second generation Iraqi Kurds returnees 
that they would have a better quality of life in their parents’ homeland compared to their lives 
in the diaspora countries. 
In accordance with social and economic theories about the return of migrants, Lanya’s 
return was inspired by her father’s intention to work in Kurdistan and the unfavorable 
socially- or family-motivated perception of her mother about women who stayed abroad 
when their husbands were working in Kurdistan. A Sulaimani native born in 1985, Lanya 
moved to Iran at the age of three years with her family and stayed in Iran in 1992 before 
moving to Syria in 1993. The narrative below gives evidence about the interaction of both 
economic and social/family factors in motivating return: 
The factors in our return were: my father returned to his post in Sulaimani, and my 
mother was against those women whose husbands returned to Kurdistan and they 
stayed in Europe. She said that: ‘My husband should return to Kurdistan. I do not do 
what I was against from the very beginning’. That is why she made a quick decision to 
return all of our family to Kurdistan. During 2000 to 2003, when we were in Holland, 
my father was in Iran”. 
  
These second-generation returnees made use of their parents and family bonds to develop 
their social networks. Most importantly, this provided them with support in the practical 
details of return such as renting or purchasing of homes, finding work and developing their 
skills, and opening their own business. The contacts that occurred through family 
relationships were especially important to second-generation returnees finding work, because 
getting appropriate work profoundly depends on existing relationships. Many of the second-
generation returnees used their family and social contacts to find employment or develop 
business opportunities.  
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Another factor influencing return among second-generation Iraqi Kurds was the economic 
benefits. The second generation felt that they were in a better position to use the skills and 
qualifications obtained in diaspora countries, to set up their own businesses and develop their 
entrepreneurial skills in the KRG region. Karwan, who returned from Iran, talked about the 
advantages the second generation gained in term of economic and academic achievement, 
when they returned from European countries compared to neighbouring countreis. He said 
that: 
Those who returned from Europe, they acquired languages, the English language 
which is an international language. However, I learnt Persian. I have nothing to do 
with Persian language. Every job opportunity here requires English language and 
Arabic. Persian language is derived from Arabic, Kurdish and Indian. It is not an 
official language. If I were in Germany, for instance, there are job opportunities for 
German language. There is a German Embassy in Kurdistan and you are welcomed 
to work with them, or translate for them. This is a disadvantage of being in a country 
like Iran. Persian is a good language, but it does not help you in studying or finding a 
good job. It is not an international language.  
On the other hand, those who returned from Europe, they were free and were 
allowed to learn another occupation. One of my brothers is there, and my relatives as 
well. They cared for humanity insofar as if they know for example you are from 
Africa, Kurdistan, or Turkey, they gave your children similar courses to study in their 
own languages to avoid forgetting their languages. It is a grain of salt. If they did not 
get employment or have a good degree at least they have a lot of money to start a 
business. They are supported by the social services to learn the language, integrate in 
the host community and get financial aids. When they return to Kurdistan most of 
them have a better and brighter future, either involved with German governmental 
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projects in Kurdistan or private companies. Finally, even those who don’t get through 
in this aspect, they would have gained some money in exile and learned some work 
experience that they use locally.  
 
  5.3 Construction of ‘Home’ and ‘Belonging’. 
The regular visits of second-generation Iraqi Kurds to their parental homeland is a good 
example of transnationalism. The narratives of my participants point out that the second 
generation travelled often, on their own or with their parents, to the KRG region. To trace the 
process through which the notions of ‘belonging’ and ‘home’ are constructed, this research 
section reflects three main memory types that feature in the theoretical overview outlined by 
Erll (2011), Assman and Czaplicka (1995). The first memory type is the communicative 
memory. It entails the assessment of the daily communication between second-generation 
returnees and their parents. It also features the evaluation of the practices in family spaces 
concerning Kurdish traditions and culture. By paying attention to the communicative 
memory, the aim of this analysis in this respect is to determine the ways through which the 
second generation Kurds construct their ‘belonging’ at the individual level situated within the 
collective memory spheres. The cultural memory is the third one. It looks at the second 
generation’s diaspora spaces within which they construct/develop a sense of belonging to 
Kurdistan (their original homeland) through media, education and visits to Kurdistan. In this 
regard, I illustrate the reflections of the second generation on Kurdistan’s ‘grand collective 
narratives’ in relation to ethnicity. Through the contrast and comparison of the experiences 
that second-generation Kurds have within the constructions of cultural, communicative and 
collective memory, this section reveals the standpoints of the second- generation Kurds 
towards their parental homeland.  
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Eventually, this part connects to the motivations or factors of return for the second-generation 
Kurds returning to Kurdistan, as covered in the previous section. This section also links to the 
experiences of the second-generation returnees in their parental homeland and looks at the 
potential renegotiations and shifts in their diasporic identities. 
The results reported in this section also underscore the significant role of transnational 
contacts in the construction of the notions of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ for diaspora Kurds. The 
transnational contacts between Kurds in the diaspora and residents in Kurdistan are extensive. 
These networks transcend the boundaries of the nation-state to help in the development of 
communicative and collective memories that develop their notions of ‘belonging’ and 
‘home’. Van Bruinessen (2000) noted that “organised diaspora communities continually 
enable the construction of non-territory-based contacts and networks, political institutions 
and organisations and the development of publications”. Exemplary cases related to 
organised diaspora communities include the Kurdish National Congress and the Kurdish 
Parliament in Exile. Moreover, the Kurdish diaspora communities’ transnational space 
reveals particular dynamics with respect to exile, historical Kurdish nationalism background, 
and the notion of ‘otherness’, which the ongoing situation that Kurdish minorities encounter 
in KRG continue to inform (Toivanen 2014). 
The findings of this research about the notion of home compliment the depiction of 
home by Blunt and Dowling (2006) who found that home is not necessarily a single place, 
but has a multi-scalar characterisation from the current theorisations. Considering Brah’s 
poignant question: ‘where is home?’ (1996: 192), I find that the concept of diaspora involves 
a notion about ‘home’ and that a dislocation and displacement from ‘home’ remains core. 
However, Brah expounds on the notion of ‘home’ by describing it as ‘a mythic place of 
desire in the diasporic imagination. In the sense that it is a place of no return even if it is 
possible to visit the geographical territory that is seen as the place of “origin”’ (1996: 192). 
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Yet, home could also be a locality’s lived experience under the mediation of daily social 
relations captured explicitly in history.  
From Brah’s viewpoint, home has these two conceptualisations of far-off imagined, 
mythic places and the feeling of connection with a place through lived experiences. In the 
case of lived experiences, it implies the potential construction of the notion of ‘home’ 
through lived experiences including social relations. On the other hand, collective narratives 
that draw from memories, or the transmission of such memories through generations, instil 
the notion of ‘home’ in Kurds living abroad. While researching about Kurdish Diasporans 
living in Sweden, Alinia concluded that the social activities, social relations and their 
transnational communities and networks concerning ‘the politics of location have in this 
process become their “home”’ (2004: 330). Since Kurdistan is not a state, this could cause 
ambivalent feelings towards departure, for those geographically situated in the states of 
Turkey, Iran and Iraq. As revealed in the study by Alinia, this could cause various 
distinctions in the notion of homeland and home by returnee Kurds. 
The narratives of the interviewees in this research about their perceptions of ‘what 
home means to them’ or ‘where home is for them’ revealed three overarching themes. The 
conceptualisations of the notion of home for some of the second-generation returnees were 
about Kurdistan being home and belonging to Kurdistan. However, some interviewees 
expressed that they had multiple homes. This was especially prominent in the case of 
returnees that had been born in a foreign country, lived there longer or did not have any 
experiences of Kurdistan. Some of the interviewees also felt that they did not belong in 
Kurdistan, in particular as a result of their experiences upon returning or their more 
favourable experiences in the countries of settlement. The exploration of these three themes 
follows in the three subsections below. 
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5.3.1 Kurdistan is home, belonging to Kurdistan 
Second-generation participation in transnational activities, national and cultural events is 
quite different to that of the first generation. It might include a family visit to the Kurdistan 
region (often the de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq), relationships and communication 
with friends and relatives in the parental homeland, transnational political activities, and 
being in touch and staying informed about the situation in the Kurdistan area by following 
news in Kurdish or other host country languages about Kurdistan. Moreover, second-
generation Iraqi Kurds take advantage of the diversity of digital media and social-networking 
tools (including Windows Messenger, Facebook, and Skype) to keep in contact with family 
members, relatives and friends in Kurdistan, but also with people, especially family, who 
belong to Kurdish diaspora communities. On the other hand, many participants were also ‘in 
touch with’ Kurdistan through Middle Eastern satellite channels, online news sites, and 
Internet chat rooms. Certainly, the diversity of these transnational activities were different 
among the participants. For example, some had not visited Kurdistan since they were born or 
since the migration with their family, while others had visited there on some occasions. The 
second generation’s feeling of belonging to their homeland is not just a bond with their 
territorial place but is often based on a sense of attachment to relatives and friends, personal 
and collective memories, language, and cultural products and practices. 
For Zhwan, the notion of home is where one feels safe, a kind of haven where one 
could escape to and Kurdistan is that place. It is noteworthy that Zhwan grew up in Iran and 
had no memories of Kurdistan before migration. Instead, the memories of Kurdistan are 
constructed through communicative memory handed down by parents and the transnational 
interaction with Kurdistan while living in Iran. The expression of hope in Kurdistan being a 
safer place (home) dominated the construction of the notion of home for Zhwan. Zhwan also 
expressed a sense of belonging with Kurdistan: 
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I think home is where you feel safe, whenever you want to escape a depression or 
problem or anything. In home you should feel safe and you are sure in that place 
there is always someone that will be there for you. Furthermore, you should have a 
special hope and try hard to achieve it. For me, Kurdistan is home. Although I faced 
some unforeseen difficulties at the beginning, but now Kurdistan is my only home. I 
do not think I can call any place home except for Kurdistan. I am not able to describe 
what Iran means for me where I spent most of my years in. I can say it is just a second 
home.  
Being in Iran had a great impact on my personality, it influenced me socially 
and psychologically. It made a social and optimistic person out of me. I befriend 
people without fear and shame. It made me know how to be flexible in any place and 
situation. Although, we were afflicted either financially or by feeling loneliness, but it 
made me trust my parents in every situations and to have trust in their decisions. They 
taught me to be flexible in any situation, and to never lose hope, and to be optimistic 
and social.  
Although the situation here is unstable and complicated, I think it is temporary 
and this economic crisis will be solved. As to my study, according to the field which I 
study in, I will probably go to Europe to study since currently studying is 
complicated. Depending on the branch which I long to study, it might be hard to study 
oncology or anything else here. I might try to study outside Kurdistan, but it is 
temporary. After finishing my study, I will return. I do not think after my study has 
been finished, I can live there and get a job. I want to come back here, serve my own 
folks. Although, it was very hard at the beginning, I do not regret returning. Now I 
realize if I was not here, I had no future”.  
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Like Zhwan, Sazan has no memories of a childhood in Kurdistan. However, returns to 
Kurdistan in 2001 and 2004 helped in the construction of a sense of belonging and the 
identification with Kurdistan as home. The narrative by Sazan coincides with the two 
conceptualisations of home especially the notion of home not being an actual place, but an 
imagined, mythical place. However, there are struggles to give up the experiences of the 
country of settlement as home. In the end, Kurdistan remains home for Sazan: 
Home plays a significant role in my life, I always demonstrate that the anthem of ‘Ay 
Raqib’ is very significant. Kurdistan is my belief and religion. I am sceptical in 
religion, but I view nationality as religion, and it must be protected. Home is where 
the heart is. Home is an assembled society which makes cultures and traditions, and 
made the individuals to abide by them. I view Germany as second home. I like being 
there, but not as much as Kurdistan. Here everyone is a Kurd. This is my country, the 
country of my ancestors. When I am here I feel home. However, Germany is a place 
whenever you are afflicted in your own country due to something, it is like a shelter. 
When you suffer, you turn to it. You already knew it and when you came back, you 
embrace it”. 
 
Tofan was born in Iran and had no lived experience of Kurdistan. Yet, Tofan claimed, he 
‘longed to return to our homeland’. Again, the role of communicative memory, handed down 
from one generation to another, is evident because the parents taught Tofan about Kurdistan 
and instilled the notion of loving and being patriotic to Kurdistan. The notion of home to 
Tofan is connected to family and origin. There seems to be an inseparable intertwinement of 
the notion of home and belonging for Tofan, as is the case with the other second-generation 
returnees who have been handed down the communicative and collective ‘memories’ of 
Kurdistan: 
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Home is mother and family for me and I belong to Kurdistan. My parents taught me to 
love Kurdistan and to be patriot. Kurdistan is my homeland. I was born in Iran and 
lived there, though I do not belong to it. We moved to Iran due to patriotism, because 
my father was Peshmerga. We suffered those years because of Kurdistan, so if anyone 
asks me where I belong, I will say, ‘I belong to Kurdistan’. Although I was not born 
here, but I belong to Kurdistan and consider it home. Besides, my rights have been 
protected here more than Iran. I do not know how to describe Iran, I do not belong to 
it and I felt a stranger there. Our situation was better than the other refugees in Iran. 
The refugees were jobless, for they viewed us as foreigners. If you did not have an 
official document, your life will be hard. All of our relatives were in Kurdistan. 
Although, we had official papers and I spoke a native Persian language being born 
there, I was still not feeling at home. Those feelings stopped me from further 
integration and even terminated my active search for work, job, and a career in Iran. 
Compared to other refugees it was easier for me to stay and start an occupation or 
professional life. In my mind and for years I made my decision to return to Kurdistan. 
I felt that I can do far better and offer more to my homeland on returning. I thought of 
a better lif , better profession and better future”.  
 
For Karwan, the construction of the notions of home and belonging became more profound 
through visits to Kurdistan. Karwan stayed with family in Iran for 16 years, but recollects a 
two-year stay that shaped the experience of Sulaimani as home. The sense of belonging and 
the notion of home to Karwan came from ancestral links to Kurdistan. The suffering endured 
in Kurdistan further underscored the relationship between Karwan and Kurdistan as home, 
despite the implication of Iran as the second home: 
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For me Kurdistan is one hundred per cent home. My ancestors lived in Kurdistan. We 
martyred thousands of martyrs here. We suffered from the chemical attack on 
Halabja, the Al-Anfal campaign, and as refugees. I love Kurdistan insofar as I adore 
it. Unfortunately, we love Kurdistan, but some corrupted political made the situation 
worse in Kurdistan. People complained about them, and I think this happens 
everywhere. But they did not fulfil their duties toward Kurdistan the way Kurdish 
people expected. They did not meet their needs.  
I strongly believe that with the returning of younger, well educated, hardworking 
people from exile, there will be less chance for corruption. Despite having obstacles, I 
have hardly seen anyone returning home having financial, social, or professional 
difficulties. Most of those whom I know, are working in trading, export and import, 
working in construction business and also some health professions like doctors, 
dentists, or nurses. All of them have made their way through and most of them were 
innovative and introduced some of their professional experience which helped in the 
progression of that speciality. Some of those returnees have entered politics and 
contributed in fighting against corruption. They have given a good picture of justice 
and leading by example. Therefore, I assume if those who have an intention to work in 
politics or have experience in that field in Europe or the USA return back to 
participate on the political and administrative sector, they wold be able to improve 
people’s life generally and collectively. They can run or lead a stronger battle against 
corruption and establish a transparent government. My wife is Iranian, but she 
returned to Kurdistan with us, so I respect her nation. They helped us so much. My 
children’s maternal uncles are there, their grandparents and aunts were there as 
well. I have a special respect for it and I consider it my second home”. 
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Exclusion and hostility encountered in Iran contributed to Ali feeling like a stranger in Iran 
and associating more with the notion of Kurdistan representing home and belonging more 
than Iran. This is despite staying longer in Iran than in Kurdistan only to return as an adult. 
The struggles for Kurdistan and Iraq at large also played significant roles in helping Ali 
develop a stronger sense of belonging in Kurdistan than in Iran. His narrative reflects a 
struggle between the known foreign home and the construction of the notion of home based 
on the encounters: 
Although I spent most of my life in Iran and returned to Kurdistan as an adult, for me, 
Kurdistan is home. Kurdistan was always in my thoughts. I have often fought for even 
Saddam Hussein who oppressed Kurds, and I felt offended when someone spoke about 
even Iraq, not to mention Kurds and Kurdistan. The reason was the love of 
nationality. I was such a patriot. I loved Kurdistan insofar as I could not stand 
someone who criticized even my enemy. I was offended when in 1997, when the civil 
war occurred, I was quarrelling about one of the Kurdish political parties, and a man 
broke a glass on my head. They said one of the Kurdish political parties came to 
Baneh, they threw tomatoes at them.  
Kurdistan is my home. I felt like a stranger in Iran. I do not belong to Iran. 
When I got into trouble with someone, I told them, ‘I am a stranger twice’. First, we 
migrated from Kurdistan to Saqqez and then from Saqqez to Tehran. I said I do not 
have the ability to fight, or have a quarrel with you. When I went to Saqqez, I was in 
love with the city and its people, but I was homesick. People invited me to celebrate 
Eid with them. They knew that I was Iraqi, and welcomed me warmly. Then I went to 
Tehran. At first I did not know Persian, but I gradually acquired the language. Even 
If you learn the language, because you do not have ID it strikes fear into your heart. 
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The visits of my participants to the Kurdistan Regional Government region gave them the 
opportunity to renew relationships with their relatives after a long time and meet some of their 
relatives for the first time. As in Emanuelsson’s 2008 research of diaspora Kurds returning 
from Sweden to Northern Iraq, young Kurds in my study harboured positive feelings for 
developing relations with their family members in the region of Kurdistan and travelling there 
for holidays or for temporary jobs. Most of my participants indicated that Kurdistan is home to 
them and that they had a sense of belonging in Kurdistan 
 
 5.3.2 Multiple homes 
The question ‘where do I belong? usually presupposes a reply containing geographically 
identifiably indicators, whether these would be countries, regions, cities, or neighbourhoods 
(Toivanen 2014). This means the question of a sense of belonging and of emotional 
attachments is often connected to the understanding of home and its possible attachment. The 
spatial parameters aside, individuals who are embedded in a transnational space may have 
attachments to multiple localities, which take shape through lived experiences, through 
memories, or simply via continuous and frequent references to home or homeland (see Levitt 
2009: 1231). The transnational reality means being attached to multiple transnational sets of 
social networks, several layers of polities, institutions. Sense of belonging and emotional 
attachment to a home in relation to a physical place are narrated vary among the participants 
in relation to how individuals are attached within such social networks, polities, institutions. 
Corresponding to the perspective of belonging being a dynamic process (Skrbi! et al 
2007), this research finds that belonging could also relate to the second-generation returnees 
having multiple homes. Some of the returnees are unable to determine what their home is 
exactly. This also applied to the case of belonging whereby the narratives indicated that 
belonging was about whether the returnee belonged or could belong to either Kurdistan or the 
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country of settlement. The inter-subjective associations of the surroundings of the returnees 
and the reactions to the perceptions of the individual returnee about the positioning produced 
by such surroundings also contributed toward the notions of multiple homes and multiple 
belonging (Anthias 2009). However, the main conflict emerged in home being Kurdistan and 
a sense of belonging elsewhere. 
Sarnj suggested multiple belonging, yet identification of Kurdistan as home. The 
distinction between home and belonging can be explained in the conceptualisation of the 
meaning of home to Sarnj. The notion of home seems synonymous with associations of 
historical childhood memory for Sarnj, despite living in Sweden longer and with a better life 
than in Kurdistan: 
I thought about the term home a long time ago, since most years of my life had been 
spent out of my country. I am inspired by a quote which says ‘home is where the 
childhood is’, but I wanted to apply it to my life. When I came back, I found myself, 
the memories of my childhood are restored. I thought integration had happened inside 
my personality. I felt those plants which I viewed in my childhood, those herbs and 
flowers that I smelt. I heard the sound of birds, the sun which I viewed. I left all the 
people and things alone. I searched for the old streets of our house, the old school. I 
found myself here. Despite the fact that the issue of language and the freedom of 
speaking is very significant for me, in the Swedish language I can read, write and 
speak. I can speak fluently in corporations and manage my work in governmental 
departments, but I cannot use all colours. In Kurdish I can use all the colours that I 
want to use, but when you speak a foreign language the speaking is black and white. 
For instance, in the Kurdish language I can give you a poem example and describe 
literature, so I think I am very controlled here. Kurdistan is where my childhood was, 
so it is my home”. 
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Similar experiences of clashing belongingness, despite clarity of home being 
Kurdistan was also replayed in the case of Lanya. It appears that belonging for second-
generation returnees has nothing to do with home. Instead, belonging is about association 
with a place and the kindness extended to the individual while at that place, including 
inclusion in the social and economic aspects of life in such places. For Lanya, lack of 
childhood memories in Kurdistan before moving to Europe and multiple returns to Kurdistan 
were responsible for the construction of the notion of home, but not belonging. Childhood 
memories are also significant in shaping the difference between homeland and home in 
accordance with Brah (1996). Homeland is a place of origin while home is the place where an 
individual feels welcome and belongs. Lanya’s narrative coincide with the results of Mand’s 
(2010) study concerning the conceptualisations of home by Bangladeshi children born in 
Britain: 
My home land is where my loves are – first my mother, then my brother, my husband 
and my children. There are a lot of good and bad memories here. I imagine the 
situation of our country will be better. It’s not going to be like that forever, but it take 
two more years, a little less or little more. However, on the other hand, I feel Syria is 
home for me, because I spent my childhood and adolescent years in Syria. All of my 
childhood friends were in Syria. I was in Syria from a very young age until my 
adulthood, that is why Syria is like home for me, but undoubtedly not as long as 
Kurdistan. From childhood, they saw hatred of Arabic people in our heart, and it 
transmitted from our ancestors to us. But I lived eight years with Arabs in Syria, until 




Darya’s narrative is a depiction of a struggle that some of the second-generation 
Kurds encounter while attempting to identify with a place as home and advance belonging. 
Darya provides a rare account of the ‘self-commotion’ a returnee might encounter due to 
shifting perspectives about home and belonging. For instance, Darya feels at home and 
belongs in the place that he is not in at any given time. The physical dissociation from a place 
creates the desire for that place to be home and to belong there. The implication is that some 
second-generation returnees like Darya have no home in any real sense, although they know 
that their places of origin are their homelands: 
Home is very strange for me. When I am in Kurdistan, I thought of England and 
considered it home, and when I am in England, I thought of Kurdistan and considered 
it home as well. When I am in one of those two, I consider the other home. I never feel 
that I am home. I am officially British. There is an English saying which says,‘home is 
where the heart is’, and when I am in England my heart is in Kurdistan and vice 
versa. It is hard to decide where your home is. My homeland is Kurdistan, I 
immediately respond with the answer. But if you ask, ‘where do you consider home?’ 
I have no idea. For me both of them are home. There is a distinction between home 
and homeland. Homeland is the city, the country, the culture, the food, the language 
and everything, but home is a place where you are comfortable in. Your relatives, 
family, and friends are there. I have so many relatives and friends in both of them, 
that is why I cannot decide where my home is. ‘Till I stopped my home, I do not know 
where it is’.  
 
5.3.3 Non-Kurdistan belonging 
Although not as many respondents as those covered in the previous themes expressed that 
they belonged elsewhere than Kurdistan, the narratives of the interviewees indicating this 
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show the possibility of returnees feeling that they belonged to their countries of settlement. 
Likewise, some second-generation returnees do not identify or associate themselves with any 
of the places as home. Accordingly, they do not belong to any place despite inclination 
toward Kurdistan as homeland and the other country as the place of belonging. For Dyar, 
home is the place of comfort and Kurdistan does not qualify. Dyar connects more with 
Europe in terms of belonging, but appreciates Kurdistan is home to a limited, unwanted 
extent: 
In my opinion, home is where you are comfortable. It is right that this is my home, but 
I am not satisfied with it. I travel to Europe, because when I graduate there is nothing 
to do. I will not have a steady job. There is a political disorder and an economic crisis 
in spite of the fact that humans are not respected and glorified in this country. 
Kurdistan is my country, but I am obliged to live in it. If it was under my control, I 
wish I was not here, I wish I was not born here. I wish I was not a Kurd, but this is my 
country and it is doomed to be my destiny. The first thing that I hate in this culture, 
that infuriates me, are social relationships, which are very horrible insofar as they 
interfere in the smallest details of your life. You have no privacy, everyone misjudges 
you. I want to live my own life. I want to live the way I want. I am free in how to think, 
how to live, but you should act like they want and pretend that you live for yourself. 
You should live for people. Either you escape or adapt, otherwise there is no place for 
you in this society. I am second generation, I have belonging to Iran, and I was born 
there and grew up there. Second generation means those who were like me, and I am 
the victim of the bad politics of this country. For example, my family and I got an 
incurable psychological trauma. The chemical attack of halabja was a shock. None of 
us have recovered from that psychological trauma. 
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Another interesting revelation of home and belonging is evident in the narration of Keser 
who recalls her childhood in Kurdistan, but prefers to have no home. In other words, there are 
second-generation returnees who prefer to associate with Kurdistan only as a homeland and 
not as a home. The notion of belonging does not even surface in the case of these returnees 
like Keser who prefer to be ‘free of home and belonging’ to place: 
I have no need to have a home. Kurdistan is my homeland because my ancestors come 
from there and I was born in Sulaimani. I left too young to go to another country to 
even consider Kurdistan my home. Now that I have even returned here, I still don’t 
feel like Kurdistan is my home. For me, home should give me an unquestionable 
feeling of belonging; I do not feel that with Kurdistan or with Lebanon where I stayed 
for over 16 years. I do not have a home and I do not belong to any place or country. It 
is a funny life, but that is my life and I love it that way.  
 
A sense of belonging and emotional attachment to home was a complex issue for 
most of my participants. However, very often, they have attached it to geographical locations, 
somewhat overlapping and multiple, and constructed it in relation to both the past and the 
present. They have had a feeling of belonging to multiple location. The sense of belonging 
and emotional attachment to a home among my participant stems partially from lived 
experiences and from the existing social relations and networks within that place. Many of 
them were extremely aware of the importance of living in one’s own home country because 
of having lived in other countries as refugees who did not belong to the mainstream 
population. Home – one’s own territory, one’s ancestors’ place of origin, where one can feel 
a sense of psychological freedom, and where one’s legal rights should be assured as 
honourable citizens of the nation – was of crucial importance to many of the second 
generation (Saito 2007). 
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 5.4 The Concept of identity   
For the second generation, the concept of home is a more difficult one to define for they feel 
as though they belong neither here nor there (i.e. to their parents’ land) Taylor points out that 
‘what you identify as your home, and your identity, is a figment of your imagination. Bits and 
pieces of your parents’ and family’s history have influenced you, but it is not your history’ 
(2007: 130). Taylor recounts how, despite being born on Canadian soil, engaging in a typical 
Canadian lifestyle, he is constantly asked ‘but where are you really from?’ Therefore, the 
concept of identity then becomes fluid, never really belonging to a fixed location or specific 
culture. The identity holder is in constant pursuit of some sort of middle ground where they 
can feel at ease and proudly stand for all aspects of who they are. The development of this 
section supports Hall’s (2000) assertion that identity is a temporary attachment to the 
positions of subject constructed for us by discursive practices (Uwase 2014).  
Identity is what makes us who we are. “There is a very deep ontological longing in 
people to feel complete, which manifests itself in a desire to belong to something that is 
greater than oneself and to participate actively in the life of this supra-individual entity” 
(Létourneau 2001: 5). I concur with the criticism of conventional classifications of identity 
by Anthias (2002), as if identity was a possessive property. The narrations of the interviewees 
show a constant renegotiation of identity upon integration with national and ethnic 
representations of various events and stages constrained in space and time. The results reveal 
an interplay of various factors informing the identity of the second-generation Kurdish 
returnees. Alinia and Eliassi (2014) have reported the diversity of identity quests by Kurdish 
returnees, except that the quest remains common to all generations and not just second-
generation returnees.  
The narrations by different interviewees in the current research reaffirm the reports of 
various scholars about nationalism being central to the ideological framework for the 
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construction of the collective identity (Wahlbeck 1999; Alinia 2004; Khayati 2008; Eliassi 
2012). However, the narratives in the current research also feature multiple identity 
experiences especially due to exclusion from the country of settlement and self-exclusion 
from Kurdistan upon their return due to unmet expectations. An interesting finding is the 
relation of identity to self and without affiliation to place.  Why then would they not opt for 
mixed/double/multiple identities? I find the third and fifth elements of identity as identified 
by Brubaker and Cooper, which portray ‘identities as deep and foundational forms of 
selfhood’ and ‘identities as fluctuating, unstable and fragmented modes of the self’ (2000: 6) 
respectively to be adequate in explaining the ‘personal identity’ narratives. In general, the 
narratives reveal second-generation returnees that identify as Kurds, those with mixed/double 
identities (including non-Kurdish) and those with personal or unaffiliated identities.  
 
5.4.1 Kurdish identity 
The definition of national identity is multi-dimensional and varies in each society based on 
specific national identity markers. Many studies confirm birthplace as a marker of national 
identity, followed by ancestry, residence, language/accents and so on (Jones, 1996). Jones 
(1996) has defined in his research national identity as ‘Australian Nativist’, according to him, 
‘being an Australian national means being born in Australia, having lived most of one’s life 
in Australia, and being Christian’. On the other hand, in his research Eliassi (2010) has 
studied ‘identity formation among younger generation of Kurds in the Swedish context’. His 
research argues that his interviewees emphasized a sense of ‘Kurdishness’ and Kurdish 
identity, although being ‘Kurdish’ was accorded various meanings. Similarly, with my own 
participants, second-generation returnees identified themselves quite strongly as ‘Kurdish’. 
This identification was often narrated during the interviews with my participants in relation to 
being part of the Kurdish society, knowing the Kurdish language and having roots traceable 
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to the Kurdistan region (in Iraq, Iran, or Turkey). The participants’ parents were all of 
Kurdish background, and the families had migrated to diaspora countries when the 
interviewees were not born or they migrated with their families to diaspora countries when 
they were five years old or younger. Therefore, some of the second-generation returnees, who 
were born in parent’s homeland also had memories from the societies of departure and from 
their visit to their parental homeland, which to some extent highlighted the (symbolic) 
construction of belonging to Kurdistan. However, some participants were born in diaspora 
countries and had never visited Kurdistan – hence the word ‘symbolic’ in brackets. 
The role of nationalism in forming Kurdish identity was eminent in Zhwan’s 
narrative. Zhwan also expressed awareness of double identity in some of the second-
generation Kurds. The association with Kurdistan as home and as the place of belonging 
could also be responsible for the single identity as a Kurd: 
Unlike many people who declare that they have double-identities or multiple 
identities, I have one identity: I am Kurd.  
 
Many people identify themselves as a Kurd. For instance, Zhwan is very clear that she 
identifies herself as a Kurd in a very clear distinction from other people with multiple 
identities.   
We lived in a Persian area temporarily, then we lived in Pawa which was a Kurdish 
area. Although we could not speak Kurdish outside home, we lived in a Kurdish area 
and our cultures were almost similar. Besides, we must speak Persian with our 
friends, but we always watched Kurdish channels, and speak the Kurdish language. 
We always talked about Sulaimani, my parents were nationalist, and influenced us. 
We were taught that we are Kurds and have one identity. If someone asks me, ‘what is 
your nationality?’ I certainly say I am a Kurd, and I live in Sulaimani. Therefore, I 
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belong considerably to Kurdistan, in a way I cannot live in another place. Although I 
was a child when I lived there, but it made me feel how difficult that life was for my 
parents, and I do not think I could live that life. Once I visited my friends in Iran when 
I properly realized that we cannot live there again. Kurdistan is our home not Iran or 
anywhere. 
 
Similarly, the role of parental nationalism and patriotism passed on to second-generation 
Kurds and instilled in them as they grew up, regardless of the country of settlement, seems 
more prominent in Sazan's narrative. Notably, Sazan easily related with Kurdistan as home 
and felt a sense of belonging, as reported in the previous section: 
I had no conflict in showing my identity since my mother was a nationalist, her father 
had been martyred in Kurdistan. When we were there she took us to a Kurdish school 
once a week, they taught us Kurdish language, culture, reading and writing. She did 
not allow us to forget our nationality, so I did not have a conflict when I came back. 
Moreover, when someone asks me, ‘what is your nationality?’ I immediately say I am 
a Kurd, and if they do not know where Kurdistan is, I describe it for them. 
 
Although Dyar indicated that Kurdistan is home and associated Iran with the 
territorial place of belonging, his identity was as a Kurd. I find the narrative by Dyar 
resonates with Male!evi"’s (2006) inference that identity is not obvious or physical, and 
Toivanen’s (2014) expression that locality and cultural identity are perceivable as fixed 
within a given time and indexed within a reference frame defined territorially like the nation-
state. Altogether, examining the migration experiences of individual second-generation Kurds 
including resettlement, displacement and settlement inclines towards “problematizing the 
essential perspective of static associations in the culture, locality and identity triad” 
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(Toivanen 2014). Besides this triad, the role of language as a qualifier for Kurdish identity is 
implicated in Dyar’s narrative about identity: 
We are Kurds, so we speak the Kurdish language. My brother and I did not know the 
Kurdish language until 1999. We used to learn Kurdish. It was easy to express myself 
in Persian. We were obliged to learn Kurdish, because we did not understand each 
other, but from 1995 on, we used to learn Kurdish in school and my family speak 
Kurdish, so we learnt to speak Kurdish, too. I wish to know English and think in 
English. Although, Persian is somehow a good language, if it is compared to the 
languages of the area. But if compared to English and French it is not a dominant 
and standard language. For instance, in English you can convey a message by only 
two sentences, but in Persian you may comprehend it by five pages, it is similar to 
Kurdish. Some years ago my Persian was dominant, since I did not know Kurdish, but 
now my Kurdish is dominant and I think in Kurdish. When I go to Iran I speak 
Persian sporadically, people could recognize my accent when I was in the first grade 
of university, I was so bad in Kurdish. But in my sophomore year, I tried and utilized 
some Arabic words, since the Kurdish language has so many meanings. Besides, 
Kurdish people underestimate both Iranian people and those who lived In Iran as a 
refugee, but those who lived in Europe do not have that problem.  
 
Similarly, Tofan did not have a problem identifying with Kurdistan as home and talking of 
his belonging to Kurdistan, which might have had a significant role in instilling his Kurdish 
identity. However, the discrimination faced in Iran and the patriotism towards Kurdistan 
further reinforced Tofan’s Kurdish identity. The conflict between locality and cultural 
identity is revealed in Tofan’s description of identity and collides with the sense of belonging 
and home: 
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Being in Iran does not affect my personality, I am always a Kurd. However, when we 
were in Iran they called us as Iraqi, and when we returned to Erbil, they called us 
Iranian. There is a quarter in Erbil which they named the Iranian quarter. If you do 
not say Iranian quarter, no one would know or find the place.  
 
For Afran, identity is a choice and a heritage that no one can take away from an individual 
without his or her permission. It is something one acquires and accepts to keep regardless of 
circumstances. This reiterates the core element of ‘deep and foundational forms of selfhood’ 
(Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 6): 
I was not born in Kurdistan, but I am a Kurd. No one can take that away from me; not 
even the 16 years spent in three different nations with different cultures and peoples 
of different ways of life and identities. I have never wanted to be anything else 
because being Kurdish is an identity given by Allah (SWT). They might have taught 
me English and Persian and their ways of life, but I insisted on learning Kurdish 
whenever I had an opportunity (at home, in social gatherings, during my short visits 
to Kurdistan). I acquired Kurdish identity and will retain it to death. I am a Kurd.  
 
My participants’ narratives seem to reveal that most of the second-generation returnees have 
constructed the ideal image of homeland with little memory or that their identity has been 
informed by location, language, knowledge of culture and their affection towards the 
‘homeland’ and has not been influenced by the current situation in the KRG region.  
5.4.2 Mixed/double identity  
The concept of identity then becomes fluid, never really belonging to a fixed location or 
specific culture. The identity holder is in constant pursuit of some sort of middle ground 
where they can feel at ease and proudly stand for all aspects of who they are ( Uwase 2014).  
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Double consciousness is a theory that (Du Bois 1996) first explored in his publication 
The Souls of Black Folk. His work was focused on the African-Americans who were 
denigrated and oppressed in a nation that the world saw as a proponent of principals of 
human dignity and equality. He has indicated in his book that the negative views, such as 
rejection from the outside world, shaped the experiences of African- Americans and, in turn, 
their self-image. (Du Bois 1996) describes the reality of having multiple identities; 
recognizing that individuals experience a kind of ‘two-ness’, with two identities trying to 
exist within one person. Furthermore, he has explained the two life-altering experience that 
the African-Americans are facing from the moment he/she realized he/she was Black, and the 
moment he/she realized that was a problem.  
Mixed and double identity narratives manifested in three interviewees in my research. 
The most striking similarity in the narratives of these three interviewees is that they all had 
discordant views of home and belonging. This further reaffirms that mixed perceptions of 
home and belonging are likely to cause similar discord in identity. One way in which second-
generation Iraqi Kurds describe their emotional connection to homeland and diaspora is by 
describing themselves as being a blend of different ethnic and national identities. When 
second-generation Iraqi Kurds define their emotional relationship to homeland or to diaspora 
it is by defining themselves as being a blend of different identities.  
Rawa an Iraqi born girl, who grew up in Germany and then moved to UK as a 
teenager, could not decide whether Kurdistan was home or not and had issues with tracing 
belonging, which might have had a significant impact on her mixed identity: 
I had difficulties in recognizing my national identity, especially in my college years. I 
felt that I was Eastern, but when I returned to Kurdistan, I came to realize that I am 
not Eastern, I am completely different from them. I am a mixture of East and West. At 
the end of the day, it is me. However, it did not have a negative impact on me. Instead, 
 192 
it had a positive impact on my personality, for I had so many experiences and am 
familiar with various cultures and norms which led me to realize more. I appreciate 
that this mixture of feelings produced a broader mind and way of thinking. Sometimes 
I feel loyal to Kurdistan because that’s where I’m from, but at the same time I feel 
loyal to Germany or the UK because they have been good to me. 
 
Through this ‘mix' of identities she is representing the flexibility of national and 
regional boundaries and her reluctance to select one identity marker. Second-generation Iraqi 
Kurds feel a sense of belonging and loyalty to both diaspora countries and the homeland, 
which they expressed through narrative statements.  Furthermore, Rawa argues that:  
It has been helping a lot in having a wider network and establishing more friendships. 
It has also enhanced my confidence in applying for jobs and using this dual capacity 
to market myself. Transcultural feeling is great. Rather than being a conflict or a 
problem I found this helped in developing more powerful coping strategies. Overall 
this mixed feeling has a positive influence and effect on my personality.  
 
Sarnj had problems maintaining the same identity with a change in location. In 
Sweden, her identity was Kurdish and in Kurdistan it was Swedish. Her identity was subject 
to the treatment received from those around her, which implies that it was subject to the 
interpretation of others. This brings in an element of ‘otherness' (Toivanen 2014) in ‘forcing’ 
an identity on some of the second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning to the KRG region: 
I feel my identity was stronger here. There is an identity theory – I suppose it is 
formulated by a French man – it gives me inspiration, which says ‘when you are out 
of your country they saw you as immigrant, when you are home they look at you as 
foreigner, none of them give you your rights’. So I get bored with these things. 
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 I want to tell both sides: ‘please see me as who I am, do not generalize me into a 
theory'. They called us, ‘those who returned from Europe’. There are so many people 
who came back from Europe. View me as me, I am not like others. Besides, they 
prejudge you. It means before they know you well, they misjudge you. But due to my 
strong identity here, I feel I am so controlled. I cannot face it when they called us 
immigrants. They say immigrants have polluted our country, and they take our jobs. 
Although I am one of them, I was always a second-rate citizen there. However, people 
glorify and appreciate you in Kurdistan, but they do not give you your basic rights. I 
do not know why. I do not know whether it is only the corporation I work in, or if all 
the corporations are normally like that. 
 
The experiences in the diaspora are also influential in instilling a sense of mixed identity for 
some of the second-generation Iraqi Kurds like Lanya. Certainly, the inclination towards a 
Kurdish identity is stronger and this could be traceable to an equally strong association with 
Kurdistan as home. Language acquisition and childhood memories, which implicate 
communicative and cultural memories, are crucial for identity formation. Lanya claimed: 
We can say I have multiple identities in my personality, because I learned some things 
in Iran, some others in Syria, and something else in Holland. These countries have 
different religions, they have different cultures. I received those which were 
compatible with my family rules, customs, and tradition, which adapt within that limit 
of freedom. For instance, my mother gave me ultimate freedom, but she drew a red 
line which I could not pass. In every culture we collect those good things which adapt 
to the fence our parents put up for us. We may collect the bad things, because no one 
is an angel, but mostly we get good habits. I acquired useful experience from different 
cultures in different countries. All these helped in building a stronger personality. 
 194 
 It made me more adaptable, approachable and more tolerant in my life. Experience 
in those different societies stimulated better decision making. I feel that I can live 
anywhere and work anywhere. I can take more on board now compared to before. I 
have seen good and bad days and I made notes of all of them. I learn from my 
mistakes. Furthermore, I learned how to survive difficult times and how to enjoy good 
times. I evolved my strategies of absorbing pressure and de-stressing plans and 
procedures.  
 
The difficulty in finding a self-identify and then later justifying chosen identities is a 
way for the second generation to come to terms with transnational belonging. They are 
feeling that one identity by itself does not really fully satisfy the principle of who they are or 
what they believe. The process of defining the self in such a way that accurately reflects 
emotional connection and symbolic belonging is influenced by external social factors; the 
process of self-representation varies according to individuals and groups in two countries 
(Somerville 2008:27). The second-generation returnees sustain mixed or double identities in 
order to connect themselves simultaneously to more than one country.  
Some of the Iraqi Kurd returnees feel emotional attachment and belonging to their 
family and friends in diaspora countries and at the same time they promote their ties to their 
parents’ country of origin as a way to express these connections. These transnational 
connections indicate an effort to express a social identity that is forged between the diaspora 
and parents’ home country, and which expresses inclusion in both simultaneously. The 
second-generation returnees combine multiple attachment and emotional affiliation to people, 




5.4.3 Personal /unaffiliated identity  
Although they were fewer in number than those whose stated identity was Kurdish, it is 
interesting to note that all the interviewees claiming unaffiliated identities were born in the 
Eighties. Coincidentally, their principal reason for return was the development of Kurdistan 
and they had discordant senses of home and belonging. However, the reasons for personal 
identities differed. For example, Darya expressed: 
The decision of returning to Kurdistan did not impact my identity. As a national 
identity, I view my identity as one thing. I am a Kurd who lived in England. I am a 
person who must establish my own identity, and I am at an age that it takes a little 
more time to make people know me. Identity is individual, it is not fair to give 
someone an identity depending on their surroundings, and the person should be able 
to choose their own identities. My identity is not pertaining to home. For me they are 
two different things.  
Some of the second generation declared that they have a double-identity or 
triple-identity for they were in Iran for a long time due to political problems then they 
went to Europe, but my identity belongs to my personality, it belongs to my individual 
self. My identity belongs to me, no one can affect it. If I think of national identity, I am 
a Kurd and was born in England and grew up there, but I returned to Kurdistan. As a 
national and geographical identity, these have some effects on my individual identity, 
but it is not my full and genuine identity, it is a part of my identity. 
Similarly, Dashti refuses an identity bound by geography (location) and instead opts to define 
a self-identity. Further examination of Dashti’s view of identity shows awareness of potential 
misinterpretation of double or multiple identities. Dashti refuses to be associated with double 
or multiple identities in any way. The feeling of identity as an incarcerator is evident in 
Dashti’s narrative: 
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I personally refuse to have a solid identity, this makes nervousness and violence in 
nationality, in religion, in philosophy, or in ideologies of political parties. I do not 
believe in that. People must be flexible and view every dimension of various identities. 
They should receive what they think is suitable and adapt it, and freely distance 
themselves from what they are not interested in. In my opinion my identity is my 
thoughts. My identity is neither this passport in my pocket, nor the past I was living 
here, nor the plans which I will pursue in the future. My identity is my thoughts, my 
current thoughts, which specify my personality. 
I do not have double identities. I heard so many people who had double and 
multiple identities, but for me it is different. The focus is on the issues and situations 
of Kurdistan, but even in Holland there were some cultures and customs which I was 
against and wanted to be improved. I suggest it is better to establish your personal 
identity, every individual must establish their own personal identities. It is not in your 
power where you were born, grew up, or where you lived, it is your thoughts that fill 
your profile.  
 
Waja is also uncomfortable with the idea of a single territory-based identity and refutes the 
notion of double or multiple identities applying to her. The claim of an amorphous, personal 
identity is further cemented by her marriage to an Englishman. She argues: 
I do not have double or multiple identities. I was born in England and married an 
Englishman, but I am from Sulaimani. How can one condemn me to being English 
because I have British documents and children and a husband born in Britain? I 
disagree with being Kurdish because I am free to craft my own identity the best way it 
suits me and in the circumstances. I will never be purely English or purely Kurdish or 
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purely Iraqi or Iranian or Syrian, although I have experienced all of them. I am my 
own identity and I will remain that way.  
 
5.4.4 Transnational Identity  
Evidence suggests that the lives of first-generation immigrants have been forged within and 
across national borders; however, the lives of their children are less directly tied to the 
parents’ homeland (Chams: 2015). The way how these second-generation negotiate their 
identities, and the importance they attach to transnational ties is less clear. Researchers, who 
have conducted empirical work on the transnational trends of the second-generation, have 
produced contrasting conclusions on the matter (Chams: 2015). My research aims to clarify 
the factors that encourage transnational identities and involvement among second-generation 
Iraqi Kurd returnees in diaspora countries. My research reveals particular patterns of 
transnational connections that indicate the need to rethink the scope of the concept.  
The second-generation Iraqi Kurds’ visits to their parental homeland is an example of 
transnational spaces. My interviewees’ stories point out that the second generation visited 
their parental homeland once a year with their parents during the summer holidays.  “The 
second generation grew up hearing their parents talk about their ancestral land, they take part 
in activities which reflect their cultural heritage and some have even spent time in their 
parents’ country of origin, while others have not” (Uwase 2014: 31). My research participants 
narrate in my study their experiences which transcend national boundaries; they have been 
exposed to different lifestyles and social backgrounds which redefine how they view 
themselves and others around them. The following statements are their responses to whether 




Darya states:  
Every year we visited Kurdistan once or twice since 1997. We visited our relatives. I 
have so many friends here, and relatives. I spent a nice time being with my relatives. 
So, they were very sweet to us and all of them made us feel like we were at home.  
At the beginning, my expectations were over fulfilled in every respect. When I 
returned to Kurdistan annually on a trip, all the times were spent in visiting our 
relatives and on invitations. I did not go to downtown to those giant projects that have 
been finished in Kurdistan, new restaurants, new entertainment parks, new hotels 
etc… Every week people went out to entertain themselves. I saw a kind of social life 
that I could not see in one hundred years if I stayed in England. However, when the 
recent economic crisis occurred, the situation was completely opposite.  
 
Dashti’s story about his visit to parental homeland is the following: 
We returned to Kurdistan for a summer holiday in 2004. One time, there was one of 
our friend’s weddings. It could be considered as a social visit. Once again, I returned 
in 2010. In time, I graduated from university, I came back to find out whether it is 
suitable to come back and live in Kurdistan or not. It was a year of orientation. I did 
not stay for the whole year, but I stayed for more than one month. I visited university; 
I spoke with my old friends and relatives.!
 
Second-generation Iraqi Kurds describe their visits to their parental homeland as a feeling of 
being at home and having an emotional connection with their family. Visiting family means 
that they are among different people, but a bond exists between them because they are 
relatives. Lanja describes her feeling of visiting as a good experience.  
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She states that:  
It was a great feeling when we returned to Kurdistan, because we viewed Kurdistan 
as a trip. We were never in the real life of Kurdistan. We always returned with a 
group of people who were similar to our background. We did not have any interaction 
with other people. When you live in the daily routines, it is different. Moreover, those 
people whom you saw in your trips, they are different when you live with them. Unlike 
when you stay for one or two weeks, we expected to have a few changes to our trips to 
Kurdistan. We expected a different way of life, especially as my father was in a high 
rank, and we assumed our lifestyle would be different. Besides, we were the first 
family who decided to return to Kurdistan and did not come back to Europe. 
 
All my participants described their relationships to the family and the emotional 
bonds of family membership as a part of their transnationality. Their expression of emotional 
connections determines their transnational being, because the actual relationships of 
emotional bonding are absent. The emotionally grounded family relationships that exist with 
their parents are instrumentally extended to their transnational relatives. There is also a 
practical side to the second generation’s family membership. They must conform to family 
rules and expected behaviours. What the participants say about expected behaviours 
highlights the differences between their diaspora lives and their experiences in the parental 
homeland. As a result of being raised up in a diaspora society, some of my participants, as 
highlighted in a previous chapter, experienced disappointment upon arrival in their parents’ 
home country. The idealized impression of the homeland came face to face with the existing 
reality of what life is really like back home. Some of my participants, especially those who 
returned from neighbouring countries, had never experienced visits to their parents’ home 
country due to ongoing problems in the countries of diaspora. However, “transnational life 
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does not only cross boundaries created by nation states, it is an expression of a heterogeneous 
global identity connecting norms, values and ideologies without attaching them to a specific 
geographical location” (Uwase 2014:33). However, many second-generation Iraqi Kurds felt 
a very strong bond to their parental homeland through their parents. 
 
5.4.5 The passing of intergenerational identities 
This section aims to demonstrate some of the ways in which intergenerational identities are 
passed on and how these result at times in intergenerational struggles. Second-generation 
Iraqi Kurd returnees narrated that they first learned about their homeland from their family 
and especially from their parents, but also from other family members in the diaspora 
country. For many, these memories provided them with an idealized picture of their 
homeland as they were growing up in diaspora countries and helped them to form their 
Kurdish identity.  
In the ideal conception, ‘home’ is a geographical and social area where one feels at 
home and upon which one’s identity is based, a place where one’s family and friends live and 
where security, social warmth and a strong connection to the soil are experienced. These 
ideal qualities call upon many characteristics that the contemporary Kurdistan Regional 
Government fails to offer to their second-generation returnees. Return, as experienced by my 
research participants, was a ‘mixed feeling’, surrounding feelings of anticipation, nostalgia 
and excitement but also disappointment and sadness. The second generation who experienced 
mixed feelings about their return are those who planned the return themselves as an 
autonomous decision or some who decided to return with their families. Some of my 
participants saw the return as an ‘adventure’. There are also the cases in which the second 
generation felt disillusioned at first, but in time they found out that they ‘belonged to’ their 
home country.  
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However, they still highlight the negative part of their lives in the KRG region. For 
example, they complain about discrimination and exclusion in their job, social life and setting 
up a business.  
This section will present narratives to summarise the main elements of the second 
generation’s identity crisis in the diasporic and transnational setting, imaginings of homeland 
and intergenerational identity after their return and self-reflection on their identities and 
belonging. Zhwan’s expectations of the return in terms of their social life in Kurdistan were 
unfulfilled. The narration below explains this more explicitly: 
We have some expectations in returning to Kurdistan, to have a future here, to be with 
our family and relatives, and to have a good social life. Since my mother was the first 
child, and has only one brother, she related to her mother considerably. Her one wish 
was to return to her mother, both to improve our social life and to have a good future. 
She expected our studies would be much easier in Kurdistan, especially in college. In 
Iran it was very hard, you must wait for some years before you are employed, and as 
to my parents they were financially unsecured. Besides, the situation was very 
unstable, and they mistreated the Kurds. All these reasons led us to return and expect 
to have a good life, socially and economically, for they thought they might find a 
steady job in Kurdistan.  
Although Darya’s expectations were high, the situation in Kurdistan proved more difficult 
than anticipated. Despite the difficulties encountered, the patriotic Darya would rather remain 
in the troubled Kurdistan and contribute towards its restoration than go back to England or 
Lebanon, where life was better and the jobs paid better wages than in Kurdistan. The 
paradoxical lamentation about the choice between re-emigrating to England or staying on in 
Kurdistan manifests in the narrative below: 
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The situation in Kurdistan is terrible and it will be probably be worse compared to 
2013 and a decade before. The economic crisis has an impact on every Kurdish 
individual. I cannot say that I did not think of returning to Europe. 
 I keep thinking of it, but as a person I cannot leave something incomplete, because I 
faced some challenges and difficulties. One should attempt in the face of hardship and 
find a solution instead of quitting. I decided to finish all the things, which I intended 
to do before returning to Kurdistan. I could not quit in the middle of things. 
I often thought about quitting and returning to Europe. If I return to Europe with my 
current CV, my salary will be 20 times more than the amount I receive here. My life 
will be much more convenient there, I will have my own freedom. Here it is different. I 
do not have that freedom I wanted in the first place. I did not come back for money or 
anything else, I came back due to patriotism, because I want to fulfil my duties toward 
Kurdistan. When I was in Lebanon, I also had a better salary than here. Currently 




I had some expectations on returning to Kurdistan. I always asked my friends and 
relatives to what degree Kurdistan has changed. They always declared that Kurdistan 
is better now, it has been changed considerably, the Kurdish people have changed, 
which made have some expectations. I stayed tuned in to the Kurdish channels, on TV 
and the internet. I wanted to know what made Kurdistan better. I felt that the people 
had changed educationally. In every respect, Kurdistan had developed and changed a 
lot. But when I returned, it did not fulfil my expectations. Everything was different 
when it came to reality. I was shocked to feel the difference between what I learned 
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and heard from my parents while in exile about the significant changes politically, 
financially and socially, among the native population living in my local city of 
Sulaimani. Furthermore, following social media, TV channels and journals, specially 
of the opposition parties, mainly of the Change-Goran movement, I hoped that these 
would have a great impact on people's way of thinking and their approach to life. My 
expectation was wrong and I faced a different reality. 
 
Second-generation Iraqi Kurds faced difficulties in term of finding a job due to the lack of 
social networks in their parental homelands. In their community back home, finding a job, 
setting up a business, all rely on social connections, without which it is extremely difficult to 
get things done. Dashti’s narration about his experience was the following: 
When you came back for a week or two, in a week's time you can never find out the 
exact life until you live it. I had some general expectations about politics and the 
economy which were fulfilled, but in the details of life, thinking and behaviour, you 
don’t find out any of these until you live in the situation. I did not have any 
expectations about those issues. It was like a blank paper which needs to be filled 
gradually. The idea of serving my nation and country was uppermost in me making 
my decision. I totally forgot that I had changed a lot since leaving Iraq. The country 
was also different and local people had altered too. My main goal controlled and 
influenced [my decision] more than looking into the details. Trying to be positive and 
looking at the constructive and good points only affected me making the right 
decision, which I still don’t regret.  
Back in Holland I felt that local people are pleased and grateful to someone 
like me who suffered a lot and worked very hard to become a pharmacist and help in 
looking after people living in Holland. 
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 I felt people were happy and pleased for me to contribute positively in the 
community. Unfortunately, in contrast, I felt that my homeland citizens were not very 
welcoming and rather felt that I was competing with them in job opportunities. From 
another aspect, it was not easy to practice pharmacy or my profession alongside 
teaching at university with the same principles I acquired over here during my 
training. This was another hurdle which I never thought about as I was making my 
final resolution about returning. Finally, as time went on, I realised that I had started 
to wake up from a dream and started to be conscious about the reality and the 
challenges. As time goes by, you start to understand that you have to adapt rather 
than expecting others to do it. You have to alter rather than expecting others to 
change, hoping that you can add something new without making people feel bad. I 
started to apprehend the locals’ sensitivity and accommodate their feelings. I am 
happy that I have attained some of my goals and succeeded in helping to relocate 
some of my experience to help my nation and country.   
For some of my participants who previously had high-status jobs in their settlement country, 
it was surprising and frustrating for them that they found it difficult to get equivalent 
employment on their return. Interestingly, many interviewees’ stories about their life upon 
their return and how recruitment in the current region operates, indicates that discrimination 
is predominant. Second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning from neighbouring countries and 
European countries, especially those considering long-term return, experienced 
disappointment and dissatisfaction about their life in the KRG region. But despite their 
feelings of disappointment some of them decided to stay in the region and contribute to 




Darya’s narrative furthermore states that:   
In years to come, I would love to look back and remember my role in this progression. 
I believe that Kurdistan has great potential, especially knowing that it is an oil-rich 
area. I feel that we need a non-corrupt administration, which will implement more 
transparency and use the country’s resources more wisely. I, therefore, strongly feel 
that our knowledge and professions are very much needed in this period of time. 
 I think the region lacks expertise and skills in different specialities, hence I am very 
positive about myself and others returning to Kurdistan. Although I face barriers and 
obstacles in my daily work and daily life, I am optimistic about my input in the 
community from a professional and a social point of view. I am also happy to work 
with some friends in a similar situation, who have returned and re-integrated at 
different levels and have contributed to society. We meet on a regular basis and share 
our daily experience and ideas and help each other in finding solutions to overcome 
barriers. We also discuss methods and techniques for better involvement with local 
people and introduce each other to newly acquaintances and colleagues”. 
Saza, who was brought up in Germany, went back to the KRG region because her 
father was living there and her mother decided to go back so that the whole family would be 
together. She claims that: ‘My father, mother and close relatives always used to talk to us 
about their homeland and their nice memories about it.’ History, memories and myths about 
life in the homeland and about the values that it represents are repeatedly told as a mantra and 
‘often become parts of family lore’. Nevertheless, parents also want their children to 
assimilate into mainstream society and cope with the situations in which they find 
themselves, because they want their children to succeed. Zhwan, who was raised in Iran, 
narrates that:  
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My mother expected our study would be much easier in Kurdistan, especially in 
college. In Iran it was very hard. My grandmother helped me to befriend two girls in 
school, where she taught Kurdish language. Although they were not in my class and 
older than me, in the breaks she told them to take care of me. And we have contact to 
this day. Now I love them more than my new friends, they helped me so much. I was 
very energetic and social, but gradually with the help of my family, who assisted me 
in entering a new social life, I made some friends and learnt the language. Now I 
have abundant friends. I also have contact with my childhood friends in Iran via 
social media, especially Facebook. We speak in Persian and Kurdish, since we know 
Kurdish people as well. So I speak Kurdish with them too. 
Among second-generation returnees from neighbouring countries their parents perceived that 
they would have better educational opportunities in the host country compared to the diaspora 
countries. On the other hand, parents are also fear that their children forget about their culture 
and their roots and become too westernised. According to Kebede “this is one major factor 
that distinguishes the 1.5-generation from the second. Those who are born in the host 
countries may have a less stressful relationship with their parents because of fewer cultural 
expectations and their capacity to move effortlessly between the ‘home’ and ‘host’ cultures. 
For the 1.5-generation children, in contrast, there is a higher expectation that they will be able 
to juggle both cultures and this becomes central in their life, since it is often a question of a 
real necessity for the survival of their relationship with their parents” (Kebede 2010:17).Far 
from a countable process, intergenerational identity was found to be complex and fragmented. Its features 
appear to be changing over time, involving redefinitions of concepts, values and practices and of their 
importance, by both parents and children. Intergenerational transmission is largely conditioned by parents’ 





This research seeks to address the multifaceted aspects in which notions of ‘return’, ‘home, 
belonging and identity’ can be examined and experienced in a migratory context, through the 
voices and life-narratives of second-generation Iraqi Kurdish returnees. The vast majority of 
Iraqi Kurds in Europe and neighbouring countries are second-generation refugees. They have 
grown up in a very different environment to that of their parents and they have had a greater 
range of opportunities in exile compared to those of their generation who remained in Iraq 
during the prolonged years of war. 
The main sources of information were the life-story narratives, delivering direct and 
often well-articulated understandings from the lives of the second-generation Iraqi Kurdish 
returnees. As I think has been obvious, the life-narratives were significantly rich, with details 
often expanding beyond the focus of my research. I have attempted to take up those elements 
and themes that characterised the narratives as a whole, whilst staying true to the individual 
stories (and the words they consist of). One of my key aims was to avoid making assumptions 
about my participants in advance, both in light of their parents’ migration histories as well as 
the wider literature on second-generation ‘return’ migration.  
Domestic political players and external powers – in particular, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and 
Syria – have variously battled for control of the territory, using different readings of history 
to justify their claims (Taylor 2009). None of the neighbouring countries recognize the region 
controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government as an independent state. Furthermore, even 
though the international community respect the special circumstances of this region and have 
established a notable and exceptional economic, military, and political relationship, the world 
has insisted that the time has not come yet to declare the dreamed of independent state.  
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This was evident during the reaction of the world towards Kurdish attempts to declare 
an independent state in September 2017.  
Instead of gaining more autonomy, the regional and global powers have re-confirmed 
that they support a strong, powerful and united Iraq. Almost a century of instability in this 
part of the world has left people with uncertainty and led to constant movement in and out of 
Kurdistan depending on political, economic and security factors. Many of those who were 
displaced or moved outside Kurdistan have created a new life in the diaspora and raised a 
new family in exile. This new generation who were born, grown up, educated and worked in 
a host country can be called second-generation refugees.  
The termination of the political institutions of Baathist Iraq in spring 2003 filled most 
Kurds with new hope for democratic processes in the aftermath of human rights violations and 
war. The political and economic limbo, imposed on the Kurdistan Region in 1991, has also 
finally ended. After years of suppression, fighting and the struggle for self-rule, the time for 
Kurds, especially those who have lived for years in exile, has come to contribute to developing 
a democratic state. For many, this new situation was a chance to transfer years of experience, 
education and professional skills to re-build their stateless home. As far as the Kurdish diaspora 
is concerned, these changes have refreshed the dream of returning for many Iraqi Kurds. 
Following the establishment of Kurdish de facto self-rule in 1991, many Kurds returned to 
socialise with families and friends, get married or engage in the reconstruction process 
(Emanuelsson 2008: 5).  
This forced migration brought to the foreground deliberations on the meaning of 
home, belonging and Identity for second generation returnees. The view of this generation 
regarding their roots or national belonging, as well as their connections, networks and links 
with the host community is significantly different from their parents.  
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Moreover, the way these young immigrants view their homeland and the factors 
motivating them to return are remarkably different from the first generation. Hence, in the 
last 20 years researchers have tried to explore and highlight the variation in the parameters 
between these two groups. However, the perspective of first-generation refugees are more 
common than those studies looking into the experiences of second generation refugees and 
their perspective regarding host and home countries.  
In an attempt to capture the experiences of second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning to 
the KRG region, narratives from 20 (N = 20) interviewees of both genders were analysed and 
discussed. The following sections will illustrate the key points of my research’s findings:  
 
6.1 Motivations for second-generation Iraqi Kurds to return to the KRG 
region 
My first research question, which was focused on the factors motivating Kurdish returnee 
migration back to Kurdistan, is sophisticated and too complex to be captured by single 
theories. Factors which influenced or stimulated young Kurdish migrants to return ‘home’ 
were a mixture of personal, social, political and financial reasons. This combination of 
internal and external grounds interacted to formulate the basis upon which interviewees made 
their final decision to return. Without refuting the role of social networks in the factors 
motivating returnee migration back to Kurdistan, the findings of this research complement 
the arguments by Keles, which indicate that ‘social networks are social fields and each social 
field accepts only members with similar taste, social and political interests, culture, and class 
background and so on' (2016: 11). Social networks, therefore, are not entirely inclusive, but 
also associative and exclusive, thereby rendering such networks discriminatory and selective.  
This research has connected the constructions of ‘home’, ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’ to 
the second generation’s return journey by investigating their motivations and desires to 
return, including their lack of agency in contributing to the return decision in many cases, and 
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their experiences post-return. One of the findings illustrated that the second generation often 
faced isolation in their first and second years in their parental homeland. One interesting 
finding of this research is that participants had more than one reason to return to Kurdistan. 
Although one factor might have dominated others, the combination of all of them contributed 
towards making an eventual decision.  
Summarising the motivations for the returnees resulted in the development of four 
themes. First, some returnees returned to Kurdistan to reconnect with family members that 
were still in Kurdistan and to re-establish social relations with neighbours and friends in 
Kurdistan. The second factor of return was political and involved motivation by the Iraqi 
government. For example, the Iraqi government offered incentives for returnees including 
money to help them rebuild Iraq and Kurdistan upon return, or the offer of employment. 
Furthermore, the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime also inspired optimism in Kurds in 
foreign lands that Kurdistan had became safer and peaceful enough for them to return. This 
did not always turn out to be the case. The third set of reasons for return can be classified 
under hostility and discrimination (exclusion) in settlement countries. This exclusion 
cultivated a desire to be accepted and Kurdistan seemed to be the best choice at the time. 
Again, their expectations were not always met upon returning to Kurdistan only to realise 
they did not fit in properly. The fourth theme was patriotism and nationalism. Mainly, this 
factor of return comprised the urge to come back and contribute to developing Kurdistan. 
Most of those who come under this category were younger people who lived in Europe or 
nearby countries and had gained a wide range of experience in different aspect of life 
academically and professionally. These people were stimulated by a hope of sharing their 
experience to help to develop the devastated infra-structure of Kurdistan. For each 
participant, return was encouraged by individual circumstances.  
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My overall examination shows that most were drawn to the KRG region for pragmatic 
reasons. Additionally, it is hard to identify a single reason for everyone, and motivating 
factors have interacted with each other in each interview either consciously or 
subconsciously. However, I have highlighted the main elements for return from the second-
generation point of view.  
The first generation’s desire to return back to their homeland and leave the host 
country is presumed to be essentially based on a desire to go back to their roots. Meanwhile, 
the second generation’s return, especially in the case of my research, usually has other 
predominant and mostly personal reasons. However, as mentioned before, despite the social 
element being the main reason for returnees to go back home to Kurdistan, only a small 
number of my participants made a direct connection between parental return narratives and 
their own desire to return. The most dominant argument of second-generation Iraqi Kurdish 
returnees was a desire for a better (or different) quality of life in terms of safety and pace of 
life.  
What made the KRG region the obvious choice for second-generation Iraqi Kurds 
was the combination of the desired qualities of life, plus a familiar environment, in terms of 
‘culture’, language and geography. However, such pull factors are significantly different 
from the feelings of nostalgia or the essential longing to go back to one’s ‘roots’ often 
mentioned in other studies on second-generation return migration (for instance, Phillips and 
Potter 2009; Wessendorf 2007). Finally, this research revealed that the return theories that 
were designed for the first-generation migrants, cannot be analysed for the second-generation 
Iraqi Kurds returnees and that is, mainly because the second generation’s understanding of 
‘home', ‘belonging' and ‘identity' is more vague compared to the first-generation. On the 
other hand, the main narratives of return of second-generation Turkish returnees from 
Germany were three: return as a family decision, return through marriage, and return as self-
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realization (Kilinc 2014). Furthermore, Teerling’s research about the return of British-born 
Cypriots to Cyprus indicates that the factors of returning home are varied.  
Some were pulled by the warm welcome they experienced during their childhood visits or 
remembered from family stories, whilst others returned for more practical reasons, like to join 
a partner. Many believe that Cyprus provides a better and safer environment to raise a family; 
hence children often played an important role in the migration decision. For most, however, 
the decision was based on a unique combination of factors, in order to reach a better quality 
of life for themselves and their loved ones. In this sense, again, many commonalities can be 
found with second-generation Greek-Cypriot returnees (Teerling 2010). !
 
Similarly, in this study more than half of my participants stated social elements as 
their reason for returning home. However, this was mixed mainly with a feeling of national 
pride and a strong desire to serve their own nation and their own Kurdistan. The analysis of 
my data indicates that for the second generation who have taken the decision to return to the 
KRG region, this migration is facilitated through the family networks  and capitals which are 
created and sustained through family relationships. It is these family networks which make 
the difference between the dream or intention to return and the actual reality of doing so. 
Another factor influencing return among second generation Iraqi Kurds returnees was the 
economic benefits. 
Like German-born Turkish or British-born Cypriots, second-generation Kurdish 
returnees have made their way back because of social factors. These were mainly related to 
themselves directly and sometimes to their parents. Social bonding and connection with their 
roots and relatives were the main basis or ground for returning. It seems that these families 
never lost their connection with home. In the last few years with the help of technologies, 
communication has become significantly easier and refugees have had a better link to their 
families in Kurdistan.  
 213 
This helped to increase attachment and provide a better understanding of the current 
developing situation in Iraq and Kurdistan. Furthermore, in the last few years social media, 
TV and radio stations have better reflected the conditions of daily living. All of these factors 
have significantly strengthened the association between Kurdish second-generation refugees 
and home and were, therefore, the main basis of returning.  
The superiority and dominance of social factors in combination with patriotic feelings 
can be explained by the sociology of the Kurdish individual and their personality as well as 
the cultural and historical components. The social networks among Kurdish people in exile, 
at home, and between the two is remarkably powerful. Added to these strong emotional and 
social feelings, the sense of marginalization in the Middle East historical and politically has 
maintained a robust patriotic affection which contributed in producing a significant desire for 
return. On the other hand, the other outstanding finding of my research is reflected in the 
interviews of the the other half of my contributors in whom non-social factors like the 
political situation and the living conditions in host countries were the main component for 
making the decision to return. 
Like Caribbean migrants in the UK (Reynolds 2008), some second-generation 
Kurdish refugee were unable to build a network in the host community. Although most of 
them graduated or qualified in host countries, they were unhappy and not satisfied with the 
progression in their professional life. Moreover, they felt excluded and unable to actively 
contribute to the community. On the other hand, the participants in this research whose 
families asked for asylum in Iran and who were born and brought up there, had suffered a lot 
and felt oppressed while living in exile in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is mainly a result 
of political history in the region and freedom fighting between Kurds from one side, with 
Turks, Arabs, and Iranian on the other side. Similar feelings did not exist among Afghans 
who sometimes felt at home while staying in Iran (Saito 2007).  
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I consider this an exceptional finding in my research. Kurdish second-generation 
immigrants shared the same sense of dissatisfaction with their Caribbean peers in relation to 
professional development in host country. However, my interviewees – particularly those 
who stayed in the neighbouring countries, namely Iran – were marginalized, unable to 
integrate in the host society, and were unable to establish a bond in the new community. My 
participants felt unsafe, unhappy and were always looking for an opportunity to return home. 
This is clearly explained by the unique political history of this stateless nation.  
Another interesting outcome of this study is that I found that second generation 
Kurdish refugees are unique in their decision to return for patriotic, political or national 
reasons. This patriotic feeling among my interviewees is very strong compared to any other 
group of second-generation refugees. Added to this is the change in the political situation in 
Iraq, particularly Kurdistan after 2003. This is the other important factor for return and an 
exceptional finding of my study. It is obvious that the apparent political dilemma in the 
Kurd’s history and the lack of an independent state was the main cause for forming or 
growing national feeling among the second generation, started to think of returning after the 
political change in Iraq in 2003. Similarly, second generation Afghans had the same 
motivation for returning to Afghanistan after the toppling of the Taliban regime by the USA 
and its allies (Sianto 2007). However, unlike Kurds, second generation Afghans living in 
Europe, mainly the UK and Germany, were less keen to return. Pragmatic consideration was 
more likely to outweigh any other nostalgic yearning for homeland. The need for safety, 
better education for their children, electricity, running water, and medical care were more 
likely to be fulfilled in the host country. For Afghans, return is more like a nightmare than a 
dream. There was more interest in return and contribution to the process of re-building from 
those who are able to come back to Europe without endangering their residential status in the 
host country.  
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Even those who shown a desire to go back and live in the homeland, would prefer to 
do it with a European passport safely tucked in their pocket (Braakman & Shlemkhoff 2007). 
In contrast, Kurdish national feeling was sustained among Kurdish second-generation 
refugees, in both neighbouring and European countries.   
In summary, maintaining social connections and the national sentiment and the desire 
to-rebuild the stateless diaspora of Kurdistan were among the main reasons and motivations 
for return. Furthermore, second-generation Kurdish refugees never lost their attachment to 
their roots. The development of different channels for communication through a variety of 
TV satellite channels, radio stations, and social media, has further facilitated constructing this 
network for the second generation in a way that was lacking many years ago for their parents. 
Moreover, the establishment of powerful patriotic consciousness is mainly rooted in political 
and historical events in the Middle East over the last hundred years, which have always left 
Kurdish people marginalized and alone, yet more determined to strengthen their belonging to 
a stateless Kurdistan. In addition, the significant change in the political, social and economic 
situation in Iraq in general and Kurdistan particularly after 2003, when the Saddam regime 
was rejected was also an important turning point for Kurdish second-generation refugees to 
reassess their viewpoint and seriously think of returning home.  
 
6.2 Notions of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ 
My other research questions addressed notions of home and belonging. My participants 
define home through the lens of their parents, adding a generational dimension to their 
understanding of the meaning of ‘home’. There was a tension between the concept of ‘home’ 
and ‘homeland’. What does it then mean to call a place ‘home’? In terms of theory, this study 
contributes to conceptualizations of home and an understanding of a sense of belonging 
among second-generation Iraqi Kurd returnees.  
 216 
The distinction between diaspora as ‘home’ and the Kurdistan Regional Government region 
as ‘homeland’ indicates that, for second-generation Kurds, belonging to one does not rule out 
belonging to the other. To some extent, this is reflective of the social realities in which these 
young people are surrounded. The second-generation social environment is within the 
boundaries of the diaspora countries. But it also includes a relationship with the home 
country that provides feelings of belonging, both concretely through visits, but also 
emotionally through family networks and memories.  
Participants are returning to a home they have never lived in before and their 
experiences and expectations are different. They have strong obligations to the homeland, as 
a particular national place. Some of them returned because they feel a commitment towards 
the homeland, the obligation of participating in re-construction and establishing a connection 
to their roots. This feeling has motivated second generation Kurds to bypass some pragmatic 
obstacles to their return, like lower salaries, deficiency in some of basic necessities and 
luxury items.  
Regarding home and belonging, the overarching sense was that most second-
generation Iraqi Kurdish returnees indicated that Kurdistan is home to them and that they had 
a sense of belonging in Kurdistan. Similar findings of belonging were illustrated in a study 
among British-born Caribbeans returning to the Caribbean. These young people had a strong 
attachment culturally and spiritually to the Caribbean (Reynolds 2008). In the same way, 
Kurdish second-generation returnees had a very strong feeling of connection to their 
homeland while in exile and after returning. Particularly, almost all of those who lived in 
neighbouring countries, namely Iran, had stronger and intense feeling of attachment. This is 
in contrast to Afghans who sometimes felt more at home while in Iran (Saito 2007). In the 
same way, the majority of second-generation Kurdish refugees living in exile in European 
cites, felt a stronger belonging to their own community rather than the host one.  
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However, there were also those who were confused about where home was for them, 
to the extent that they considered themselves as having multiple homes. Some of the 
returnees felt that Kurdistan was home but they did not belong to Kurdistan, especially those 
that had spent many years away. Research by Crul and Schneider (2010) looked into diversity 
of participation and belonging of second-generation Moroccan refugees in different European 
cities. In their study they found variable feeling of belonging among second generation 
refugees, while Moroccan young people were more attached to their own community than the 
national community in the Netherlands. However, this picture was reversed in the 
neighbouring country of Spain as second-generation Moroccans were more connected to the 
host community. Crul and Schneider concluded that this diversity is related to the behaviour 
of host people towards refugees in these European societies. Therefore, in cities like 
Amsterdam, where locals were hostile towards Moroccans, root attachment was stronger. In 
contrast, in cities like Madrid where local people were welcoming towards Moroccans, young 
refugees had a stronger sense of belonging to Spain. The study concluded that education, 
housing, religion and legislation had an impact on the feeling of attachment for second 
generation refugees. Moreover, it showed that the second generation who had entered 
university education had a stronger connection with the host community (Crul and Schneider 
2010).  
Crul and Schneider’s findings differed from my research to some extent as those 
living in a neighbouring country (Moroccans in Spain) had more attachment to the host 
communities compared to those living in Europe, whereas in my research participants had a 
stronger sense of belonging to Kurdistan whilst living in Iran and a more mixed feeling of 
attachment whilst they were living in European countries. Similar findings were revealed for 
Afghans living in Iran, who sometimes had a sense of home while in Iran (Saito 2007).   
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My finding is possibly explained by the historical relationship between Kurdistan and 
Kurdish people and the neighbouring countries. Despite fleeing to Iran, Iraqi Kurds did not 
on the whole feel safe there and were unlikely to feel attachment to the host community, 
because of a belief that this part of Kurdistan is being occupied by Iran. In contrast, the 
second generation felt safer and more connected in European cities. Moreover, the Iraqi 
Kurdish second generation seemed to lack any chance for progression professionally or in 
education in the neighbouring countries compared to wider opportunities in Europe. This also 
explains the difference in feeling of belonging of Kurds in Europe and nearby states.  
Kurdish second-generation migrants behaved the same way their peers did when the 
host community welcomed them or showed hostility towards them. This is reflected by them 
connecting better to a host society when they were embraced by it and having negative 
feelings to the host society and being more attached to the homeland when local people 
showed hostility. However, a key finding of this research is the feelings of Kurdish migrants 
towards the host community, whilst in exile in nearby country, namely a sense of hostility 
towards Iran felt by the Kurdish second generation compared to the feelings expressed by 
Moroccans or Afghans towards their neighbouring host countries of Spain and Iran. This 
original finding adds to an understanding of second-generation Kurdish refugees due to the 
unusual circumstances of their home nation and its position among its rival neighbours.  
 However, another interesting study explored the sense of belonging among diasporic 
African communities in Northern England showed that the second generation had variable 
feeling of belonging towards their homeland. The article, which looked into the feeling of 
attachment in both first- and second-generation Sudanese, Somalians, Zimbabweans and 
Kenyans found that they experienced a feeling of ‘plurilocal homes, stretched attachment and 
multiple identities’ (Waite and Cook 2011: 13).  
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Some second-generation Africans felt more comfort and strategic usefulness in their 
original countries during occasionale visits to their homeland. However, a significant number 
were confused and dislocated with more intense negotiations of insider and outsider 
belongings in multicultural United Kingdom. Such feelings left some more isolated and 
struggling to associate with the host country. However, they were more comfortable in their 
‘locally oriented belongings’ which valued some elements of their identity i.e. religious 
identifications (Waite and Cook 2011: 13).   
Similarly, second-generation Kurdish refugees who returned from different European 
cities had a contested sense of attachment. Although some would say they still belong to their 
root country Kurdistan, most had confused or disputed feelings. For the majority a feeling of 
dual belonging strongly existed. Moreover, some had no attachment to either host or original 
country and did not have a desire to make a choice between the two. Furthermore, for some it 
was very hard to declare where home is and this created an internal conflict which was 
impossible to solve. This mixed feeling of belonging to home and host nations was shared 
between second-generation refugees in this study and other research. This is especially the 
case for those immigrants born, raised and living in Europe, who sometimes expressed a 
confused attachment and a difficulty to identify an intense belonging to one location or 
another. For others, this caused them to reject the need for a distinctive attachment.  
On the other hand, second generation Afghan refugees behaved like their Kurdish 
peers who lived in Europe in exile. According to an article published in 2007, second 
generation Afghans living in the United Kingdom and Germany were confused about their 
belonging. (Braakman & Shlemkhoff 2007). Younger refugees clashed with their parents 
when identifying their own culture and inheriting the culture of their parents. Younger 
Afghans built wider network with their local and national community, compared to older 
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members of their family, as they tried to come to terms with their identity and seek a sense of 
belonging. (Braakman & Shlemkhoff 2007).   
Furthermore, similar to some of my participants living in Europe, Tamil second-
generation refugees who lived in Switzerland have developed a dual sense of belonging (Hess 
& Korff 2014). Most of them have witnessed a brutal civil war in Northern Sri-Lanka which 
has lasted for decades. This has pushed young Tamils to acknowledge their roots and to build 
up a strong connection with both host and local societies, as they become political activists in 
exile (Hess & Korff 2014). The similarity between the participants of this compelling study 
and my study is possibly related to a similar historical and political background. Both Kurds 
and Tamils have been struggling for decades for self-rule, autonomy and self-determination. 
Years of fighting and blood shed between Tamils and Sri-Lankans on one side and Kurds 
with Iraq, Iran, and Turkey on the other side, has had a similar impact on the way of thinking 
and behaviour of second-generation refugees of these two nations and on their feeling 
towards both host and original land.  
Finally, the construction of homeland for second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning to 
the KRG was through cultural memory (e.g. lived experiences in Kurdistan, childhood 
experiences in Kurdistan and visits to Kurdistan), transnationalism and communicative 
memory (stories from family and relations in Kurdistan). In relation to the notions of home 
and belonging, four themes were identified concerning the identity of second-generation Iraqi 
Kurds returning to the KRG region. First, some identified as Kurdish by choice. Second, 
others had mixed/double identities combining Kurdish identity and that of their country of 
settlement. Third, there were those that did not identify as Kurdish and equally did not point 
to any non-territory- or territory-based identity. The fourth theme associated with identity 
was perhaps the most interesting result of this research. Some returnees stated that their 
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identities were personal and they had no affiliation to place or language. Instead their identity 
was personal to them and they had the freedom to sustain or alter it at will.  
Finally, the results of this study underscore the notion that home, belonging and 
identity have strong influences on each other, although identity was more contained to the 
self than to other factors such as place or heritage.  
It should be pointed out that the background and history of Kurdish migrants present a 
specific dynamic to home-making processes. I have claimed that second-generation Iraqi 
Kurds returnees’ life story experience vary dramatically from the first generations’ 
experiences. Another significant finding is that, according to my participants, no country can 
be said to give everything Iraqi Kurdish returnees desire, in the sense of a home which meets 
all of their social, cultural and economic needs, even if some countries come closer to this 
ideal than others. However, it is possible to say that the diaspora consists of multiple 
‘homes’: there is the original homeland of Kurdistan which for some people no longer 
represents home, but has instead become the place of origin; there is home in the sense of a 
place which fulfils a person's practical needs such as education or a place to work; there is 
also home in the sense of a preferred final destination whether it be the original homeland of 
Kurdistan or another country; and there is home in the sense of a place whose culture best 
expresses Kurdish culture. Having said this, it is also clear that there is no simple link 
between Kurdish culture and one particular homeland for Kurds in exile.  
 
6.3 Boundaries of identity for second-generation Iraqi Kurd returnees 
“Identity is a concept that features especially in return migration, combining the individual or 
private world with the collective space of cultural forms and social relations in the 
homeland(s). Identity is a product of self-consciousness and self-reflection; of both emotional 
and rational processes; the articulation and comprehension of a vision of both personal and 
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social history that motivates the homeland return. Therefore, we are confronted with 
identities, the imaginings of self in 'home-host' worlds of action” (Christou 2002).  
Identity has been figured prominently throughout the thesis and has been classified 
into typology (schema of identification) and to explain how the narratives (schema of 
narration) express the ‘who I am’ in the ‘where I am’ Moreover, narratives of the 'there' 
(diaspora), the 'here' (KRG) and the ‘here and there’ illustrate both the ‘personal plan of 
action’ and the third space of hominess where trans hybrid identities are formed. 
Investigating identity construction among second-generation Iraqi Kurdish returnees reveals 
their construction of identity and belonging and its relationship to their parents’ ‘homeland’ 
in diaspora. In this study almost half of my candidates still had connections to the KRG 
region and they expressed this connection through their identity options, their relationship to 
the parents’ homeland and their loyalty to the Kurdish community. Hence, they identified 
themselves as purely being Kurds. Almost all of those who perceived their origins in this way 
lived and were brought up in neighbouring countries, mainly the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Kurdish second-generation refugees have strongly maintained their identity despite Iran’s 
refusal to recognize this identity on either Iran or Iraq’s side.  
 In contrast to my research, Phinney and colleagues concluded that refugees 
maintained their ethnic identity when the hosting community accepted diversity and 
respected pluralism. While, they rejected their distinctiveness, adapted to the host nation 
identity showed more solidarity to the nation when the host society had a negative attitude or 
hostility against immigrants (Phinney et al. 2001). This means, that unlike Phinney’s study, 
Iraqi Kurd second generation returnees insisted on their identity despite getting refused by the 
host nation in Iran, while other refugees according to Phinney surrendered their identity and 
accepted the host nation’s identity when the host country refused them or had negative 
attitude.  
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This study Phinney study proposes that maintaining or surrendering ethnic identity to 
host nation identity is determined by many factors.  
It suggests that identity is based on the interaction between the attitude and the 
characteristic of the immigrants and the behaviour of the receiving society. Furthermore, the 
article suggested that the choice of identity by refugees is influenced by the interaction 
between specific characteristics of certain immigrant groups and the local setting, including 
the legislation and immigration policies adopted by the host country. Furthermore, the study 
explained the impact of different policies of host nations on various immigrant groups in 
Europe and their choice of identity. For example, the housing dispersal approach of the 
Finnish government and the message conveyed by the government that immigrants should act 
like the local people had a negative impact and enhanced separation between refugees and 
local people in Finland. In contrast, the Dutch government’s immigrant legislation which 
focused on more integration, allowed more cultural practice, offered better health and 
educational services and language lessons for refugees had a very positive effect on the 
Turkish refugee community especially in deciding their identity (Phinney et al. 2001).  
Similar findings were illustrated by Crul and Schneider (2010), who found a robust 
relationship between commitment to a particular identity and the behavior of the receiving 
community and government.   
A key finding of my research is that, while the expression of identity among second-
generation Kurdish refugees living in Europe matched the findings of Phinney and colleagues 
(2001) and Crul and Schneider (2010), in that they either felt more Kurdish or showed a 
combined identity, those exiled in Iran were more determined to say that they belonged to 
Kurdistan and have a single identity despite experiencing hostility and sometimes even a 
refusal to acknowledge their original identity in the host country.  
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When the host community was more welcoming and showed hospitality, Kurdish 
second-generation immigrants manifested their identity in the same way as other young 
immigrants.  
In contrast, those younger immigrants born or raised in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and felt a reluctance from local community to let them maintain their original identity and as 
a result they were more determined to keep the Kurdish identity.  
This important outcome of this research might be explained by the personality of 
resistance Kurds have developed over years of fighting for freedom and independence from 
Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. These findings will contribute towards a better understanding of 
the particularities of young Kurdish immigrants’ lives in the diaspora, which might stimulate 
other researchers to conduct further investigation into this subject. Moreover, further studies 
might be required to explore the different feelings of belonging and identity between second-
generation Kurdish returnees from different neighbouring countries, also comparing them 
with returnees from variable location in Europe. Second-generation Iraqi Kurds have been 
building their own communication to their parents’ homeland through regular phone calls and 
contacts with friends and family member, the internet and visits to the KRG region. Without 
these contacts, their identity construction would be limited to the host society context with 
imagined links to the KRG region. 
This means, that most second-generation Iraqi returnees are attached physically and 
emotionally to more than one country. These findings propose that researchers should be 
more aware of the meanings associated with cross-border ties not only among the first 
generation, but also the second generation. On the other hand, for those second-generation 
Kurdish refugees who lived in Europe and participated in this research, they would mostly 
recognize or identify themselves as being Kurdish, while some have opted to say that they 
possess or own personal or dual identity.   
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A mixture feeling or even a confusing picture which is not uncommon among 
refugees in the exile. Interestingly, almost all these second generation Iraqi Kurds expressed 
themselves this way lived in European cities.  
Similarly, in Waite and Cook’s study of young African refugees who lived in the 
United Kingdom, they indicated a mixed feeling of identity. Some of them expressed a 
complex argument to decide where are they from (Waite and Cook 2011). According to this 
study, younger refugees were calling themselves British Somali or British Zimbabwean or 
sometimes refusing to put themselves in a certain box. A Sudanese boy said that he is from 
Sudan because he originated from there, however he is British because he is born here and 
carries a multiple identity (Waite and Cook 2011). In this study, some disclosed that they are 
on a continuous search for the right identity and yet they cannot find it. In the same way, 
second-generation Turks in Germany had equivalent emotions towards both original and host 
country. Personal or dual identity was more evident in those with higher education and those 
with more powerful networks and connections within the host community (Kilinc 2014). 
Similarly, in my study interviewees expressed difficulty in identifying themselves. 
Some had stronger feeling towards the host country on difficult days back in Kurdistan, 
sometimes even re-thinking whether or not they have made the right decision in returning. 
Equally, they had a stronger commitment to their original identity when they were back in 
Europe for a visit. This study also showed a similar understanding about identity between 
second-generation Kurdish refugees and their peers from different minorities in European 
Countries.  
 Moreover, second generation Maghrebi (Moroccan) refugees who lived in France 
had difficulty in differentiating between their ethnic or original identity and their national 
one. Young Maghrebis had identical attachment to both the Maghreb and French 
communities.  
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Similarly, they had dual or multiple identities and powerful connections to French 
society. The contributors of this study were not obliged to choose between the two identities 
and were happier to see themselves as French as well as Maghrebi (Duchkovska 2015).  
Furthermore, according to the study the second-generation immigrants (or as they 
called in France enfants d’ immigres – children of immigrants, or jeunes immigres – young 
immigrants) expressed their love of France. Also, they wanted to separate themselves from 
the immigration of their parents and adapt to the culture of the host society or practise a dual 
culture. Finally, this group of interviewees mentioned that religion had lately been a factor of 
exclusion in the French community, even for those who declared themselves a spiritual 
person who is not practicing Islam or for those who practiced the religion. However, despite 
this they still had a strong connection to France and a powerful attachment to French identity.   
Meanwhile, Toivanen’s study about Negotiating Home and Belonging Young Kurds 
in Finland investigating the belonging and identity of Kurdish refugees aged between 19 and 
28 living in Finland, concluded that patriotic feeling among Kurds was very dominant. 
Furthermore, the research revealed that these young refugees had an extreme belonging to 
Kurdistan, described it as homeland and identified themselves as Kurd rather than Finnish 
(Toivanen 2014).  
Similarly, Eliassi (2010) who interviewed Kurdish second-generation refugees in Sweden 
revealed that, like young Tamils (Hess & Korff 2014), the interviewees had strong national-
Kurdish feeling, kept powerful connections with their roots and were active in politics 
(Toivanen 2014). Toivanen believes that this belonging to the diaspora community became 
prominent as a result of specific historical and political developments in the Middle East. She 
explains that this strong national feeling among Kurds emerged from the division of 
Kurdistan between four nation-states and the continuous struggle for more self-determination 
and independence (2014).  
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A similar reason was echoed in the strong attachment second-generation Kurdish refugees 
feel with their stateless diaspora. In contrast to my study, the second-generation refugees 
from South Sudan, in the Ajith study about Identity & Belonging among the First & Second 
Generation of South Sudanese in London, which has a similar history to Kurdistan having 
fought for independence from Sudan since 1955, identified themselves as more British than 
Sudanese (Ajith2012).  
In summary, this research has shown that the Kurdish second generation have retained 
or kept their own identity. They are proud of being Kurdish. However, most of those who 
were in exile in European cities had a feeling of dual identity or more interestingly had a 
difficulty in deciding to choose one identity. A significant outcome of this research is that  
most of the interviewees who stayed in Europe retained what they explained as a personal 
identity and refused to choose between the identity of residence or origin. Furthermore, un-
expectedly those who lived in nearby countries, were very determined to recognize 
themselves as being Kurdish. All of this is possibly explained by the historical and political 
history of the nation.  
 
6.4 Social capital and cultural capital theory 
There are aspects of the idea of social capital which are helpful when we consider the 
circumstances of people like those who returned to Iraq. The directionality and continuity of 
migration flows benefit the original sending society because the human, economic and social 
capital accumulated by migrants in their host country is then fed back into the original 
sending area following return migration (Reynolds 2008). My research shows that some 
people who return to Kurdistan have been brought up in Europe and possess skills, money 
and social connections that their parents never had, which can help them to advance their 
lives in Kurdistan.  
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If they go back to Kurdistan with a degree in engineering, for example, but at the same time 
their social capital and networks connects them to Berlin or Stockholm or London, this may 
prompt contradictory feelings. This is similar to Reynolds 2008 research about Caribbean 
second-generation returnees from UK, for whom family and kinship relationships acted as a 
key vehicle sustaining their emotional, cultural and spiritual ties to the region. These family 
and kinship relationship also later acted as an important social capital resource in facilitating 
their return ‘home’ (Reynolds 2008:26). 
Second-generation Iraqi Kurds returning to their homeland from diaspora countries 
can be seen as essential for rebuilding community from the grassroots level after the long-
lasting conflict during the Ba’ath regime in Iraq. Despite levels of education, participants in 
this research outlined that they had obtained different skills, knowledge and new ideas while 
living in diaspora countries. Many second-generation Iraqi-Kurdish returnees, with all their 
experience, knowledge and ideas gained from diaspora countries, can play an important role 
in the reconstruction of their homeland at individual, family and community levels, as well as 
at the broader national level. 
For many second-generation Iraqi Kurds who have been interviewed for my research, 
‘home is one’s ancestors’ place of origin, where all are Kurds, where one can feel a sense of 
psychological freedom, and where one’s legal rights should be assured as honourable citizens 
of the nation – was of crucial importance to many of them (Saito 2007). Nevertheless, 
returning home for second generation Iraqi Kurds to the KRG region does not necessarily 
mean ‘return’, as the majority were born or have grown up without ever actually having 
experiencing life in the KRG. Many also have a profound attachment to the host country in 
which they grew up – the place that they are most familiar with. In this way, some of the 
respondents in this study were highly assimilated into their host societies.  
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The decision by second generation Iraqi Kurds to return ‘home’ is made amid a 
complex set of push and pull factors, which entail significant psychological stresses and 
emotional struggles. 
Social capital can give people opportunities, but it can also reinvent their relationships 
with people somewhere else. For many countries which experience major out-migration 
movements at some point in their history, returning migrants or refugees may have a role to 
play in processes of (economic) development, peace building and reconstruction.  
A significant proportion of the Iraqi Kurdish refugee population, who spent most of 
their life in diaspora communities, produce large and notable flows of financial and human 
capital, networks of social capital, knowledge and technology, and political support when 
they decide to return back to their homeland.  
The investment and reproduction of cultural capital serve to include or marginalize 
individuals in society, which in turn leads to unequal social and economic rewards. The Iraqi 
Kurdish second generation who have gained academic qualifications have a different 
experience when they return back compared to those who have not. The cultural capital of the 
parents will also have a significant influence on the second generation in their daily life and 
in their performance at school. When the Iraqi Kurdish second generation decide to return 
they bring social and cultural capital that may change their living standards and life 
orientations and may significantly alter the economic prospects of a community and 
eventually lead to social transformations at large.  
Less-educated migrants and those who work in low skilled jobs in host countries are 
unable to bring skills that can be utilized for business startups in their home countries, as has 
been shown by McCormic and Wahba (2001) for illiterate Egyptian returnees, and Mahmood 
(1995) for less-educated Bangladeshi returnees. On the other hand, high-educated migrants 
accumulate savings and economic capital in the host countries, which they usually invest in 
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small business start ups upon their return. Iraqi Kurdish refugees’ family and social-networks 
are key sources of social capital, which is often maximized when a family group is welcomed 




6.5!What can be learned from this research on Iraqi Kurdish second-
generation returnees?  
Although my research adds significant empirical data to the growing literature on second-
generation and ancestral return, being the first study of its kind focusing on second-
generation Iraqi Kurdish returnees, it also offers challenges to some of the main findings on 
second-generation return so far. Return migration is mainly seen as a first-generation 
phenomenon. Until recently, research on the second generation has focussed on integration or 
assimilation into the ‘host’ society, whilst relatively little was written about the connection 
(and potential ‘return’) to the ‘homeland’. !
 
This is now increasingly being rectified by a rapid increase in studies on the 
transnational lives and the ‘return’ of the second generation, many of which have been cited 
throughout this thesis. Yet, the migrants’ experiences are mainly examined within, or 
weighted against, the cultural and national integrity (traditionally) held by the societies they 
inhabit, and hence often remain placed along the marginality vs. assimilation continuum. The 
potential new social spaces and relations that second-generation returnees form beyond such 
fixed cultural and ethnic boundaries, however, and the role of such spaces in creating a sense 
of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ in the parental homeland, have received little attention. Apart from 
some work on Caribbean return migrants, these studies appear to mainly talk about the 
problems and difficulties involved with the process of return.  
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Usually, any group of migrants comes with its unique particularities and historical 
characteristics, and it is important to acknowledge the regional context, and the larger social 
and cultural context of the nation state within which experiences are formed.  
Certain limitations of this study also need to be acknowledged; due to time 
constraints, there are a number of issues that have been left without adequate analysis. This 
includes insufficient consideration of the gender dimension of the issue that takes into 
account. Although the qualitative part of this research is only a small element of the whole 
study, it is still important to recognise that my sample is not representative and that the 
conclusions cannot be generalized due to these limitations. 
My main concern when embarking on this study has been the scarcity of research that 
concentrates primarily on the second-generation without lumping this group together with the 
1.5-generation. 
By indicating the gaps in current research on Diasporas, and by presenting findings from 
my specific study on the second-generation Iraqi Kurd returnees, I can only be hopeful, that 
my study has offered some insight into second-generation Iraqi Kurdish returnees and that 
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